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THE U.S. CRIMINAL-IMMIGRATION CONVERGENCE AND ITS
POSSIBLE UNDOING

Allegra M. McLeod*
ABSTRACT

The intensifying convergence of U.S. criminal law and immigration law poses
fundamental structural problems. This convergence-which manifests in the
criminal prosecution of immigration law violators, in deportation of criminal law
violators, and in a growing immigration enforcement and detention apparatusdistorts criminal law incentives and drains enforcement resources, misguides
immigration regulation, and undermines efforts to implement alternative immigration regulatory frameworks. This Article offers an account, informed by social
psychological and literary theory, of why this convergence persists notwithstanding these problems, as well as how the convergence (and inherently associated
problems) might be undone. The U.S. criminal-immigration convergence holds
powerful sway, despite the fact that it does much harm and relatively little good,
because it serves to relieve pervasive cognitive dissonance in the United States
regarding immigration, specifically in relation to economic and racial concerns.
Drawing on previously unexamined Immigration and Customs Enforcement memoranda, legislative history, and empirical studies of criminal-immigration enforcement, this Article critically engages the primary justifications of the convergence
in immigration scholarship and policy discourse. Finally, it assesses two approaches to undoing the convergence.
TABLE oF CoNTENTS

INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

I.

U.S. CRIMINAL-IMMIGRATION CONVERGENCE. .
Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1. Institutional Resemblance and Overlap . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Criminal Law as Immigration Proxy . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3. Criminal-Immigration Prosecutions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

ASCENDANCY OF THE

.

A.

.
.
.
.

106
112
113
113
113
114

* Associate Professor, Georgetown University Law Center. J.D., Yale Law School, 2006; Ph.D., Stanford
University, 2009. In writing this Article, I benefitted from the insightful comments and suggestions of David Cole,
Josh Cohen, Matt Dimick, Ingrid Eagly, Dyan Ferraris, Doug Keller, Gregory Klass, Derin McLeod, Kieran
Oberman, Judith Resnik, Andrew Schoenholtz, David Sklansky, Abbe Smith, Jayashri Srikintiah, Juliet Stumpf,
Manuel Vargas, Robin West, the editors of the American Criminal Law Review, and participants in the Emerging
Immigration Law Scholars Conference at American University, the Georgetown Law Fellows Workshop, and the
Criminal-Immigration Program at the American Studies Association Meeting in San Antonio.© 2012 Allegra M.
McLeod.
105

106

....
....
....
....
....

115
115
115
121
123

CONVERGENCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .

125

CASUALTIES OF THE U.S. CRIMINAL-IMMIGRATION CONVERGENCE . . . .

130
130

B.

II.
III.

B.

C.

D.

...
...
...
...
...

..
..
..
..
..

...
...
...
...
...

Concern for Membership ..........................
I. Lawfully Present Persons ......................
2. Unauthorized Immigrants ......................
Misguiding Crime Control . ........................
1. Distorting Crime Control . ......................
2. Unnecessary Prosecutions . .....................
3. Diverting Resources to Minor Crimes . .............
4. Diverting Resources to Demographic with Low Crime
Rate ......................................
Institutional Pathologies ..........................
Considering Objections ...........................

PERSISTENCE OF THE

A.

B.
V.

4. Immigration as Criminal Law Adjunct . .
Context. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1. Changes in U.S. Immigration Law . . . . .
2. Institutional Repurposing . . . . . . . . . . .
3. Conceptual Shift . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

JUSTIFICATIONS OF THE U.S. CRIMINAL-IMMIGRATION

A.

IV.

[Vol. 49: 105

AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

u.s. CRIMINAL-IMMIGRATION CONVERGENCE .. .

Immigration Cognitive Dissonance . ..................
1. Cognitive Dissonance Theory ...................
2. Two Forms of Immigration Cognitive Dissonance . ....
Dissonance Deferred . ............................

.
.
.
.

UNDOING THE U.S. CRIMINAL-IMMIGRATION CONVERGENCE . . . . . . . .

A.
B.

A Procedural Fix? . .............................. .
Centering Development Economics and Human Rights .... .
I. Economic Dissonance, Immigration, and Development ..
2. Racial Dissonance, Immigration, and Human Rights . ...

CONCLUSION

132
143
145
146
147
148
150
151
153
156
157
157
158
164
168
168
173
174
177
178

INTRODUCTION

Jose Angel Carachuri-Rosendo, a lawful permanent resident who has lived in the
United States since he was five years old, faced deportation under federal law after
he committed two misdemeanor drug possession offenses in Texas. For the first,
possession of less than two ounces of marijuana, he received 20 days in jail. For
the second, possession without a prescription of one tablet of a common antianxiety medication, he received 10 days in jail. After this second offense, the Federal
Government initiated removal proceedings against him. 1

I. Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 2577,2580 (2010).
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Jose Padilla, a native of Honduras, has been a lawful permanent resident of the
United States for more than 40 years. Padilla served this nation with honor as a
member of the U.S. Armed Forces during the Vietnam War. He now faces
deportation after pleading guilty to the transportation of a large amount of
marijuana in his tractor-trailer in the Commonwealth of Kentucky. 2
It is hard to think of any public policy that is less controversial than the removal
of criminal aliens. 3
In courtrooms, jails, and police stations across the United States, criminal law
and immigration law converge with unprecedented intensity. 4 Between 1990 and
2010, immigration offenses became the most common federally prosecuted crimes
in the United States. 5 In a separate manifestation of the convergence of criminal
and immigration law, since 1997, when the executive branch began to enforce
major new criminal-immigration legislation, 6 approximately one million immigrants have been deported or removed7 from the United States as a consequence of
a criminal conviction. 8 Approximately twenty percent of those deported due to a
2. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1477 (2010).
3. Peter H. Schuck & John Williams, Removing Criminal Aliens: The Pitfalls and Promises of Federalism, 22
HARV. J.L. & Pus. PoL'Y 367,372 (1999).
4. During the late twentieth century, an immigration law enforcement framework tied to criminal law eclipsed
other enforcement approaches. See, e.g., Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
(IIRIRA), Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 3, 6, 7, 8, 13, 16,
26, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47,48 U.S.C.); see also Jennifer M. Chac6n, Managing Migration
Through Crime, 109 CoLUM. L. REv. 135 (2009) [hereinafter Chac6n, Managing Migration] (exploring increased
prosecutions of migration-related violations); Daniel Kanstroom, Criminalizing the Undocumented: Ironic
Boundaries of the Post-September 11th "Pale of Law", 29 N.C. J. lm't. L. & CoM. REG. 639, 640 (2004)
[hereinafter Kanstroom, Criminalizing the Undocumented]; Stephen H. Legomsky, The New Path of Immigration
Law: Asymmetric Incorporation of Criminal Justice Norms, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 469,471-72 (2007); Teresa
A. Miller, Citizenship & Severity: Recent Immigration Reforms and the New Penology, 17 GEO. IMM!G. L.J. 611,
619-20 (2003). This Article focuses on the use of criminal law as an immigration law enforcement framework,
rather than on the broader range of regulatory concerns that factor in admissions decisions, such as family ties,
professional skills, and personal wealth.
5. See, e.g., Jennifer M. Chac6n, A Diversion ofAttention? Immigration Courts and the Adjudication of Fourth
and Fifth Amendment Rights, 59 DuKE L.J. 1563, 1565 (20 10) [hereinafter Chac6n, A Diversion?].
6. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214,
at tit. IV; see also IIRIRA.
7. "Removal" is the statutory term generally used in the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA") to describe
what is understood in common parlance as deportation. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (2006).
8. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, FORCED APART (BY THE NUMBERS) 2-3 (2009) [hereinafter FORCED APART (BY
THE NUMBERS)] (reporting 897,099 noncitizens were deported from the United States on criminal grounds
between 1997 and 2007). This is the best available data on deportations from the United States on criminal
grounds during this period, though it is incomplete. See id. at 2. Different government sources provide conflicting
data, and the government's own records lack accurate data on the criminal bases for removal and immigration
statuses for a considerable portion of cases. See id. at 3; see also U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT
(ICE), ICE FISCAL YEAR 2008 ANNUAL REPORT 3 (2008) (reporting 221,085 charging documents were issued to
noncitizens in criminal custody in FY 2008); Memorandum from James M. Chaparro, ICE-DRO Dir., to Field
Office Dirs. & Deputy Field Office Dirs. (Feb. 22, 2010) [hereinafter Chaparro Memorandum] (on file with
author) (reporting that from October 2009 to February 2010, ICE removed 56,853 "criminal aliens").
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criminal offense were in the country lawfully, many having lived in the United
States for decades; most of the relevant violations involved only minor, nonviolent crimes. 9 Noting this increasing integration of U.S. criminal and immigration law, the U.S. Supreme Court in Padilla v. Kentucky 10 remarked that:
The landscape of federal immigration law has changed dramatically ....
While once there was only a narrow class of deportable [criminal] offenses and
judges wielded broad discretionary authority to prevent deportation, immigration reforms over time have expanded the class of deportable offenses and
limited the authority of judges to alleviate the harsh consequences of deportation. The "drastic measure" of deportation ... is now virtually inevitable for a
vast number of noncitizens convicted of crimes. 11

This far-reaching interpretation of criminal and immigration law-the de facto
use of criminal law as an immigration regulatory proxy-raises a set of fundamental questions: Does this convergence embody a desirable framework for immigration regulation? How well does criminal law capture relevant characteristics
signaling un-belonging or undesirability? Moreover, what does criminalimmigration enforcement portend for criminal law administration? And why has
immigration enforcement come to rely so heavily on criminal law as a proxy
enforcement regime? 12
Although at first blush, immigration enforcement focused on "criminal aliens" 13
may seem eminently reasonable-after all, criminal law presumably identifies
relatively undesirable noncitizens engaged in bad (i.e. criminal) behavior-this
Article challenges that assumption through an account of the failings, persistence

9. See FORCED APART (BY THE NUMBERS), supra note 8, at 2-3. Of those lawfully present who faced removal
due to criminal conviction, seventy-seven percent were convicted of nonviolent crimes. See id. Of the total
population of noncitizens removed on criminal grounds, seventy-two percent faced immigration consequences
due to nonviolent offenses. See id.
10. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1478 (2010) (holding that a noncitizen has a constitutional right
to be advised by criminal defense counsel about potential immigration consequences of a plea).
II. See id. at 1478. The Court also noted that deportation is "intimately related to the criminal process." See id.
at481-82.
12. Conventionally, criminal"law is understood to be concerned with adjudicating guilt subject to procedural
safeguards and pronouncing punishment in light of moral blameworthiness. See, e.g., Gerard E. Lynch, The Role
of Criminal Law in Policing Corporate Misconduct, 60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 23,43-44 (1997) (describing
"traditional viewpoint" of the purpose of criminal law). Immigration law is to determine which noncitizens
seeking entry to admit and which of those already admitted to permit to remain and for how long. See, e.g.,
Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and
Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545, 547 (1990). Instead, as U.S. criminal and immigration law have
converged, criminal law has come to function as an immigration screen, seeking both to deter aspiring immigrants
and to sort those already present. See Ingrid V. Eagly, Prosecuting Immigration, 104 Nw. U. L. REv. !281, 1288
(2010).
13. Under U.S. immigration law, an "alien" is "any person not a citizen or national of the United States." 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3) (2006). The term "criminal alien" may refer to any non-U.S. citizen, lawfully or unlawfully
present, who has a recorded criminal violation, whether a minor misdemeanor offense or serious felony. See
Schuck & Williams, supra note 3, at 377.
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and possible undoing of the convergence of U.S. criminal and immigration law.
This Article elucidates the reasons why, contrary to what is commonly thought to
be the case, criminal law serves as a poor immigration regulatory proxy. It then
explores the motivations for the intertwining of U.S. criminal and immigration
enforcement despite profound limitations and associated harms. Finally, it examines available approaches to addressing harms generated by the convergence of
U.S. criminal and immigration law.
Toward these ends, this Article engages the most significant justifications of the
convergence presented in previously unexamined policy directives by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE"), as well as in a small corpus of
immigration law scholarship. Dominant justifications of criminal-immigration
enforcement may be classified in terms of efficient allocation of limited resources,
as proposed by high-ranking ICE officials; 14 in reference to political palatability,
as elaborated by Professor Peter H. Schuck; 15 or on a legal economic theory of
informational advantage, as suggested by Professors Adam B. Cox and Eric A.
Posner. 16 Also implicit in explanations of the wisdom of criminal-immigration
enforcement, though seldom if ever expressly articulated, are a constellation of
ideas about the nature of immigration as a form of trespass or privilege, or as a
contractual relationship 11 subject to retaliatory termination and possibly criminal
punishment in the event a noncitizen becomes subject to criminal law enforcement. 18 A spokesperson for the immigrfition agency put it this way: "If you haven't
become a citizen, you are here as a privilege. And, if you commit a crime, you lose
that privilege." 19 In sum, these ideas-sounding alternately in the register of
efficient resource allocation, political palatability, informational advantage, trespass, contract violation, and punishment-seek to justify criminal law administration as a proxy immigration regulatory regime.

14. See, e.g., Memorandum from John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, to Employees, Civil Immigration Enforcement: Priorities for the Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of Aliens (June 30,
2010) [hereinafter Morton Memorandum] (on file with author) (explaining ICE's emphasis on criminalimmigration enforcement in terms of efficient resource allocation and the promise of criminal law contact as a
proxy for noncitizens' undesirability); see also infra Part II.
15. See generally Schuck & Williams, supra note 3, at 372. While there is significant public hesitation about
deporting noncitizens integrated into U.S. communities as workers and neighbors, there is little resistance to
removing criminal aliens. See infra Part II.
16. See Adam B. Cox & Eric A. Posner, The Second-Order Structure of Immigration Law, 59 STAN. L. REv.
809, 846 (2007); see also infra Parts II-III. But see Hiroshi Motomura, Choosing Immigrants, Making Citizens,
59 STAN. L. REv. 857, 859 (2007) [hereinafter Motomura, Choosing Immigrants] (arguing that Cox and Posner's
model only persuasively applies to unauthorized immigrants and less well to other noncitizens).
17. See, e.g., HIROSHI MOTOMURA, AMERICANS IN WAITING: THE LOST STORY OF IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
IN THE UNITED STATES 15-16 (2006) (exploring conception of immigration as analogous to contract formation).
18. Criminal-immigration enforcement, on a trespass account, respo!lds to an ongoing intrusion-a wrongful
entry to the United States-the wrongfulness of which is exacerbated by criminal conduct. For lawful residents,
the trespass account morphs into a conception of immigration as a privilege to be revoked at will. See infra Part II.
19. See Shonda Swilley, Deported to Cambodia: A Lave Story, SACRAMENTO NEWS & REV. (Dec. 12, 2002),
http://www. newsreview.com/sacramen to/deported-to-cambodia-a-love-story/content?oid =13780.
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This Article challenges these justificatory accounts, demonstrating that the
convergence of U.S. criminal and immigration law in action-as embodied in U.S.
government practice and largely embraced in U.S. public discourse--does not
represent a defensible immigration law enforcement approach. To the contrary, this
convergence has brought about devastating effects: misapprehending the range of
complex legal and social concerns to be managed in the immigration and criminal
law contexts; harming U.S. citizens, lawful residents, refugees, and undocumented
persons alike; and undermining efforts to implement alternative immigration
regulatory frameworks.
So again, the question: Why has the convergence of U.S. criminal and immigration enforcement effectively captured the field of immigration law enforcement
when it so poorly addresses immigration regulatory concerns and undermines
criminal law enforcement? In contrast to existing explanatory accounts regarding
the convergence of U.S. criminal and immigration law, this Article contends that
this capture has little to do with efficient resource allocation or informational
advantage-in fact, the analysis to follow will demonstrate that criminal law
contact offers information often inapposite to immigration regulatory decisionmaking-and much to do with the ambivalent social, political, and psychological
place of immigration in the U.S. national imagination. 20
In short, the core argument of the analysis to follow is that the convergence of
U.S. criminal and immigration enforcement has persisted, despite the fact that it
does much harm and relatively little good, because it serves to alleviate two forms
of pervasive cognitive dissonance in the United States regarding immigration and
immigrants-one form of dissonance involves economic unease, and the other,
racial anxiety. 21 Drawing on a stock crime narrative framework developed originally in the context of imaginative literature, criminal-immigration enforcement
purports to direct enforcement efforts only towards criminal wrongdoers, not
implicating those good, hardworking immigrants upon whom U.S. citizens economically depend, and not targeting any particular demographic on the basis of
race. This framework features prominently concepts of criminal wrongdoing,
trespass, and contract violation-central implicit themes in official justifications of
criminal-immigration enforcement-and it largely elides the complex regulatory
concerns and competing interests at stake in the immigration context. 22

20. Though the reasons for .the attraction of criminal law frameworks in immigration law and elsewhere
remain little understood, some immigration scholars have begun to consider related matters. See Daniel
Kanstroom, Deportation, Social Control, and Punishment: Some Thoughts About Why Hard Laws Make Bad
Cases, 113 HARV. L. REv. 1889, 1892 (2000) [hereinafter Kanstroom, Deportation] ("Deportation policy ...
has aimed increasingly at permanently 'cleansing' ... society of those with undesirable qualities, especially
criminal behavior."); Miller, supra note 4; Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and
Sovereign Power, 56 AM. U. L. REv. 367, 396 (2006) (elaborating implications of "membership theory" for
immigration law).
21. See LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNffiVE DISSONANCE ( 1957); see also infra Part IV.
22. See infra Part IV.
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A subsequent and related argument the Article pursues is that to undo or even to
substantially mitigate the harms produced by criminal-immigration enforcement
will require a shift in this crime-centered conceptual framework, not primarily a
revolution in rights-protective procedures analogous to that which occurred in the
criminal realm. The latter procedural approach is the one most widely embraced in
the immigration law literature and by immigrants' rights advocates to date. This
Article begins to sketch a different approach to undoing the intertwining of U.S.
criminal and immigration law enforcement-an approach not necessarily at odds
with procedural reform advocacy, but a critical and neglected supplement to it.
Proceeding from the theoretical account the Article introduces, this approach
identifies the conceptual bases of criminal-immigration enforcement and offers
more humane and empirically accurate ways of imagining immigration regulation.
In so doing, this Article makes several contributions to the existing immigration
law and criminal law literatures. A compelling body of immigration law scholarship has identified considerable shortcomings in the prevailing Supreme Court
doctrine addressing criminal-immigration enforcement, and has examined instances of excessive harshness in specific enforcement contexts. 23 But this body of
work lacks an empirically informed normative analysis of how criminal law fails
as an immigration regulatory proxy structurally, and not only as a consequence of
isolated doctrinal, legislative, or enforcement errors that might be corrected
through limited modifications. This Article provides such an analysis. Additionally, this Article offers an explanatory theoretical account-informed by social
psychological and literary theory-that illuminates why fundamentally (notwithstanding its essential failings) U.S. criminal-immigration enforcement holds such
powerful sway. Finally, in assessing approaches to undoing harms associated with
criminal-immigration enforcement, this Article begins to chart the conceptual
bases of alternative regulatory models that would better manage the complex
concerns at stake in the immigration context.
The Article proceeds in five parts. Part I takes stock briefly of the eclipse of
other immigration enforcement frameworks by a convergence of U.S. criminal and
immigration law-what immigration law scholar Professor Jennifer Chacon has
called in the context of federal criminal-immigration prosecutions, "Managing
Migration Through Crime." 24 Part II considers in more depth, justifications for the
convergence of U.S. criminal and immigration law enforcement. Part III explores
the casualties of the convergence of U.S. criminal and immigration enforcement,
in particular its foundational errors in neglecting the complicated nature of
immigration regulation and of the punishment and control of crime. Synthesizing
the growing body of immigration law scholarship that addresses particular harms

23. See, e.g., Chac6n, Managing Migration, supra note 4; Eagly, supra note 12; Kanstroom, Criminalizing the
Undocumented, supra note 4; Miller, supra note 4; Legomsky, supra note 4.
24. See Chac6n, Managing Migration, supra note 4, at 135.

112

AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49: 105

in specific contexts, Part III demonstrates that considered together, these harms-to
lawful residents and unauthorized immigrants, green-card holders, U.S. citizens,
asylees, refugees, and undocumented persons alike-thoroughly undermine the
existing justifications for this enforcement model. Ultimately, Part III argues that
targeted criminal-immigration enforcement is justifiable, if at all, only if concentrated on the most serious immigrant criminal law breakers and those without
strong claims to U.S. membership. This would be a vastly different regime than the
one currently in place.
Part IV presents a theoretical account of why criminal-immigration enforcement
wields such powerful force given that, as Part III reveals, it does much harm and
relatively little good. Drawing on analyses of the cathartic features of crime
narrative and the theory of cognitive dissonance developed by social psychologist
Leon Festinger, Part IV relates how criminal-immigration enforcement functions
to alleviate simultaneously two forms of pervasive dissonance in the United States
regarding immigration and immigrants?5 Understanding the motivational and
psychological attachment to criminal-immigration enforcement is crucial to envisioning alternatives that might limit associated harms and excesses.
Part V begins to examine alternatives that seek to mitigate the harms of
criminal-immigration enforcement. Part V first suggests why the procedural
approach dominant in the immigration law literature on its own is unlikely to
substantially curtail the convergence of criminal and immigration law enforcement, even as it promises much-needed protection to vulnerable persons. Part V
then explores two attempts tore-conceptualize immigration regulation that address
head-on the dissonance grounding criminal-immigration enforcement: one concentrated on development, and a second focused on human rights. Ultimately, the
Article proposes, only an immigration framework centered on development and
human rights will suffice to undo fully the failures of U.S. criminal-immigration
enforcement, and to shape a more humane and empirically (rather than ideologically) oriented immigration regulatory regime.
I.

ASCENDANCY OF THE

U.S.

CRIMINAL-IMMIGRATION CONVERGENCE

As an initial matter, it is critical to identify what precisely the integration of U.S.
criminal and immigration law entails, how it came into being, and how it operates.
Because these themes are explored elsewhere, I address them only briefly here,
emphasizing matters of particular relevance for the analysis to follow? 6

25. See FESTINGER, supra note 21.
26. See, e.g., Chacon, Managing Migration, supra note 4; Eagly, supra note 12; Miller, supra note 4; Hiroshi
Motomura, Immigration Outside the Law, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 2037, 2087-88 (2008); Juliet Stumpf, Fitting
Punishment, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1683, 1720-26 (2009).
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A. Definition

A hybrid criminal-immigration enforcement system-discussed in this Article
in short-form under the rubric of the "U.S. criminal-immigration convergence"became a dominant framework for immigration enforcement as criminal and
immigration regulatory regimes merged in the following four respects.
1. Institutional Resemblance and Overlap

Immigrants are increasingly processed in civil immigration matters in institutions and by personnel that resemble, and in some instances, directly overlap with
criminal law enforcement.Z7 Immigration enforcement is regularly delegated to
local and state criminal officers.Z 8 The federal immigration agency also crossdesignates immigration officers to serve as criminal prosecutors. 29 Substantive
immigration law has become ever more harsh and punitive. 30 And immigrants are
routinely detained in re-purposed prisons and jails in what has become the largest
detention system in the United States?' In these ways, civil immigration enforcement has come to resemble and overlap with criminal law enforcement, generating
a unified criminal-immigration enforcement system constituted out of shared
personnel, priorities, and resources. 32
2. Criminal Law as Immigration Proxy

Decisions about which immigrants to deport or remove from the United States,
as well as whom to exclude from entry, are increasingly based on criminal law
contact. 33 Even long-term lawful permanent residents who have lived much of
their lives in the United States are subject to immigration detention and deportation
as a consequence of criminal arrest and conviction. 34 Since major immigration
reforms took effect in 1997, ICE and its predecessor agency, the Immigration and
Naturalization Service ("INS") have removed over one million criminal aliens,

27. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 4, at 614-15.
28. See Press Release, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, ICE Announces Standardized 287(g)
Agreements with 67 State and Local Law Enforcement Partners (Oct. 16, 2009), http://www.ice.gov/news/releases/
0910/091016washingtondc.htm.
29. See, e.g., ICE Worksite Enforcement-Up to the Job?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration
Policy & Enforcement of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, !12th Cong. 81 (2011) [hereinafter ICE Worksite
Enforcement] (statement of Kumar Kibble, Deputy Director, ICE); see also Chac6n, supra note 4; Eagly, supra
note 12.
30. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 4, at 613.
31. During 2009, ICE held over 375,000 individuals in immigration detention (mostly in re-purposed prisons
and jails), in over 300 facilities. See U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., IMMIGRATION DETENTION: OVERVIEW AND
RECOMMENDATIONS 2, 6 (2009).
32. See, e.g., Eagly, supra note 12.
33. See, e.g., INA§ 212(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2) (2006) (stating criminal grounds of inadmissibility).
34. See, e.g., INA§ 212(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2).
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classified as such predominately for relatively minor offenses. 35 The annual rate of
deportations based on criminal law contact increased from 1978 in 1986, to over
88,000 in 2004. 36 So criminal law enforcement has increasingly come to trigger
immigration consequences, with criminal law contact serving as a proxy for
un-belonging and undesirability.
3. Criminal-Immigration Prosecutions

Criminal prosecutors routinely process criminally what were previously understood as merely civil regulatory infractions. 37 Immigration prosecutions, the most
common category of federal prosecution, surpass drug and weapon prosecutions,
and all violent crimes. 38 Not only are immigration prosecutions directed at
immigrants apprehended entering the United States, they also target workplacerelated immigration offenses and employers who hire unauthorized immigrants. 39
This shift in the content of federal criminal adjudication toward immigration
offenses has transformed a significant portion of federal criminallitigation,40 such
that it exhibits a more administrative, less formal, and less rights-protective
character. 41 Along with the federal government, states too have sought to criminally prosecute immigration-related offenses. Arizona Senate Bill1070 is only the
most well-known example of such provisions. 42 Other states and municipalities
have similarly passed or introduced legislation seeking to extend state criminal
liability to undocumented immigrants and their associates. 43

35. See supra note 8 (detailing the relevant research on removal).
36. MARY DOUGHERTY, DENISE WILSON & AMY Wu, U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION
STATISTICS, IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS 2004, at 6 & tbl. 4 (2005), http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/
statistics/publications/AnnualReportEnforcement2004.pdf.
37. In a trend that developed over the previous twenty years, in 2009, fifty-five percent of federal criminal
prosecutions involved "immigration crime," defined a~ immigration-related offenses in title 8 of the U.S. Code,
primarily illegal entry and illegal reentry. See Flora v. Rustad, 8 F.2d 335, 337 (8th Cir. 1925) ("It has never been
the policy of this Government to punish criminally aliens who come here in contravention of our immigration
laws. Deportation has been the remedy."); Eagly, supra note 12, at 1282 n.3.
38. New Findings, TRANSACTION RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE (Aug. 24, 2005), http://trac.syr.edu/tracins/
latest/131/ (finding that prosecution of immigration cases surged in the United States).
39. See, e.g., Flores-Figueroa v. United States, 556 U.S. 646 (2009) (considering statutory questions that arose
from the widely publicized mass immigration prosecution of workers at an Iowa meat packing plant who
allegedly used false identification in obtaining jobs); see also Eagly, supra note 12, at 1282; News Release, U.S.
Immigration & Customs Enforcement, San Diego-Area Bakery, Its Owner and Manager, Indicted on Federal
Charges for Hiring Undocumented Workers (Apr. 21, 2010), http://www.ice.gov/news/releases/1004/
100421 sandiego.htm.
40. See, e.g., United States v. Roblero-Solis, 588 F.3d 692, 693 (9th Cir. 2009) (describing transformation in
the federal district courts' criminal docket occasioned by the substantial increase in immigration prosecutions).
41. See generally Chac6n, A Diversion?, supra note 5, at 1567; Miller, supra note 4, at 618; see also Amanda
Bronstad, Federal Courts in Arizona Declare Judicial Emergency, NAT'L L.J. (Jan. 25, 2011).
42. See Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act, S. 1070, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz.
20 I 0), http://www.azleg.gov/legtext/49leg/2r/bills/sb I 070s.pdf.
43. See, e.g., Michael R. Boland, Jr., No Trespassing: The States, the Supremacy Clause, and the Use of
Criminal Trespass Laws to Fight Illegal Immigration, Ill PENN. Sr. L. REv. 481, 483-84, 48~87 (2006) (noting
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4. Immigration as Criminal Law Adjunct
Minor immigration violations increasingly serve as a basis for obtaining results
in the criminal domain that would be unavailable using conventional criminal law
tools. 44 With the threat of immigration sanctions, criminal law enforcement
officers obtain cooperation in federal criminal-particularly terrorism-relatedinvestigations.45 Additionally, where evidence is too thin to successfully bring
criminal prosecutions, law enforcement officers are able to effectuate the detention
(and ultimately physical removal from the United States) of individuals who have
committed minor immigration violations. 46
B. Context

This intertwining of U.S. criminal and immigration enforcement came about in
part due to express changes in U.S. immigration law, but the convergence also
involved institutional repurposing, as the federal immigration agency adopted a
crime control agenda even beyond that expressly mandated by law. Also critical to
the emergence of the criminal-immigration convergence was a broader conceptual
shift in U.S. public discourse that increasingly came to conceive of immigration in
reference to crime control, criminal wrongdoing and punishment.

1. Changes in U.S. Immigration Law
Although U.S. law has "enmeshed criminal convictions and the penalty of
deportation for nearly a century,"47 it was only in the final decades of the twentieth
century that criminal law came to play a central role on a widespread basis in
immigration enforcement. 48 From the late 1700s until the 1880s, individual states

that in New Ipswich, New Hampshire, local law enforcement officers made novel use of a state criminal
trespassing statute to prosecute illegal immigrants); Teresa A. Miller, A New Look at Neo-Liberal Economic
Policies and the Criminalization of Undocumented Migration, 61 SMU L. REv. 171, 180-81 (2008) (examining
Oklahoma and New Hampshire's criminalization of immigration-related offenses).
44. See Nora V. Demleitner, Immigration Threats and Rewards: Effective Low Enforcement Tools in the "War"
on Terrorism?, 51 EMORY L.J. 1059, 1059 (2002) (examining critically the application of immigration law as a
tool of criminal investigations).
45. See David Cole, The New McCarthyism: Repeating History in the War on Terrorism, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. I; 3 (2003) (examining how the U.S. government has relied on immigration "administrative processes" in
terrorism investigations to circumvent "guarantees associated with the criminal process").
46. See id; see also DAVID COLE, ENEMY ALIENS: DOUBLE STANDARDS AND CONSTITUTIONAL FREEDOM IN THE
WAR ON TERROR 22-35 (2003) (describing how noncitizens predominantly from Muslim countries were rounded
up on alleged visa violations and detained for months without charge after 9/11 ).
47. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1481 (2010).
48. The first short-lived federal integration of U.S. criminal and immigration regulation occurred in 1798 with
the Aliens Act, which made it a crime to return to the United States after having been "removed or sent out ...
by the President." Alien Act of June 25, 1798, ch. 58, § 2, I Stat. 570, 571. This provision was apparently never
used and was allowed to sunset after two years. /d.; see Doug Keller, Re-thinking Illegal Entry and Re-Entry
(working paper on file with author). Subsequently enacted statutes punished illegal entry and subjected to
exclusion or deportation noncitizens with criminal convictions, but these provisions did not form a central part of
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sought to restrict the entry of convicts, poor people, those with contagious
diseases, and persons of African descent as well as Asians. 49 Early convict
exclusions aimed principally to prevent other countries from sending prisoners to
the United States, and did not serve to facilitate criminal prosecution of unauthorized entry or deportation on account of post-entry conduct. 50 In 1882, Congress
passed the Chinese Exclusion Act, 51 which adopted an immigration enforcement
model that operated on explicitly racial grounds, as the Act's name suggests. 52
Also in 1882, Congress enacted legislation excluding from the United States
convicts and persons likely to become public charges. 53 Ultimately this list of
excludable54 persons expanded to encompass persons with "loathsome or dangerous contagious diseases," prostitutes, polygamists, and anarchists, largely mirroring earlier state immigration restrictions. 55 Subsequent immigration legislation
expanded to permit the deportation of noncitizens convicted of "crime[s] or
misdemeanor[s] involving moral turpitude." 56 For all practical purposes, however,
those who managed to remain in the United States for longer than a few years were
immune from deportation as the law contained statutes of limitations on deportations.57 Moreover, these early statutory interconnections of criminal and immigra-

U.S. immigration enforcement; by contrast, ten significant pieces of legislation since 1986 include provisions
embodying a criminal-immigration enforcement approach. See Criminal Aliens Identification (CAl), Pub. L. No.
105-141, Ill Stat. 2647 (1997); AEDPA, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996); Immigration and
Nationality Technical Corrections Act of 1994 (INCTA), Pub. L. No. 103-416, 108 Stat. 4305; Violent Crime
Control and Law Enforcement Act (VCCA) of 1994, Pub. L. No. I 03-322, 108 Stat. 1796; Miscellaneous and
Technical Immigration and Naturalization Amendments of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-232, lOS Stat. 1733;
Immigration Act of 1990 (IMMACT90), Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978; Anti-Drug Abuse (ADA) Act of
1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181; Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), Pub. L. No.
99-603, 100 Stat. 3359; Anti-Drug Abuse Act (ADA) of 1986 (ADA of 1986), Pub. L. No. 99-570, I 00 Stat. 3207.
49. See Gerald L. Neuman, The Lost Century of American Immigration Law ( 1776-1875), 93 CoLUM. L. REv.
1833, 1841-84 (1993).
SO. See id. at 1841-46. There is debate over whether these early restrictions operated to any effect, with some
scholars suggesting, as a matter of fact, that the U.S. borders were relatively open for much of the nineteenth
century. See, e.g., Mae M. Ngai, Response to Joseph Carens' The Case for Amnesty, in IMMIGRANTS AND THE
RIGHT TO STAY 57 (2010) [hereinafter Ngai, Response].
S I. Chinese Exclusion Act, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58 (1882) (repealed 1943).
52. Ngai, Response, supra note SO, at 57.
53. See, e.g., Immigration Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 141, § S, 18 Stat. 477-78 (seeking to bar the immigration of
prostitutes).
54. See Ngai, Response, supra note SO, at 58.
55. See id.; see also Neuman, supra note 49, at 1897-98.
56. Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 551, §§ 7, 10, 11, 26 Stat. 1084, 1085-86. Congress reenacted the provision
excluding noncitizens convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude in 1903, 1907, and 1917, and expanded the
statute to include exclusion or deportation of a noncitizen who has been "convicted" of or who "admits" having
committed an offense involving moral turpitude. See Immigration Act, ch. 29, § 3, 39 Stat. 889, 875-78 (1917);
Act of Mar. 3, 1903, ch. 1012, § 2, 32 Stat. 1213, 1214; Act of Feb. 20, 1907, ch. 1134, § 2, 34 Stat. 898, 898-99.
57. See Immigration Act § 19; MAE M. NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJEcrs: ILLEGAL ALIENS AND THE MAKING OF
MODERN AMERICA 59 (2004 ). The 1917 Immigration Act also included a protection to prevent deportation where a
noncitizen had strong ties to the United States.§ 19. A sentencing judge at the time of sentence was empowered to
recommend "that such alien shall not be deported." See id.; Yolanda Vazquez, Advising NonciJizen Defendants on
the Immigration Consequences of Criminal Convictions: The Ethical Answer for the Criminal Defense Lawyer,
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tion enforcement were deployed largely to advance restrictive racial, economic,
and ideological agendas, rather than relying upon criminal law as a foundational
and independent vehicle for immigration enforcement. 5 8
The Immigration Act of May 26, 1924 further entrenched a racially organized
model of U.S. immigration regulation by establishing a quota system to allocate
the limited slots available to aspiring immigrants. 59 This system favored the
immigration of white Northern Europeans, disfavored Southern Europeans, and
banned Asian immigration altogether. 60 Literacy and fee requirements were used
to restrict immigration from Latin America, though no national quotas were
applied to the Western Hemisphere. 61
In 1929, Congress first criminalized unlawful entry to the United States, making
it a misdemeanor punishable by up to a year in prison, 62 and also expanded illegal
reentry provisions; 63 but, relatively few prosecutions actually occurred under these
statutes. 64 Nonetheless, the introduction of criminal penalties tied to violations of
immigration regulation began to bring about a conceptual shift in how unauthorized migration was treated in public discourse. 65 Whereas up until the 1930s,
immigrants were understood as either "legitimate" immigrants, or "illegitimate" or
"ineligible" immigrants, the application of criminal penalties to immigrants, even
if seldom imposed, began to reinforce an idea of "illegal immigration."66
The period from 1952, when Congress passed major comprehensive immigration legislation, to the mid 1980s involved the relative liberalization of U.S.
immigration law. 67 Criminal grounds for exclusion and deportation remained a
part of the 1952 statutory scheme, but these grounds were not vigorously enforced

the Court, and the Sixth Amendment, 20 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 31, 39 (2010). As both a legal and practical
matter, this bound the executive from deporting the noncitizen. See id.; see also Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct.

1473, 1479 (2010).
58. See Kerry Abrams, Polygamy, Prostitution, and the Federalization of Immigration Law, 105 CoLUM. L.
REv. 641, 671-77,693-94 (2005) (exploring anti-prostitution laws, among other provisions, that were passed to
prohibit Chinese immigration); see also Ngai, Response, supra note 50, at 57.
59. Act of Mar. 4, 1929, ch. 690, § 2, 45 Stat. 1551, 1551 (codified at 8 U.S.C.).
60. BILL ONG HING, MAKING AND REMAKING ASIAN AMERICA THROUGH IMMIGRATION POLICY, 1850--1990, at 53,
55 (1993); KEVIN R. JOHNSON, THE "HUDDLED MASSES" MYTH: IMMIGRATION AND CIVIL RIGHTS 23 (2004).
61. See JOHNSON, supra note 60, at 23-25.
62. Act of Mar. 4 1929, § 2, 45 Stat. at 1551.
63. /d. at§ I.
64. See U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER GENERAL OF IMMIGRATION 21 (1930),
available at http://www.archive.org/stream/annualreportofcol930unit#page/n3/mode/2up.
65. See, e.g., Jennifer M. Chac6n, Unsecured Borders: Immigration Restrictions, Crime Control and National
Security, 39 CONN. L. REv. 1827, 1842 (2007) [hereinafter Chac6n, Unsecured Borders].
66. JOSEPH NEVINS, OPERATION GATEKEEPER: THE RISE OF THE "ILLEGAL ALIEN" AND THE MAKING OF THE U.S.
MEXICO BoUNDARY 95 (2002); Anna Marie Gallagher, The Situation of Undocumented Migrants in the United
States, in 05-06 IMMIGR. BRIEFINGS I (2005).
67. See generally DEBRA L. DELAET, U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY IN AN AGE OF RIGHTS 2 (2000) ("[F]undamental
legislative changes to U.S. immigration policy from the 1960s through the 1980s have been comprised oflargely
liberal measures that have contributed to an increase in immigration to this country."); MICHAEL C. LEMAY, FROM
OPEN DooR TO DUTCH DOOR: AN ANALYSIS OF IMMIGRATION POLICY SINCE 1820, at I 03 ( 1987).
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and were accompanied by generous exceptions and waiver provisions. 68 Waivers
were routinely extended for a wide range of convictions, even serious ones. 69
In 1965, Congress passed the Hart-Celler Act, imposing for the first time
numerical limits on immigrants from countries in the Western Hemisphere. 70 This
led to a sharp spike in unauthorized immigration from Mexico and Central
America, though the preexisting deportation waiver regime remained largely
intact. 71
The thoroughgoing criminalization of U.S. immigration policy commenced in
the 1980s as Congress began a process of revising the Immigration and Nationality
Act ("INA") to more closely integrate criminal and immigration law. Legislative
changes in the 1980s sought to respond to the growing numbers of unauthorized
immigrants generated by the 1965 legislative reforms. 72 Increasing numbers of
authorized and unauthorized immigrants of color arriving in the United States,
many of whom were among the working poor, prompted escalating economic and
racial anxiety in U.S. public discourse-sentiments only exacerbated by ongoing
economic and political transformations in the world at large. 73 Immigration
legislation passed in 1986 applied criminal sanctions to marriage fraud 74 and
reliance on false documents to avoid employer sanctions laws. 75 In a change that
would later prove significant in facilitating criminal-immigration enforcement, the
1986 Act provided additionally for reimbursement to states for the costs of
incarcerating foreign-born noncitizens? 6 Movement toward a criminal-immigration enforcement model accelerated over the course of the late 1980s, during
which time criminal alien removals came to play a critical part in structuring U.S.
immigration enforcement. In 1988, in the midst of the war on drugs and the
mushrooming of U.S. prison populations, the Omnibus Anti-Drug Abuse Act of

68. Under the 1952 Act, a noncitizen could be excluded or deported based on a crime of "moral turpitude" or
"drug trafficking," but a broad waiver was available provided that the noncitizen had seven years of U.S.
residence, and the positive equities in the noncitizen's case (such as family ties in the United States, long period of
residence, employment history, and hardship if deported) outweighed the negative factors (such as the nature and
seriousness of criminal conviction). See INA, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 212, 66 Stat. 163, 182 (1952) (codified at 8
U.S.C. § 1182(c)); see also Matter of Marin, 161. & N. Dec. 581, 584-85 (B.I.A. 1978).
69. See Maureen A. Sweeney, Fact or Fiction: The Legal Construction of Immigration Removal for Crimes, 27
YALE J. ON REG. 47,61 (2010).
70. See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 (Hart-Celler Act), Pub. L. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911.
71. Douglas S. Massey, Response to Joseph Carens' The Case for Amnesty, in IMMIGRANTS AND THE RIGHT TO
STAY 75 (201 0) ("The number of migrants entering the United States from Mexico did not change very much after
1965. What changed was their legal status."); see Ngai, Response, supra note 50, at 61.
72. See Massey, supra note 71; Ngai, supra note 50.
73. See Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986, Pub. L. 99-603, I 00 Stat. 3359. IRCA effected
three primary changes: (I) legalization for a significant number of undocumented immigrants, (2) an increase in
border enforcement, (3) and criminal penalties for employers who hired undocumented workers. See id.
74. Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendment of 1986 § 2(d) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1325(c)).
75. IRCA § 103(a).
76. See IRCA § 50l(a) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1365).
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198877 directed the immigration agency to set up pilot programs to work with local
law enforcement organizations in four cities, seeking to institutionalize integrated
federal immigration enforcement and local crime control. 78 The Anti-Drug Abuse
Act of 1988 also introduced to immigration enforcement the category, "aggravated
felony," which was defined at the time to encompass offenses involving murder
and trafficking in drugs or weapons. 79 Some "aggravated felons" had committed
serious crimes, but others had been convicted for "trafficking" offenses when they
were actually fairly minor players in drug crime. 80 Aggravated felons were
rendered deportable regardless of their length of lawful permanent residence or
other membership claims short of U.S. citizenship, and were prohibited from
receiving a form of relief referred to as "voluntary departure." 81 Still, under the
1988 Act, even serious offenders remained eligible for discretionary relief from
deportation when mandatory deportation seemed too harsh a consequence. 82
The scope of judicial discretion to prevent deportation began to contract
dramatically during the final decade of the twentieth century. 83 In 1990, Congress
barred discretionary relief for anyone convicted of an aggravated felony and
sentenced to at least five years imprisonment, 84 and eliminated judicial recommendations against deportation for any conviction. 85 The 1990 legislation also restricted and streamlined procedures for criminal-immigration enforcement, requiring all states, in order to enable deportation of individuals convicted of crimes, to
create a plan to provide the INS 86 with certified records of conviction within thirty
days of any state conviction. 87 In 1994, Congress further tightened the connections
between criminal and immigration enforcement, 88 expanding grounds for deporta-

Anti-Drug Abuse (ADA) Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181,4387.
See id. at§ 6151.
See id. at § 7342.
See, e.g., Joseph B. Treaster, Minor Players, Major Penalties; The Rockefeller Drug Laws Took
Prisoners-for 15-to-Life, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 5, 1995), http://www.nytimes.com/1995/03/05/nyregion/minor-players77.'
78.
79.
80.

penalties-rockefeller-drug-laws-took-prisoners-for-15-life.html ?page wanted =all&src =pm (examining cases of
persons convicted and sentenced as traffickers for playing a peripheral role in a single transaction involving a
small quantity of drugs).
81. See ADA§§ 7343(a)-(b), 7344(a).
82. See INA§ 212(c), 8 U.S.C. § Jl82(c) (1994), repealed by IIRIRA, Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C, 110 Stat.
3009, 3009-597 (1996) (explaining that aliens with seven consecutive years of residence were eligible for
discretionary relief).
83. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 4, at 614,619-20.
84. IMMACT90, Pub. L. No. 101-649, §§ 501,511 104 Stat. 4978,5048,5052 (1990).
85. !d. at § 505.
86. INS was the predecessor agency of ICE, Department of Homeland Security's U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Service ("USCIS"), and Customs and Border Patrol agency. Our History, U.S. CITIZENSHIP &
IMMIGRATION SERVICE, http://www.uscis.gov/portaVsite/uscis/menuitem.eb ld4c2a3e5b9ac89243c6a 7543f6d 1a/
?vgnextoid =e00c0b89284a321 OVgn VCM I OOOOOb92ca60aRCRD&vgnextchannel =e00c0b89284a321 OV gnVCM
JOOOOOb92ca60aRCRD (last updated May 25, 2011).
87. IMMACT90 at§ 507.
88. See, e.g., VCCA, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 130002, 108 Stat. 1796,2023 (1994) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1252
note) (stating that the Attorney General shall operate a criminal alien tracking center).
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tion and exclusion for many crimes to include attempts and conspiracies to commit
those crimes; 89 and expanding the definition of "aggravated felony" to include
sixteen different crimes. 9°Congress gave federal judges authority to issue an order
of deportation based on a criminal conviction directly at sentencing, instead of
through the previously separate civil immigration process. 91 In 1989, only 7338
criminal removals occurred, but by 1995 that number had increased to 32,285. 92
The federal legislative integration of criminal and immigration enforcement
culminated in 1996 with two pieces of legislation that crafted a far harsher
criminal-immigration enforcement system: the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act ("AEDPA")93 and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act ("IIRIRA"). 94 AEDPA and IIRIRA dramatically expanded the
list of crimes for which a person could be deported from the United States,
including by expanding the definition of "aggravated felony" to include, among a
"stunning range" of offenses, 95 any crime of theft for which a sentence (even
suspended) of more than a year was imposed, and virtually eliminating discretion
of immigration adjudicators to waive deportation for any crime included within
that definition. 96 AEDPA contained special removal procedures for "terrorist
aliens" 97 and abrogated federal habeas review in a manner that applied not just to
alleged terrorists but to all "criminal aliens." 98 IIRIRA also increased criminal
penalties for a broad range of immigration-related offenses, 99 increased bars to
reentry, 100 and mandated detention for certain immigrants in removal proceedings. 101 The jurisdiction of federal courts in criminal sentencing to issue removal
orders directly was expanded from aggravated felony cases to any deportable

89. INCTA, Pub. L. No. 103-416, § 222, 108 Stat. 4305,4311,4320-21 (1994).
90. /d.
91. /d. at § 224. Congress authorized bypassing immigration proceedings altogether for any non-lawful
permanent resident convicted of an aggravated felony and deemed ineligible for relief from deportation. This
deprived persons so identified of a right to an administrative hearing before an immigration judge to determine
whether they were, in fact, not a lawful permanent resident, ineligible for any relief, and actually convicted of an
aggravated felony. See VCCA § 130004.
92. Schuck & Williams, supra note 3, at 384.
93. AEDPA, Pub. L. No. 104-132, tit. IV, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996).
94. IIRIRA, Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C, I 10 Stat. 3009,3009-546 (1996).
95. See Legomsky, supra note 4, at 520 (explaining that the definition of "aggravated felony" now includes a
stunning range of crimes).
96. Nancy Morawetz, Understanding the Impact of the 1996 Deponation Laws and the Limited Scope of
Proposed Reforms, 113 HARV. L. REv. 1936, 1939 (2000) [hereinafter Morawetz, Understanding] ("[A]
conviction for simple battery or for shoplifting-either of which would be a misdemeanor or violation in most
states-can be deemed an aggravated felony.") (internal citations omitted); see IIRIRA § 321 (a)(3) (amending the
aggravated felony definition to include theft sentences of at least one year instead of at least five years).
97. AEDPA § 401.
98. ld. at § 440.
99. IIRIRA §§ 211-13.
100. /d. at§§ 301-08.
101. /d. at§ 305(a)(3).

2012]

THE

U.S.

CRIMINAL-IMMIGRATION CoNVERGENCE

121

criminal offense, even offenses carrying only a sentence of probation. 102 Congress
ordered immigration officials to develop a "criminal alien identification system" to
track noncitizens with convictions and to assist local, state and federal law
enforcement to locate such individuals for deportation. 103 Another significant
feature of IIRIRA is that it added a provision to section 287(g) of the INA, which
permits cross-deputization of local law enforcement officers to police immigration
violations. 104 In 1998, over 56,000 criminal removals took place. 105
It is worth noting that these significant changes in U.S. criminal-immigration
law occurred during the 1990s, well before September 11, 2001. In the aftermath
of that day, however, criminal-immigration enforcement became an increasingly
central component of the U.S. immigration regulatory regime, even though the
pivotal moment of expansion of criminal-immigration enforcement powers happened several years earlier. 106
Although attempts at comprehensive immigration reform failed during the first
decade of the twenty-first century, in legislative sessions in 2005 and 2006, both
houses of Congress passed bills that would have significantly expanded criminalimmigration enforcement: In December 2005, the U.S. House of Representatives
passed House Bill4437, which contained no legalization or guest worker programs
and rendered unauthorized physical presence in the United States a felony. 107 In
May 2006, the Senate passed a bill that expanded criminal removal provisions,
though it also created a guest worker program and offered a limited path to
legalization for certain noncitizens unlawfully present. 108 Due to considerable
divergence between the two bills and feared political fallout during an election
year, Congress failed to agree on any compromise legislation. 109 Despite the
legislative failure of expanded criminal-immigration enforcement, Congress has
consistently provided generous funding for existing criminal-immigration enforcement mandates. 110
2. Institutional Repurposing
In addition to legislative rt:form, institutions involved in immigration enforcement have been reorganized and repurposed to focus on the apprehension and
102. /d. at§ 374.
I 03. VCCA, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 130002, 108 Stat. 1796, 2023 (1994), amended by AEDPA, Pub. L. No.
104-132, tit. IV,§ 432, 110 Stat. 1214, 1273-74 (1996); see IIRIRA §§ 326, 327, 110 Stat. at 3009-630.
104. INA§ 287(g), 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (2006).
105. Andrew I. Schoenholtz & Thomas F. Muther, Jr., Immigration and Nationality, 33 INT'L LAW. 517, 527
(1999).
106. See, e.g., Sweeney, supra note 69, at 66.
107. Border Protection, Antiterrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act of 2005, H.R. 4437, 109th Cong.
§ 203 (2005).
108. Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of2006, S. 2611, 109th Cong. (2006).
109. Chac6n, Unsecured Borders, supra note 65, at 1829.
110. The 2009 federal budget proposal included $1.4 billion designated for ICE programs to remove criminal
aliens. How the $3.6 Trillion Would Be Spent, WASH. PosT, Feb. 27, 2009, at A 7.
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removal of criminal aliens. 111 In January 2011, Kumar Kibble, Deputy Director of
ICE testified before the U.S. House of Representatives: "The Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) has fundamentally reformed immigration enforcement,
focusing on identifying and removing criminal aliens who pose a threat to public
safety and targeting employers who knowingly break the law." 112 According to the
Deputy Director, employing this approach has resulted in "record enforcement,
removing more aliens in both 2009 and 2010 than in any point in . . . history ...." 113 The identification and processing of criminal aliens has become the
highest priority for ICE, in particular through its 287(g) and "Secure Communities" initiatives. 114
Under the 287(g) program (so-called in reference to its statutory section in
IIRIRA), the federal government cross-deputizes local police officers to enforce
federal immigration law through formal agreements. 115 Cross-deputized officers
act to enforce immigration laws in their local jurisdictions, in accord with ICE
performance measures that assess the number of criminal aliens encountered by
287(g) officers during each monitoring period. 116
Separately, under the Secure Communities program, fingerprints of every
person arrested and booked by local law enforcement, even those not deputized
through 287(g) agreements, are to be automatically entered into immigration
databases. 117 ICE is alerted when an arrestee is even suspected to be an undocumented immigrant or noncitizen legal resident. 118 Additionally, when any state,
local, or federal law enforcement officer stops an individual, the officer is able to
access ICE's Law Enforcement Support Center ("LESC"), a national enforcement
operations facility that provides the officer with real-time information about the
person's last recorded immigration status, if any, twenty-four hours per day, seven
days per week. 119

Ill. See, e.g., Sweeney, supra note 69, at 72.
112. ICE Worksite Enforcement, supra note 29, at 82 (statement of Kumar Kibble, Deputy Director, ICE).
113. See id. at 85 (discussing the department's record enforcement in 2009 and 2010).
114. U.S.IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT (ICE), ICE FISCAL YEAR 2007 ANNUAL REPORT: PRoTECTING
NATIONAL SECURITY AND UPHOLDING PuBLIC SAFETY 4-5 (2008). This focus on criminal aliens was also a priority
for the former INS from the late 1980s until its incorporation into the Department of Homeland Security. See
MARGARET H. TAYLOR & T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, DEPORTATION OF CRIMINAL ALIENS: A GEoPOLITICAL
PERSPECTIVE 1-2 (1998).
115. See MICHELE WASLIN, IMMIGRATION PoLICY CTR., ICE's ENFORCEMENT PRioRITIES AND THE FACTORS THXI'
UNDERMINE THEM 7 (2010) (explaining that there are seventy-two signed agreements in twenty-six states that
delegate immigration power to local police).
116. See id. (stating that the performance mechanism for the 287(g) program is the number of aliens
encountered by the program officers).
117. See Sweeney, supra note 69, at 74.
118. See WASLIN, supra note 115, at 11.
119. See Sweeney, supra note 69, at 73-74. The Obama Administration announced in 2009 that it intended to
expand Secure Communities to cover every local jurisdiction in the nation by late 2012 at a cost of about $1
billion per year. See, e.g., Nina Bernstein, Immigration Officials Often Detain Foreign-Born Rikers Inmates for
Deportation, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2009, atA17.
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Much of this enforcement work is mediated through the use of technologybiometric databases that permit immediate computer identification of persons
suspected to be foreign-born noncitizens-which depersonalizes the identification
of criminal aliens and renders the process of differentiating dangerous persons
from non-dangerous persons a matter of computer-matching following initial law
enforcement contact. 120 A parallel process of institutional re-purposing involves
the previously noted change in criminal prosecutorial efforts emphasizing immigration law violations. 121 This process of institutional and technological reorganization alongside a changed legislative landscape reflects a general conceptual shift
toward a crime-centered immigration enforcement framework.
3. Conceptual Shift
A crime-centered conceptual framework, explored in greater depth in Part IV,
infra, characterizes immigration in reference to crime control, criminal wrongdoing, and criminal punishment, and depicts the challenge of immigration regulation
primarily in terms of apprehending and removing noncitizen criminal offenders,
thereby permitting a desirable type of immigration to flourish. This conceptual
framework draws on a stock crime narrative formula developed originally in crime
fiction and related imaginative literature. Crime fiction, which emerged as a
popular cultural form in the mid-nineteenth century, during a period of industrialization, urbanization, and the institutionalization of European and U.S. detective
and police forces, adheres without significant variation, to an established formula:
(1) a crime is committed;

(2) a designated person or group of persons is tasked with identifying the
culprit;
(3) ultimately the criminal is identified and contained; and
(4) a sense of security is restored to the affected community. 122

120. According to one ICE spokesperson: "The goal of this plan is to identify and remove all criminal aliens in
jails and prisons. Although the focus will first be on those who present the greatest risk to public safety and
national security, ICE will also deport other lower-level criminals as resources permit." See Daphne Eviatar,
Fingerprinting Plan Will Dramatically Increase Deportations, WASH. INDEP. (May 22, 2009), http:/1
washingtonindependent.com/44141/fingerprinting-plan-will-dramatically-increase-deportations. Ivan Ortiz, another ICE spokesperson, explained: "If the person ran a light, then we need to prioritize our work, and we may not
be able to send an agent to the local jail to get them. But I guarantee you, we will catch up to them later." See
Kristin Collins, Five Counties Push Jail Deportations, NEWS & OBSERVER (Feb. 5, 2009), http:/lwww.newsob
server.com/2009/02/05/86661/5-counties-push-jail-deportations.html. Immigration law scholar Nancy Morawetz
suggests that Secure Communities is "designed to sweep in people and then sort it out while they're in
detention ... without access to lawyers," an approach that "threatens all foreign nationals." See Bernstein, supra
note 119.
121. See supra Part LA. 3. For excellent analysis of this phenomenon, see Chac6n, Managing Mig ration, supra
note 4, and Eagly, supra note 12.
122. See generally JEROME H. DELAMATER & RUTH PRIGOZY, THEORY AND PRACTICE Of CLASSIC DETECTIVE
FICTION (1997) (exploring each of these themes in classic detective story model).
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This narrative formula is associated with a pleasurable experience of catharsis.
In this regard, W.H. Auden wrote of crime narrative that the "magical satisfaction"
it provides "is the illusion of being dissociated from the murderer." 123 Auden
explained:
For me, as for many others, the reading of detective stories is an addiction like
tobacco or alcohol. The symptoms of this are: Firstly, the intensity of the
craving-if I have any work to do, I must be careful not to get hold of a
detective story for, once I begin one, I cannot work or sleep till I have finished
it. Secondly, its specificity-the story must conform to certain formulas .... And thirdly, its immediacy. I forget the story as soon as I have finished
it, and have no wish to read it again. 124

Crime narrative and an associated crime-centered conceptual framework have
been applied extensively to represent and make sense of social phenomena outside
the realm of crime or detective fiction, including in the context of immigration
regulation. 125 When applied to other social phenomena, a stock crime-narrative
framework continues to adhere to the same formulaic elements, but extends these
features to understanding more complex social processes. As a broader explanatory framework, stock crime narrative similarly identifies culprits responsible for a
given harm as deserving of punishment, and an innocent community, which for
order to be restored, requires the containment of the deviant criminal elements.
The associated conceptual framework necessarily entails simplification, binary
logics of good and evil, and a proposed resolution associated with confinement or
banishment of the undesired elements. 126
This conceptual framework is implicitly invoked in official justifications of the
intertwining of criminal and immigration enforcement. This general shift toward
understanding individual immigrants as culprits or criminal wrongdoers, criminally responsible for the complex problems posed by regulating immigration

123.
124.
125.
126.

See W.H. Auden, The Guilty Vicarage: Notes on. the Detective Story, by an Addict, HARPERS, May 1948.
See id.
See generally DELAMATER & PRIGOZY, supra note 122.
Sheriff Joe Arpaio of Maricopa County, Arizona, put it this way:
The reality is stark-either the good guys will prevail and restore some sense of decency and honor
and respect to our society, or the bad guys will come out on top and destroy everything we hold
dear .... Win or lose. Right or wrong. Good guys versus bad guys. Sometimes life is that
straightforward.

See JOE ARPAIO & LEN SHERMAN, AMERICA'S TOUGHEST SHERIFF: HOW TO WIN THE WAR AGAINST CRIME xxi-xxii
(1996). In her book ILLEGAL, ALIEN, OR IMMIGRANT, political scientist Lina Newton illuminates this conceptual
shift in a changing causal story explaining unauthorized immigration to the United States. LINA NEWTON, ILLEGAL,
ALIEN OR IMMIGRANT: THE POLffiCS OF IMMIGRATION REFORM 65 (2008). During the mid-1980s, before the
full-fledged emergence of a criminal enforcement model in the immigration context, the problem posed by
immigration was characterized in public discourse in relatively more complex terms. See id. In the 1990s, a
different causal story regarding immigration became predominant-one emphasizing the moral responsibility of
unauthorized immigrants as lawbreakers. See id.
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emerged in tandem with a host of changing socio-political and economic conditions in the post-Cold War period. 127 These changes include the rise of neoliberalism and a retrenchment of the New DealfGreat Society model of governance;
refugee crises emanating from Haiti, Cuba, Southeast Asia, and Central America
that put increasing pressure on U.S. immigration enforcement; and the escalation
of a war on crime in which a crime-centered conceptual framework circulated
widely. 128 Before returning to explore further the circulation of this conceptual
framework in the context of U.S. immigration law enforcement, the following Part
examines justifications of the U.S. criminal-immigration convergence in official
government accounts and in immigration law scholarship.
II.

JUSTIFICATIONS OF THE

U.S.

CRIMINAL-IMMIGRATION CONVERGENCE

There are several distinct explanatory and justificatory accounts of the appropriateness, usefulness, legitimacy, and rationality of U.S. criminal-immigration
enforcement. First, ICE's own account of its enforcement emphasis on criminal
aliens is laid out and defended in a series of memoranda issued by high-ranking
officials. 129 ICE most explicitly and thoroughly elaborates its criminal-immigration enforcement approach in a memorandum of June 30, 2010 from ICE Director
John Morton to all ICE employees, in which Morton discusses his "Priorities for
the Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of Aliens." 130 Though articulated with
the most specificity in the 2010 Morton Memorandum, earlier policy directives,
including those of the now defunct INS, similarly conceptualize the agency's
enforcement priorities. 131
Morton's account rests on two premises: (1) a concern to allocate limited
enforcement resources in a politically palatable manner on the assumption that the
maximum affordable quantum of enforcement is required (determined based on
resources allocated to ICE), and (2) a conjecture that a focus on criminal aliens will
capture the "worst of the worst" of noncitizens in the United States given limited
enforcement resources. In his 2010 memorandum, Morton wrote: "ICE is charged
with enforcing the nation's civil immigration laws"-an undertaking "with direct
significance for our national security, public safety, and the integrity of our border

127. See, e.g., NEWTON, supra note 126, at 64-65.
128. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 4, at 619-20; see also DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME
AND SOCIAL ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY (2001); JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME: How THE
WAR ON CRIME TRANSFORMED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND CREATED ACULTURE OF FEAR (2007).
129. See Chaparro Memorandum, supra note 8; Memorandum from Doris Meissner, Comm' r, Immigration &
Naturalization Serv., to Reg'l Dirs. (Nov. 17, 2000) [hereinafter Meissner Memorandum] (on file with author);
Morton Memorandum, supra note 14; Clinton A. Folsom, Supervisory Detention & Deportation Officer, to
Immigration Enforcement Agents (Jan. 4, 201 0) (on file with author).
130. See Morton Memorandum, supra note 14, at 601-14.
131. See, e.g., Meissner Memorandum (indicating that INS officers should exercise discretion and focus
resources on cases involving significant criminal conduct).
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and immigration controls." 132 He explained, however, that ICE "only has resources to remove approximately 400,000 aliens per year, less than 4 percent of the
estimated illegal alien population in the United States." 133 Therefore, ICE has
chosen to focus its enforcement efforts on "the agency's highest enforcement
priorities, namely national security, public safety, and border security." 134 Accordingly, ICE's first priority is: "Aliens who pose a danger to national security or a risk
to public safety," with special emphasis on terrorists and spies. 135 Because it is
highly unlikely that ICE will reach its enforcement goal of 400,000 noncitizen
removals annually if efforts focus solely on terrorists and spies, priority one also
includes immigrants convicted of crimes, members of gangs, persons who are
subject to criminal warrants, or those who otherwise pose a risk to public safety. 136
Within the category of criminal noncitizens-the de facto enforcement priority
given that there are only limited noncitizen terrorists and spies on whom to focus
ICE's considerable resources-there are three further levels of priority: (1) aggravated felons as defined in the Immigration and Nationality Act, which may include
serious violent offenders but also includes drug, shoplifting, and other more minor
offenders, as well as any immigrant convicted of two or more felonies, whether or
not those are aggravated felonies; (2) noncitizens convicted of any felony or three
misdemeanors; and (3) noncitizens convicted of misdemeanors. 137 The second
overall enforcement priority is "[r]ecent illegal entrants." 138 The third priority is
"aliens who are subject to a final order of removal and abscond, fail to depart, or
intentionally obstruct immigration controls .... " 139
Despite emphasis in the initial sections of the memorandum on terrorists, spies,
and other immigrants who pose a serious risk to public safety, a subsequent and
prominently located section plainly states: "Nothing in this memorandum should
be construed to prohibit or discourage the apprehension, detention, or removal of
other aliens unlawfully in the United States." 140 In this regard, the memorandum
assures officers that they may "pursue the removal of any alien unlawfully in the
United States, although attention to those aliens should not displace or disrupt the
resources needed to remove aliens who are a higher priority." 141 Overall, then,
ICE's policy of prioritizing criminal alien removals is intended to constrain

132. Morton Memorandum, supra note 14, at I.
133. See id.
134. See id.
135. See id.
136. Only a very small number of removals on national security grounds occur each year. For example, only
ten of the 208,521 people removed in 2005 were removed on security grounds, a pattern repeated in other years.
See Chac6n, Unsecured Borders, supra note 65, at 1860 (citing U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., 2005 YEARBOOK
OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 95-96 (2006)).
137. Morton Memorandum, supra note 14, at 2.
138. See id.
139. See id.
140. See id. at 3.
141. See id.

2012]

THE

U.S.

CRIMINAL-IMMIGRXIlON CoNVERGENCE

127

immigration enforcement to focus on the "worst of the worst," while accomplishing robust enforcement by removing approximately 400,000 noncitizens per
year 142-the maximum quantum ofiCE's enforcement capacity with a budget just
exceeding $5 billion and 19,000 employees. 143
ICE's primary justification for focusing on criminal aliens is thus that limited
resources require it to target noncitizens who have come into contact with criminal
law enforcement because targeting this group will permit ICE to weed out those
individuals most threatening to national security or public safety, and will capture
relevant characteristics of un-belonging and undesirability so as to focus limited
resources. 144 This is also presumed to be an efficient allocation of resources
because it outsources some immigration screening to criminal law enforcement,
and adds an extra layer of deterrence not otherwise achievable.
In addition, several legal scholars have offered explanatory accounts, which
justify the U.S. criminal-immigration convergence as a rational policy choice.
Professor Peter H. Schuck and John Williams have proposed a series of ways in
which the convergence of criminal and immigration enforcement might be
deepened. 145 Specifically, Schuck and Williams contend that the removal of
criminal aliens could be rendered more expeditious and thorough by devolving
greater immigration regulatory authority to state and local law enforcers. 146 In so
doing, Schuck and Williams implicitly approve the criminal-immigration convergence as an enforcement model, at least in substantial part, and offer some sense of
grounds on which it might be defended. Schuck and Williams note that no
argument has been advanced-by policymakers, interest groups, or otherwise-as
to why criminal aliens should not be removed. 147 The premise underlying Schuck

142. See Chaparro Memorandum, supra note 8, at I (''Through your efforts, ICE has removed 56,853 criminal
aliens as of February 15, 2010. With every field office maintaining this level of activity we anticipate achieving
the Agency goal of 150,000 criminal alien removals in FY 2010. [Office of Detention and Removal] must now
look at the other critical Agency goal of achieving 400,000 removals and returns overall without relaxing our
increased efforts in criminal removals."). ICE officials have denied using "quotas" for removals when under
criticism, but ICE's policy memoranda routinely refer to a target of 400,000 removals. See id.; see also Morton
Memorandum, supra note 14.
143. See Marcus Stern, Director John Morton Explains ICE's Priorities on Deportation, PRoPuBLICA (Sept. 9,
2010), http://www.propub1ica.org/artic1e/director-john-morton-explains-ices-priorities-on-deportation.
144. See, e.g., id.
145. See generally Schuck & Williams, supra note 3, at 376; Peter H. Schuck, Do Not Go Directly to Jail, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 6, 2010, atA33 [hereinafter Schuck, Do Not Go Directly to Jail].
146. See Schuck & Williams, supra note 3, at 462-63.
147. Shuck has also proposed that criminal aliens be removed prior to serving criminal sentences in order to
reduce prison and jail overcrowding and associated costs. See Schuck, Do Not Go Directly to Jail, supra note 145.
Schuck explains that !IS a legal matter "deportable criminals can be deported without serving their full sentences if
they committed non-violent offenses (with some exceptions), and if the appropriate officials request earlier
deportations." See id. So, a further advantage of criminal-immigration enforcement on this account is that it may
reduce prison congestion in the United States by removing noncitizens from U.S. jails and prisons. Schuck
dismisses other possible changes to reduce overcrowding, such as decriminalizing nonviolent offenses and
reducing the length of sentences-as "promising reforms but hard to accomplish politically." See id. In contrast,
the removal of incarcerated immigrants is politically popular. See id.
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and Williams' analysis, then, is that focusing U.S. immigration enforcement on
criminal aliens is an uncontroversial and sensible immigration regulatory model-an ideal and politically palatable manner of negotiating immigration enforcement demands in the complicated undertaking Schuck explores elsewhere of
balancing the needs of "citizens, strangers, and in-betweens." 148
Both ICE's own policy directives and Schuck and Williams' analysis are
predicated implicitly on a further constellation of ideas about noncitizens who
come into contact with criminal law enforcement. One such idea is that criminal
aliens are participating in a form of trespass, the wrongfulness of which is
exacerbated by criminal conduct. Criminal-immigration enforcement serves on
this trespass account as an appropriate response to the trespass, justifying both
removal and criminal prosecution. Another implicit idea is that noncitizens who
are lawfully present have entered a contractual-type relationship with the government. On this account, when these noncitizens come into contact with criminal law
enforcement, they have violated the terms of the contractual arrangement, and the
appropriate remedy is criminal removal. 149
This violation may even justify removal as a form of criminal punishment, a
parallel theory of violation suggesting deportation as a justified punitive response.
These ideas remain implicit and unelaborated in ICE's directives and in the
existing legal scholarship, though they appear to inform justificatory accounts
articulated in terms of efficient resource allocation (ICE) or political palatability
(Schuck).
More recently, Professors Cox and Posner have introduced a theory of immigration regulation that offers, among other thought-provoking contributions, a different partial justification of the U.S. criminal-immigration convergence grounded in
information economics-this justificatory theory is embraced by ICE's own
explanatory accounts in terms of the use of criminal law contact as a proxy for
undesirability. 15° Cox and Posner propose that there are two primary methods by
which a state may achieve "first-order" immigration regulatory goals of obtaining
the desired type and amount of immigration. 151 These methods of achieving

148. See generally PETER H. SCHUCK, CmZENS, STRANGERS, AND IN-BETWEENS (1998).
149. An implicit contract violation theory presumes the noncitizen has violated a prior agreement to refrain
from contact with law enforcement, and if she violates that agreement, the appropriate response is deportation and
perhaps criminal punishment. This conception is applied both to those who enter without authorization and to
lawful entrants. Justice Scalia, in his majority opinion in Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee
articulated a view along these lines:
Even when deportation is sought because of some act the alien has committed, in principle the
alien is not being punished for that act (criminal charges may be available for that separate
purpose) but is merely being held to the terms under which he was admitted. And in all cases,
deportation is necessary in order to bring to an end an ongoing violation of the United States law.
525U.S.471,49l (1999).
150. See Cox & Posner, supra note 16, at 846.
151. See id. at 8ll-12.

2012]

THE

u.s. CRIMINAL-IMMIGRATION CONVERGENCE

129

first-order goals involve decisions as to what the authors call "second-order
institutional design." 152 Second-order institutional design may rely on ex ante
screening and/or ex post screening. 153 Ex ante screening entails patrolling initial
entry and obtaining information about aspiring immigrants prior to their arrival
into the country. 154 Ex post screening operates on the basis of information obtained
after entry, permitting in principle more aspiring immigrants to enter (whether with
or without official authorization), in part to enable the host state to apply post-entry
screens to better ascertain immigrants' desirability. 155
On Cox and Posner's account, the United States has relied to a great extent on an
ex post model that uses criminal justice system contact as a proxy for un-belonging
and undesirability, or type. 156 According to Cox and Posner: "The implicit theory
is that, at least for the pool of unskilled labor, authorities can better screen out
undesired types by waiting for noncitizens to commit crimes and expelling them
than by using some other proxy at the border ex ante." 157 Cox and Posner propose
that this is a rational immigration regulatory design choice because it permits
market-determined levels of immigration to supply labor, and then later sorts out
those immigrants who have failed to find work and who are unable to assimilatecharacteristics that are presumably accurately demonstrated by contact with
criminal law enforcement. 158
Cox and Posner suggest that relying on criminal law contact may be preferable
to relying ex ante on paper credentials, because "immigration goals are ...
complex, and paper credentials are not necessarily accurate proxies for a noncitizen's type." 159 Moreover, Cox and Posner assume "an ex post sanction on
noncitizens who commit crimes . . . will impose lower costs on the desirable
type ... than on undesirable types." 160 On this model, "[a]n appropriately calibrated ex post sanction will discourage entry from undesirable types but not from
desirable types." 161
It is also "perfectly possible that the sanction would have to be greater than
deportation; a criminal punishment might be necessary." 162 Of course, Cox and
Posner acknowledge there may be costs associated with ex post criminal law

152. See id.
153. First-order decision-making concerns questions about what sort of persons to permit to immigrate and in
what number. Second-order issues of institutional design-the focus of Cox and Posner's article-involve "how
to screen applicants for admission so that the desired types are admitted and others are excluded." See id.
154. See id. at 812.
155. See id.
156. See id. at 846.
157. See id. at 847.
158. See id. at 833.
159. See id. at 825-26.
160. See id. at 829. Cox and Posner do allow that a risk-averse noncitizen may be less inclined to immigrate if
he fears he may be "falsely convicted of a crime and deported, thus losing ... country specific investment." See id.
161. See id.
162. See id.
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screening: (1) it may discourage "country-specific investment," because immigrants will not know how they will fare in ex-post screening; (2) risk will increase
that citizens will be harmed when ties are severed with noncitizens through
deportation; and (3) noncitizens may commit crime before being screened out. 163
But on Cox and Posner's theoretical model, criminal-immigration screening serves
as a rational institutional design choice. 164
The next Part illustrates how the U.S. criminal-immigration convergenceembodied in the enforcement of U.S. immigration law by ICE (and justified in
reference to concepts of efficient resource allocation, as well as trespass, contract
violation, and punishment), implicitly defended by Schuck (as a path of least
political resistance), and supported generally by Cox and Posner's model (in terms
of informational advantage)-fails as an immigration enforcement framework.
This is so at least insofar as immigration regulation is intended to facilitate
determinations as to membership and claims to remain (or characteristics of
desirability and belonging), and insofar as criminal law administration seeks to
punish or deter serious harms perpetrated against persons or property.
III.

CASUALTIES OF THE

U.S.

CRIMINAL-IMMIGRATION CONVERGENCE

The U.S. criminal-immigration convergence fails as an immigration enforcement framework in at least the following three respects: (A) it distorts the focus of
immigration regulation and enforcement from claims to membership, and to enter,
or remain, instead mistakenly equating criminal law contact with un-belonging
and undesirability; (B) it diverts criminal law administrative resources from more
pressing crime concerns toward the regulation of a population with uniquely low
rates of commission of violent crimes who are in large part already subject to
removal from the United States; and (C) it perpetuates an entrenched institutional
attachment in immigration regulatory settings to a crime-centered framework that
is associated with unnecessary forms of incarceration and excessive harshness, and
effectively returns to criminal law forms of excessive punishment such as
banishment that had been previously abandoned as inconsistent with prevailing
norms.
A. Concern for Membership

The various justifications of the criminal-immigration convergence each misapprehend fundamental empirical and normative dimensions of the situations and
persons they purport to address-a result of the fundamental disconnect between a
conventional criminal law and crime-centered conceptual framework and the more
nuanced regulatory concerns core to a functional immigration regime. Relying

163. See id. at 827-28,831.
164. My objection is not to ex post screening per se, but to the use of criminal justice system contact as a proxy
within the ex post screening apparatus.
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upon the criminal law for informational advantage (as an immigration regulatory
proxy) assumes that criminal law contact adequately captures features of unbelonging or undesirability. This Section will demonstrate that, in large part, this
assumption is false. Further, the steep costs associated with criminal-immigration
enforcement cast serious doubt on any efficiency gains attributed to it. And
although a trespass theory presumes there has been an unlawful entry, or an entry
without invitation, and absent some form of substantial adverse possession or
claim to belonging, this Section will also suggest this presumption is false in the
case of many persons inextricably impacted by the U.S. criminal-immigration
convergence. A contract violation or punishment theory would require some
correspondence between the violation at issue, and the response contemplated.
Again, this correspondence is absent in many cases at the core of U.S. criminalimmigration enforcement. Finally, political palatability as a justification for
large-scale regulatory enforcement must be constrained by some form of accountability to concerns of justice. This Section will suggest that insofar as the U.S.
criminal-immigration convergence substitutes a crime-centered conceptual framework for concern for membership or other immigration regulatory priorities, its
legitimacy is severely compromised because in many instances it produces results
that are manifestly unjust.
Ultimately, the failure of the U.S. criminal-immigration convergence lies in
significant part in the mismatch between the institutional culture and concerns of
criminal law enforcement, on the one hand, and the concern for membership and
sorting rightful claims to belonging central to immigration law. Contact with
criminal law enforcement is a poor proxy for un-belonging. Many of the persons
who come into contact with criminal law enforcement officers and are identified as
noncitizens cannot be subject to removal. Many are lawful permanent residents.
More than an isolated few are in fact U.S. citizens. Others still may be asylees or
refugees. Even undocumented residents may successfully press compelling claims
for relief from removal. Among each of these groups, considerable numbers of
those who are subject to removal due to criminal law contact ought not to be,
irrespective of their legal status, in light of their abiding interests to remain.
Consequently, criminal law fails as an immigration regulatory proxy because it
relies upon an inaccurate indicator of un-belonging, criminal law contact. 165
Justificatory frameworks grounded in a conception of trespass, or contract violation, or political expediency likewise fail with regard to many of the noncitizens
targeted by criminal-immigration enforcement. Because the particularities of
distinct groups of immigrants matter to the analysis, I consider separately harms to
lawfully present persons first, and then to unauthorized immigrants.

165. This flaw is consistent with Motomura's critique of Cox and Posner's theoretical model: that while the ex
post (criminal law) screening approach may apply persuasively to certain unauthorized immigrants, it is
inapplicable to other categories of noncitizens, such as lawful permanent residents. See generally Motomura,
Choosing Immigrants, supra note 16.
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1. Lawfully Present Persons
Of those immigrants who have been subject to removal from the United States
as a consequence of criminal law contact, at least twenty percent were in the
country lawfully, frequently after having lived and worked for decades in the
United States with their family and loved ones. 166 Lawfully present persons
targeted in the U.S. criminal-immigration convergence include individuals with
various distinct immigration statuses, among them: lawful permanent residents,
U.S. citizens, and asylees and refugees. 167
Lawful Permanent Residents: Long-term lawful permanent residents of the
United States-who often have extensive U.S. family ties-have been subject to
removal en masse from the United States following criminal law contact. Since the
1996 immigration reforms went into effect, more than 87,000 lawful permanent
residents have faced deportation from the United States as a result of criminal
conviction, ranging from minor public order violations to more serious criminal
infractions involving harm to other persons. 168
Lawful permanent residents are legally admitted to the United States for an
indefinite period of residence. The justificatory foundation of criminal-immigration enforcement in a conception of ongoing trespass plainly does not apply to
lawful permanent residents. Nor can their presence in the United States properly be
understood as merely a "privilege" as the immigration agency has suggested in
public cornment. 169 Although lawful permanent residents are eligible to become
U.S. citizens after (in most cases) five years of U.S. residence, the advantages of
naturalization may not seem significant to many, and for persons of modest means,
the associated costs are considerable. 170 As a practical matter, a lawful permanent
resident has permission from the U.S. government to live and work for the entirety
of his or her life in the United States, and is free to travel internationally and

166. FoRCED APART (BY THE NUMBERS), supra note 8, at 2; see Chac6n, Unsecured Borders, supra note 65, at
1846 ("[M]ore than 156,000 'aggravated felons' who have been removed from the United States since 1997 had
been in the country an average of fifteen years prior to being put into removal proceedings, and 25% had been here
over twenty years.").
167. In response to the wrongful arrest and deportation of U.S. citizens and lawful residents, Senator
Menendez (D-NJ) introduced the Protect Citizens and Residents from Unlawful Detention Act. The proposed bill
finds that ICE has "mistakenly detained and deported United States citizens and lawful permanent residents" as a
result of "[m]istaken identities, bureaucratic mix-ups, and discriminatory attitudes." Protect Citizens and
Residents from Unlawful Detention Act, S. 1549, I lith Cong. § 2 (1st Sess. 2009).
168. This number represents approximately ten percent of the total population of those removed from the
United States on criminal grounds. FoRCED APART (BY THE NUMBERS), supra note 8, at 24.
169. Recall this justification for criminal-immigration enforcement offered by a government spokesperson: "If
you haven't become a citizen, you are here as a privilege. And, if you commit a crime, you Jose that privilege." See
Swilley, supra note 19.
170. The cost for the naturalization application itself is well over $500. This application fee does not include
any attorney's fees, which are often substantial. One may feel compelled to hire an attorney as the immigration
legal process is complicated and difficult for a non-expert to navigate. See U.S. CmZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERV.
(USCIS), NATURALIVJ'ION APPLICATION N-400 INSTRUCTIONS, available at http://www.uscis.gov.
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reenter without advance permission. 171 The most significant practical differences
in terms of political rights and social entitlements between residents and citizens
are that citizens, unlike residents, may vote in state and national elections and are
eligible for a greater range of public assistance; and of course, primarily subject to
the U.S. criminal-immigration convergence, lawful residents are vulnerable to
deportation whereas in principle citizens are not. 172 Notwithstanding their vulnerability to deportation, however, because lawful permanent residents have a lawful
claim to indefinite presence in the United States, a trespass or privilege justification for criminal prosecution or criminal removal is inapplicable to them.
A contract violation or retributive punishment justification of criminalimmigration enforcement as applied to lawful residents would entail that in virtue
of criminal law contact or criminal conviction, the U.S. government is entitled to
revoke entirely the permission of the lawful resident to remain in the United States.
This seems justifiable as a response to the relevant criminal conduct only inasmuch
as the conduct is sufficiently egregious to justify such a remedy in virtue of the
strength of the lawful resident's claim to membership and in accord with the
relevant agreement. This proportionality constraint would similarly be applicable
to a retributive criminal punishment account of the criminal removal of lawful
permanent residents. As will be explored infra in Section III.B, in the significant
majority of criminal removals involving lawful residents, the criminal conduct at
issue is relatively minor. This suggests that for the substantial majority of criminal
removals of lawful residents, the contract violation and retributive criminal
justificatory frameworks fall short. There are further reasons to reject the entry
contract justification as an accurate reflection of the immigration process, not the
least of which is that the functional nature of the relationship between a noncitizen
and the government changes dramatically over time in ways not reflected in the
initial agreement regarding entry. However, even assuming the applicability of a
contract conception of criminal-immigration enforcement, the contract and punishment frameworks lack justificatory power as applied to lawful permanent residents
as both seek to justify a remedy (deportation) without regard to proportionality or
to the severity of the offending conduct within the overall scheme of the
agreement.
In terms of a justificatory account predicated on informational advantage, a
lawful permanent resident's contact with criminal law enforcement offers little
reliable data about that person's belonging, assimilability, or desirability. 173
171. See, e.g., Nancy Morawetz, The Invisible Border: Restrictions on Travel by Non-Citizens, 21 GEO.
lMMIGR. L.J. 201,205-11 (2007).
172. See Should I Consider U.S. Citizenship?, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVS., http://www.uscis.gov/
portal/site/uscis/menuitem. 749cabd81 f5ffc8fba713d I 0526e0aa0/?vgnextoid =4ad708e46986f21 OV gn VCM
I 00000082ca60aRCRD&vgnextchannel = Oe8808e46986f21 OV gn VCM I 00000082ca60aRCRD (last visited Jan.
29, 2012).
173. It is worth clarifying again that Cox and Posner's theory of informational advantage applies on their
account only to unauthorized immigrants. However, the theoretical framework in which reliance on criminal law
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Lawful permanent residents identified by the use of criminal law as an immigration
screen include many individuals who have resided in the United States since
childhood, have completed all of their formal schooling in U.S. educational
institutions, speak English as their primary language, and have extensive family
ties in the United States to U.S. citizen and lawful resident children, parents,
siblings and other loved ones. 174 If removed from the United States, long-term
lawful residents frequently arrive back in their respective countries of birth,
without family ties, employment prospects, or cultural literacy, further burdening
already impoverished countries mostly in the Caribbean, Mexico, and Central
America. 175
Precisely because of these substantial ties on the part of lawful permanent
residents, Congress has retained a discretionary waiver available to certain lawful
residents facing deportation. So, in some instances, lawful permanent residents are
detained for prolonged periods, but are ultimately permitt~d to remain in the
United States. One such case involved a Mr. B.:
[A] 57-year-old lawful permanent resident of the United States for more than
forty years with US citizen children and grandchildren, [who] spent four years
in mandatory detention while fighting deportation. In August 2003, he pled
guilty to two misdemeanors and received probation.... ICE officers arrested
Mr. B based on the misdemeanor convictions and sought to deport him ....
[H]e remained in detention while his case went through several government
appeals. In November 2007 [four years after his initial detention], the federal
court of appeals ... ordered his immediate release. 176

Subjecting lawful permanent residents like Mr. B to deportation proceedings
following criminal law contact offers little informational advantage to the state,
and imposes a considerable cost due to prolonged case processing and detention.
This cost is incurred with no apparent purpose in cases such as Mr. B's, where the
lawful resident ultimately remains in the United States. But to do otherwise, that is
to remove lawful residents like Mr. B, rupturing longstanding family and employment relationships in the United States, would be to perpetrate severe harm to
those family members, employers, and the residents themselves. And the State
would not have obtained any informational benefit because contact with criminal
law enforcement in most instances involving lawful permanent residents would
not have meaningfully identified un-belonging, inassimilability, or undesirability.

serves as an immigration regulatory proxy applies equally in principle (and in practice) to lawful residents, and
practically the two categories are difficult to disassociate once criminal law is used as an immigration screen. See
Cox & Posner, supra note 16.
174. See Morawetz, Understanding, supra note 96, at 1952-53.
175. FORCED APART (BY THE NUMBERS), supra note 8, at 22.
176. AMNESTY INT'L, JAILED WITHOUT JUSTICE: iMMIGRATION DETENTION IN THE USA 22 (2009), http://www.
arnnestyusa.org/pdfs/JailedWithoutJustice.pdf.
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Still, in many thousands of instances, lawful permanent residents have been
subject to removal as a consequence of criminal conviction, where relief, such as
that afforded Mr. B, was unavailable. A justification from political palatability
cannot stand up to the harm perpetrated in many of these cases. Mr. Padilla, the
petitioner in the case before the Supreme Court cited in the epigraph on page 107,
had been a lawful permanent resident of the United States for more than forty years
and had served the United States honorably in the Vietnam War. 177 If ultimately
convicted of a drug transportation crime involving marijuana, he will be ineligible
for almost any relief from removal. 178 Mr. Carachuri-Rosendo, the petitioner
whose case is cited in the epigraph on page 106, if not granted relief in the
practically unreviewable discretion of an immigration judge, will be deported
notwithstanding the fact that he has lived in the United States since he was five
years old, is the father and husband of U.S. citizens, and stands convicted only of
two minor drug possession offenses. 179 The conclusion to be drawn from this is
that criminal-immigration enforcement ought to be applied to lawful permanent
residents, if at all, only where the egregiousness of their conduct is such that it
overcomes their claims to belonging, and where the sanction of removal is roughly
proportional as a remedy to the criminal wrong at issue.
U.S. Citizens: The misguided large-scale application of U.S. criminalimmigration enforcement to long-term lawful permanent residents is but one small
piece of a much broader set of problems-including the detention and removal of
misidentified U.S. citizens, asylees, refugees, and other long-term U.S. residents.
Criminal-immigration enforcement has resulted in the repeated apprehension,
detention, and even deportation of U.S. citizens who are profiled mistakenly as
foreign-born. 180 These individuals may be U.S.-born or naturalized citizens, or
they may have acquired or derived citizenship through birth abroad to a U.S.
citizen parent or through the naturalization of one or both of their parents during
their childhood. 181
The detention and deportation of U.S. citizens reflect fundamental structural
problems with the U.S. criminal-immigration convergence, because the convergence's basic processes create unmanageable risks that, even with procedural
modifications, U.S. citizens will be subject to criminal-immigration enforcement
and the severe harms such enforcement entails. The trespass, contract, and
punishment justificatory bases for criminal-immigration enforcement are without
question inapplicable to U.S. citizens; and, no legitimate account predicated on
177. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1477 (2010).
178. See id. at 1477-78.
179. See Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 2577, 2580 (2010).
180. See Jacqueline Stevens, U.S. Government Detaining and Deporting U.S. Citizens as Aliens, 18 VA. J. Soc.
PoL'Y & L. 606, 607-{)8 (2011) (asserting that citizens are mistaken as noncitizens in deportation decisions).
181. See, e.g., Tyche Hendricks, U.S. Citizens Wrongly Detained, Deported by ICE, S.F. CHRON. (July 27,
2009), http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2009/07/26/MNGQ 17C8GC.DTL (relating the story of
a U.S. citizen wrongfully detained in an Arizona prison due to a mistaken immigration status).
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political palatability or infonnational advantage can render legitimate the confinement and deportation of U.S. citizens.
Yet, in a stunning account of the wrongful detention and removal of U.S.
citizens, political theorist Professor Jacqueline Stevens has unmasked a problem
far greater in scope than was previously understood to exist. 182 In 2007, the Vera
Institute conducted a study that found more than 300 individuals at several
immigration detention facilities who had non-frivolous claims to U.S. citizenship.183 Stevens's more recent study, in contrast, suggests that up to one percent of
noncitizens detained by ICE in Southern Arizona between 2006 and 2008 had their
cases tenninated by an immigration judge in virtue of their U.S. citizenshipindicating a significant structural quandary, potentially impacting thousands of
vulnerable persons. 184
These instances are not simply isolated mistakes, but are the inevitable consequence of an immigration enforcement system that melds criminal and immigration regulatory functions, and operates on the presumption that criminal law
contact serves reliably as a proxy for un-belonging or undesirability. This approach
is wrong-headed because it misapprehends the legal and factual complexity of
immigration-related claims that must be sorted through a criminal law screen
ill-suited to assessing such matters. The broad application of Secure Communities
and other related ICE programs that refer for deportation processing any person
who encounters the criminal law and is suspected to be a match as deportable,
results in repeated contact of persons who may appear to be noncitizens to officers,
but in fact have colorable claims to U.S. citizenship. Because of the quick transfer
to ICE custody of suspected noncitizens following criminal law contact, even
those with valid U.S. citizenship may not be carrying documentation or even have
readily available documentation to substantiate their citizenship. According to a
study by the Brennan Center for Justice at New York University, seven percent of
U.S. citizens do not have readily available evidence of their citizenship; twelve
percent of U.S. citizens earning less than $25,000 lack access to a U.S. passport,
naturalization papers, or their U.S. birth certificate. 185
The experience of U.S. citizens subjected by ICE to immigration detention and
deportation-as reflected in federal court opinions and testimony before Congressillustrates some of the concrete consequences associated with use of criminal law
as a proxy for un-belonging. In one case, Rennison Castillo, a U.S. Anny veteran

182. See generally Stevens, supra note 180.
183. AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 176, at 20 (2009); see Jessica Corsi, Release of Citizen Held in Immigration
Detention Highlights Difficulties for Others, HARV. L. RECORD, Nov. 19, 2009 (relating the story of a detainee with
a citizenship claim under the Child Citizenship Act).
184. See Stevens, supra note 180, at 622 (discussing statistics from data collected by the Florence Immigrant
and Refugee Rights Project).
185. BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, CITIZENS WITHOUT PROOF: A SURVEY OF AMERICANS' POSSESSION OF
DOCUMENTARY PROOF OF CITIZENSHIP AND PHOTO lDENTIACATION 2 (2006), http://www.brennancenter.org/page/-/
d/download_file_39242.pdf.
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and naturalized U.S. cttizen since 1998, was incarcerated for more than seven
months at an immigration detention center in Washington before being released. 186
Castillo had immigrated to the United States at the age of seven, became a lawful
permanent resident by age fifteen, and naturalized around his twenty-first birthday.187 Following a minor criminal conviction, immigration officers interviewed
Castillo in jail, and subsequently charged him as removable on account of "a crime
of moral turpitude." 188 Castillo repeatedly informed immigration officers that he
was a U.S. citizen, that he had served in the U.S. army, and he recounted details of
his naturalization ceremony. 189 Castillo explained that documentation to establish
his claim was in the locked trunk of his car, but no attempt was made to access this
information, and Castillo did not have family members in the area to assist him. 190
Though he was without a lawyer, Castillo pleaded in court with the immigration
judge, recounting the same details of his U.S. citizenship and absence of ties to
Belize; the Judge responded that Castillo "can'tjust expect me to believe you-your
claim that you're a United States citizen." 191 Castillo was only releasedfollowing 226 days in immigration detention-after obtaining pro bono counsel
and appealing to the Board of Immigration Appeals. 192 Castillo has sued the ICE
officers responsible for his detention and is seeking unspecified monetary damages
and an apology. 193
Another U.S. citizen, Herbert Flores-Torres, spent far longer in immigration
detention before his case was resolved, and his experience illustrates yet further
structural flaws that threaten to impact a wide range of citizens and others with
compelling membership claims. Flores-Torres was detained in ICE custody for
three years as he sought to prove his U.S. citizenship, before ultimately winning
his claim in a habeas action in federal district court. 194 Flores-Torres immigrated to
the United States from El Salvador when he was eight years old; he became a
lawful permanent resident several years later; and his mother naturalized when he
was seventeen, entitling Flores-Torres to U.S. citizenship provided he was an
illegitimate child. 195 Whether a child derives citizenship based on the naturaliza-

186. See Castillo v. Skwarski, No. C08-5683BHS, 2009 WL4844801, at *I, *4 (W.O. Wash., Dec. 10, 2009).
187. See Manuel Valdes, Judge Won't Dismiss Suit over Detention, SEATTLE TIMES (Feb. 2, 2010), http://seattle
times.nwsource.comlhtmlllocalnews/2010963485_citizendetained03.html (relating the story of Mr. Castillo).
188. Castillo, 2009 WL 4844801, at *2.
189. /d.
190. /d. at *3. When Castillo was booked into the Northwest Detention Center, an immigration officer asked
Castillo if he wanted to go "home" and subsequently provided him with paperwork to sign that would have
affected a stipulated removal order. See id. at *2. Castillo refused to sign. See id.
191. /d. at *3.
192. /d. at *4.
193. See id. at *I, *6; Valdes, supra note 187 (noting the relief requested by Mr. Castillo).
194. See Flores-Torres v. Holder, 680 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1100 (N.D. Cal. 2009) ("After a bench trial this order
now determines that petitioner became and remains a United States citizen pursuant to former 8 U.S.C. [§]
1432(a) upon the naturalization of his mother on September 15, 1995.").
195. See id. at 1103; Flores-Torres v. Mukasey, 548 F.3d 708,709-10 (9th Cir. 2008).
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tion of their parent under U.S. immigration law is controlled by the version of the
statute in effect at the time of the parent's naturalization and the child's minority.
Cases of acquired and derivative citizenship are often complex, requiring analysis
of both U.S. and foreign law, and are not amenable to depersonalized non-expert
screening effectuated by ICE's computer-based instantaneous processing conducted remotely by rank and file law enforcement officers. 196
For Flores-Torres, whose mother naturalized in 1995, the statute then in effect,
Immigration and Nationality Act section 321(a), former 8 U.S.C. § 1432(a), stated
in its entirety:
(a) A child born outside of the United States of alien parents, or of an alien
parent and a citizen parent who has subsequently lost citizenship of the United
States, becomes a citizen of the United States upon fulfillment of the following
conditions:
( 1) The naturalization of both parents; or
(2) The naturalization of the surviving parent if one of the parents is
deceased; or
(3) The naturalization of the parent having legal custody of the child
when there has been a legal separation of the parents or the naturalization
of the mother if the child was born out of wedlock and the paternity of
the child has not been established by legitimation; and if
(4) Such naturalization takes place while such child is under the age of
eighteen years; and
(5) Such child is residing in the United States pursuant to lawful
admission for permanent residence at the time of the naturalization of the
parent last naturalized under clause (1) of this subsection, or the parent
naturalized under clause (2) or (3) of this subsection, or thereafter begins
to reside permanently in the United States while under the age of
eighteen years. 197

In 2000, the former section 1432(a) was repealed and amended to permit more
readily derivation of citizenship through the naturalization of a parent. 198 The new
statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1431, permits a lawful resident noncitizen child to derive
citizenship from the naturalization of either parent, so long as that parent has
custody, regardless of the status of the second parent or the legitimacy of the

196. The government had contested Flores-Torres's citizenship on the grounds that he was not truly
illegitimate as he had lived with his father for several months during his childhood. See Flores- Torres, 680 F.
Supp. 2d at II 03. The district court found that Torres was never legitimized; that when "in middle school in Los
Angeles" he had "problems in school with gang members"; was sent "to stay with his father in San Antonio"; "his
mother sent him money to pay for his expenses"; his "father did not introduce him to anyone including his wife
and daughters as his son"; "treated him 'like a stranger' and made him sleep in the laundry room." See id.; see also
Press Release, U.C. Davis L. Sch., Law School Clinics Free Client from Immigration Detention (Jan. 5, 2010),
http://www.law.ucdavis.edu/news/news.aspx?id = 24 77.
197. 8 U.S.C. § 1432(a) (1994).
198. See id. at§ 1431 (2000).
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child. 199 As a consequence of the 2000 amendment, many more persons under the
age of eighteen (as of 2000) are now U.S. citizens if their parents have naturalized.
This means that the widespread application of criminal-immigration enforcement
measures to persons from mixed citizenship families-a large class of persons-is
increasingly likely to result in the detention and deportation of persons who are in
fact U.S. citizens.
Some U.S. citizens detained by ICE have actually been physically removed
from the United States. Pedro Guzman, a U.S.-bom citizen who suffers from a
severe mental disability, was induced by U.S. immigration authorities to sign
"voluntary return" documents indicating he was a Mexican citizen without legal
status in the United States?00 In May 2007, when Guzman was twenty-nine years
old, he was removed by U.S. immigration officials from Men's Central Jail in Los
Angeles, where he was held on a misdemeanor trespassing charge, to Tijuana,
where he spent months eating out of dumpsters as his mother looked desperately
for him in morgues, hospitals, and shelters in Mexico. 201 Guzman had been
employed as a cement mixer, had only a second-grade reading ability, and spoke
limited Spanish. 202 After three months living on the streets at the CaliforniaMexico border, he was reunited with his family in Calexico.Z03 But for Guzman,
removal meant 89 days eating out of garbage cans and bathing in canals .... [H]e had tried to reenter the United States at San Ysidro but had been
repeatedly turned away. He then walked 100 miles east to reach the border
crossing at Mexicali [and] ... returned to the United States fearful, stuttering,
and no longer able to communicate ... _2°4
U.S. citizens of Latin American or Caribbean ancestry who suffer from mental
disability or mental illness are particularly vulnerable to immigration detention
and deportation. In 2001, Deolinda Smith-Willmore, a senior citizen with schizo-

199. See id. Section 1431 states:
(a) A child born outside of the United States automatically becomes a citizen of the United States
when all of the following conditions have been fulfilled:
(I) At least one parent of the child is a citizen of the United States, whether by birth or
naturalization.
(2) The child is under the age of eighteen years.
(3) The child is residing in the United States in the legal and physical custody of the citizen parent
pursuant to a lawful admission for permanent residence.

/d.
200. Problems with ICE Interrogation, Detention, & Removal Procedures: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border Security, & lnt'l Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, II Oth Con g.
70 (2008) [hereinafter Problems with ICE Interrogation] (statement of Rachel E. Rosenbloom, Human Rights
Fellow & Supervising Attorney, Ctr. for Human Rights & Int'l Justice, Boston Coli.).
201. See id. at 33 (statement of James J. Broshanahan & Mark D. Rosenbaum).
202. See id. at 30.
203. See id. at 33, 78.
204. See id. at 78 (statement of Rachel E. Rosenbloom).
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phrenia who was born in Ossining, New York in 1931 to a Dominican mother and
African-American father, was administratively removed from the United States to
the Dominican Republic. 205 Immigration officials encountered Smith-Willmore in
prison, and although she was clear that she is a U.S. citizen, no efforts were made
to corroborate her claim and she never saw an immigrationjudge. 206
The cases of U.S. citizens subject to immigration detention and removal
illustrate several important structural problems with the use of criminal law as an
immigration screen. First, immigration law is characterized not by clear delimitations of guilt and innocence as a crime-centered conceptual framework suggests,
but by complex variations of status and claims to membership. To determine
whether one is a U.S. citizen or is otherwise entitled to remain in the United States
may involve sophisticated statutory and factual analysis, which criminal law
enforcement officers are ill equipped to perform. 207 Further, the dragnet created by
numerically targeted criminal-immigration enforcement-with a goal of 400,000
removals per year-exacerbates these proble111s, where the complicated membership claims of large numbers of individuals must be quickly resolved?08 Finally,
harms associated with mistaken determinations are severe-including unlawful
prolonged detention and removal to a foreign state-especially so for the mentally

m?o9

·

In a policy memorandum issued on November 19, 2009, ICE Director Morton
provided guidance regarding the treatment during apprehension, detention, and

205. See id. at 74.
206. See id. Administrative removal, a fast-track removal process in which cases are adjudicated by an
immigration officer rather than an immigration judge, was established by Congress in 1994 to apply to immigrants
convicted of an "aggravated felony" who are not admitted for permanent residence, or are conditional permanent
residents, or have not yet lifted the conditions on residency status. See 8 U.S.C. § 1228 (2006). See generally
Morawetz, Understanding, supra note 96 (discussing mandatory deportation of legal permanent residents for
seemingly minor crimes, which are classified as aggravated felonies).
207. For example, in addition to the complexity of acquired and derivative citizenship statutes, as noted in Part
I, supra, the term "aggravated felony" under the INA includes many minor convictions, even misdemeanors under
state law, and though the definitional parameters remain in flux, since 2004, the government has lost several cases
in the Supreme Court concerning the reach of the term, one decided unanimously and another by a margin of 8-1.
See Lopez v. Gonzales, 549 U.S. 47, 50 (2006) (holding that a drug possession offense that does not qualify as a
felony under federal law is not an aggravated felony); Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. I, 4 (2004) (holding that a DUI
is not an aggravated felony). This suggests that it is a legally complex matter to determine eligibility for
administrative processing (for which aggravated felony analysis is a threshold consideration), and is therefore a
difficult analysis for low-level law enforcement officers to undertake. Although a claim to U.S. citizenship is to
trigger referral to an immigration judge, this safeguard has repeatedly failed in fast-track proceedings, as evidenced by the
case of Smith-Willmore. See 8 U.S.C. § 1228; Problems with ICE Interrogation, supra note 200, at 70.
208. See Spencer Hsu & Andrew Becker, ICE Officials Set Quota to Deport More Illegal Immigrants, WASH.
PosT (Mar. 27, 20 I 0), http://www. washingtonpost.cornlwp-dynlcontent/article/20 I 0/03/26/AR20 I 0032604891.
html.
209. See Problems with ICE Interrogation, supra note 200, at 76.
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removal proceedings of persons claiming to be U.S. citizens.Z 10 Although he
expressly instructed officers not to take into custody individuals who provide
persuasive evidence of U.S. citizenship which "outweighs evidence to the contrary," such individuals may still be placed into removal proceedings if there is
reason to believe they are "in th~ United States in violation of law." 211 Where a
person, such as Mr. Castillo, is unable to produce evidence corroborating citizenship, "the individual may be arrested and processed for removal." 212 Given the
complex factual and legal issues at stake in an inquiry of acquired or derivative
citizenship, it is not clear how a criminal law enforcement officer cross-deputized
under the 287(g) program or even line ICE officers will be able to competently
make a determination as to the relative probative value of the available evidence? 13
ICE has sought to establish additional procedural safeguards, but these are also
inadequate to address the relevant structural problems? 14 The 2009 Morton
Memorandum requires that an interview with the detainee be conducted, in which
probative questions about citizenship are raised; "[a]dditional steps to be taken
may include vital records searches, family interviews, and other appropriate
investigative measures." 215 There is no mandatory language applied to the steps
that must be taken to attempt to corroborate claims to U.S. citizenship beyond the
custodial interview. If a person does not have readily available proof of U.S.
citizenship, which is not infrequently the case for low-income persons, then ICE is
under no further obligation to take any specific investigative steps. 216 No counsel
is appointed (and there is no right to government-subsidized counsel in immigration proceedings)-all that is mandated in terms of representation is that ICE

210. Memorandum from John Morton, Assistant Sec'y of Immigration & Customs Enforcement to Field
Office Dirs., Special Agents in Charge, & Chief Counsels (Nov. 19, 2009) [hereinafter 2009 Memorandum] (on
file with author).
211. See id.
212. See id. at 2. Officers are advised that "any uncertainty ... should weigh against detention," but what
threshold precisely suffices to create uncertainty is left undefined. See id. at 2.
213. Field Office Directors and Special Agents in Charge should "ensure that all state and local officers with
delegated immigration authority pursuant to INA § 287(g) ... understand and adhere to this policy" and ICE
supervisors are "to thoroughly investigate all [U.S. Citizen] claims made by individuals encountered by [§]287(g)
designated officers." See id. at 3.
214. Where someone self-identifies as a U.S. citizen, the procedure whereby the merits of the case are to be
examined is as follows: an interview with the detainee will be conducted under oath and "must include ...
probative questions designed to elicit information sufficient to allow a thorough investigation of the person's
claim of citizenship." See id. at 2-3. The memorandum elaborates a set of internal steps of reporting up that must
be taken in cases where individuals claim U.S. citizenship, including preparation of internal memoranda and
database entries. See id. at 2.
215. See id. at 3 (emphasis added).
216. See Andrew Becker & Patrick J. McDonnell, U.S. Citizens Caught Up in Immigration Sweeps, L.A. TIMES
(Apr. 9, 2009), http://articles.latimes.com/2009/apr/09/nation!na-citizen9 (discussing how detainees often do not
carry proof of their citizenship which could lead to confusion about their immigration status; since official
investigations fail, detainees are often unable to prove their citizenship without a lawyer's help); 2009
Memorandum, supra note 210, at 3.
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officers provide the individual with a list of pro bono legal service providers. 217
Accordingly, the protective mechanisms implemented by ICE are likely to be
inadequate to protect the most vulnerable U.S. citizens. The justifications of
criminal-immigration enforcement discussed above-in terms of efficient resource
allocation, informational advantage, political palatability, trespass, contract, and
punishment--do not address adequately the harm imposed on such persons by the
convergence of U.S. criminal and immigration law enforcement. 218
These structural problems cannot be resolved by isolated procedural reforms.
Holding constant current enforcement levels and criminal-immigration enforcement practices, meaningful inquiry into claims of status adequate to prevent
frequent errors would grind the wheels of immigration "justice" to a far slower
pace, if not to a halt.
Asylees and Refugees: During the period 1997-2007, over 1000 persons coded
as refugees in ICE's recorded data were removed from the United States as a
consequence of a criminal conviction. 219 The number of refugees in the ICE
dataset almost certainly reflects only some of those persons with refugee status,
and not many others who may have had a claim for asylum or refugee status, but
whose status was either unrecorded or who were unable to prevail on a claim for
relief from removal as an asylee or refugee. 220
To deport a refugee or asylee based on criminal law contact is potentially to
return that person to a situation where he or she will be persecuted, possibly
tortured, or even killed? 21 Persons who have been convicted of an "aggravated
felony" are ineligible for asylum; some are ineligible for another form of relief
entitled "withholding of removal"; and many may obtain relief only under the
Convention Against Torture ("CAT"). CAT relief is available only if a noncitizen is
able to prove that he or she will be tortured with the complicity of government
officials upon removal-a difficult evidentiary task, especially for persons who
appear in court prose or are subject to fast-track processing?22
For other refugees or asylees, the danger in their countries of birth may have
passed, but when these persons have developed strong ties to the United States, the
harms to them entailed by their removal are grave and the responsibility for the
circumstances that led to their criminal conduct may lie equally, if not more so,

217. See 2009 Memorandum, supra note 210, at 2.
218. See supra Part II.
219. FoRCED APART (BY THE NUMBERS), supra note 8, at 39 (documenting that 1038 refugees were removed
from the United States on criminal grounds according to ICE data).
220. See id. at 23 (noting that ICE's data contains no immigration status information in seven percent of cases).
221. See Stanley Mailman & Stephen Yale-Loehr, Detaining and Criminalizing Asylum Seekers, 8 BENDER's
lMMIGR. BULL 763 (May I, 2003).
222. See Colleen Melody, Trading Information for Safety: Immigrant Informants, Federal Law-Enforcement
Agents, and the Viability of Non-Deportation Agreements, 83 WASH. L. REv. 599, 603...{)4 (2008) (citing EXEC.
OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REv., FY 2007 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK (2008) http://www.justice.gov/eoir/statspub/
fy07syb.pdf).
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with the country of residence than the country of origin.Z23 Professor Bill Ong
Hing has powerfully argued for these reasons, that in the case of Cambodian
refugees, deportation is an unjust sanction.Z 24
The same concerns about the applicability of a trespass metaphor, of the tailored
or proportional nature of the remedy of deportation in terms of contract or criminal
violation, and of the accuracy of criminal law contact as a proxy for un-belonging
and undesirability, apply to asylees and refugees as they do to lawful permanent
residents and U.S. citizens. With regard to all three of these categories of persons,
the U.S. criminal-immigration convergence overlooks fundamental concerns regarding the purposes of immigration regulation and the relevance of membership
status, and in so doing perpetrates severe harms. The institutional structure of the
U.S. criminal-immigration convergence-which necessarily involves delegation
of complex and nuanced membership determinations to line law enforcement
officers--cannot but catch in its midst lawful residents, U.S. citizens, and those
with claims to asylum or refugee status.
2. Unauthorized Immigrants
Another category of persons with compelling membership claims targeted for
criminal-immigration enforcement is that of immigrants who are undocumented or
have overstayed a temporary visa, but nonetheless have accumulated a long period
of residence and substantial ties to the United States. Some of these persons have
strong membership claims: they may have lived in the United States for much of
their lives, attended school in this country, speak English as their primary
language, and may be husbands or wives, parents, or children of U.S. citizens or
legal residents. 225 In fact, the membership claims of certain undocumented
residents may be as strong if not stronger than certain lawful permanent residents
or citizens.
Removal of long-term unauthorized residents on the basis of criminal law
contact may result in forcible family separation. The forcible physical separation
of U.S. citizen children from their parents-impacting many thousands of children
since 1997 226--causes enormous suffering for those children, and possible economic devastation for the entire family when the deportee is the primary income223. See Bill Ong Hing, Detention to Deportation-Rethinking the Removal of Cambodian Refugees, 38 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 891 (2005).
224. See id.
225. As the political philosopher Joseph Carens has poignantly argued, "[p]eople who live and work and raise
their families in a society become members, whatever their legal status." JosEPH H. CARENS, IMMIGRANTS AND THE
RIGHT TO STAY 18 (20 I 0) (hereinafter, CARENS, RIGHT TO STAY]. In effect, Carens proposes, "the passage of time
creates a moral claim to stay." See id. at 23.
226. Estimates based on findings by the Pew Hispanic Center and U.S. Census Bureau indicate that 196,674
unlawfully present individuals deported on criminal grounds since 1997 had a U.S. citizen or lawfully present
child or spouse. See FoRCED APART (BY THE NUMBERS), supra note 8, at 5. The Department of Homeland Security
has reported that it deported more than I 00,000 parents of U.S. citizen children in the ten years prior to 2007. See
Michael Falcone, 100,000 Parents of Citizens Were Deported Over 10 Years, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2009, at A 16.
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earner. 227 In this regard, the large-scale family separation effected by U.S.
criminal-immigration enforcement runs contrary to one of the most significant
motivating principles of the post-1965 framework of U.S. immigration law: family
unity. 228 Reflecting this commitment, immigration by immediate relatives of U.S.
citizens-spouses, parents, and children-is not subject to the numerical limitations that govern other types of immigration. 229
Just as with lawful residents, U.S. citizens, asylees and refugees, criminal law
contact serves as a poor proxy for un-belonging in the case of undocumented
residents with strong membership claims. From the standpoint of a contrace30 or
punishment justificatory theory, 231 for those individuals with strong membership
claims, permanent banishment from the United States as a result of minor criminal
law contact offends similar principles regarding proportionality as does the
banishment of U.S. citizens or lawful permanent residents. Although other undocumented residents may have only recently arrived in the United States and possess
weaker membership claims, to the extent the U.S. criminal-immigration regime
targets these individuals for federal criminal prosecution, a crime-centered framework distorts the complicated circumstances of poverty and disadvantage that
shape migration flows. A trespass justification232 is limited as applied even to
unauthorized immigrants, because at least for many, the circumstances that drove
them to immigrate render their presence somehow less than purely voluntary. The
functional invitation extended to unauthorized migrants for employment, and their
contribution through taxation, contradicts a conception of their presence as a
forced intrusion, hence undermining a trespass theory of criminal-immigration
enforcement as applied to this group. 233

****
If the four categories of persons with strong claims to U.S. membership who are
unjustifiably targeted by the convergence of U.S. criminal and immigration
enforcement are removed as legitimate targets-the many thousands of lawful

227. See Bryan Lonegan, American Diaspora: The Deportation of Lawful Residents from the United States
and the Destruction of Their Families, 32 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 55, 71 (2008) (internal citations and
quotation marks omitted).
228. See, e.g., Linda Kelly, Preserving the Fundamental Right to Family Unity: Championing Notions of
Social Contract and Community Ties in the Battle of Plenary Power Versus Aliens' Rights, 41 VILL. L. REv. 725,
729-30 (1996).
229. See 8 U.S.C. § Jl5l(b)(2)(A)(i)(2006).
230. See Motomura, Choosing Immigrants, supra note 16.
231. See Kanstroom, Deportation, supra note 20, at 1935.
232. See Motomura, Choosing Immigrants, supra note 16; Swilley, supra note 19.
233. For example, the Institute for Taxation and Economic Policy estimates that in 2010 alone, households
headed by unauthorized immigrants paid $11.2 billion in state and local taxes-including income, property, and
sales taxes. See Estimates of the State and Local Taxes Paid by Unauthorized Immigrant Households,
IMMIGRJmON PoLICY CTR., http:/www.immigrationpolicy.org/just-facts/unauthorized-immigrants-pay-taxes-too
(last visited Jan. 24, 2012).
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permanent residents, U.S. citizens, refugees and asylees, and long-term undocumented residents--criminal law contact on the part of noncitizens can no longer
serve as a ready proxy for deportation processing. Even if the foregoing analysis
only persuades as to U.S. citizens, asylees or refugees, or lawful permanent
residents, and not as to unauthorized immigrants, it remains the case that criminal
law contact cannot then serve, on its own, as a basis for identifying immigrant
targets for removal, because the sorting of lawful and unlawful immigrants,
refugees and those without claims to asylum, is itself a legally and factually
complicated task. This weakens considerably the efficiency rationale for relying
upon criminal law as an immigration screen as any concession regarding the
unsuitability of U.S. citizens, lawful residents, asylees or refugees as legitimate
targets would require substantial additional procedural protections to differentiate
appropriate from inappropriate targets. 234 If criminal law is to function as an
immigration screen on a large scale, nothing short of universal and immediate
access to counsel would suffice to protect the interests of vulnerable populations
given the complexity of the provisions, defenses, and forms of relief at stake. Even
that might ultimately prove inadequate as will be explored infra in Part V, but only
such a dramatic procedural rights reform would potentially be adequate to identify
that more limited number of cases in which criminal law contact serves as a
minimally defensible proxy for un-belonging, trespass, or a trigger for proportional immigration consequences.
B. Misguiding Crime Control

Not only does criminal law function poorly as a screen for membership or
belonging, but criminal-immigration enforcement is also flawed as a crime control
strategy or screen for criminal threat. Accordingly, in integrating criminal and
immigration enforcement, the administration of criminal law is undermined. At the
outset, a critical problem with criminal-immigration enforcement is that when
criminal law enforcement's function extends to immigration enforcement, it can
no longer be assumed that criminal law contact is initiated due to an individual's
priority as a criminal concern rather than on the basis of (possibly misguided)
immigration concerns. So, criminal law administration is refocused from an
emphasis on crime control to a dual function of immigration regulation and crime
control, potentially distorting both. Separately, insofar as criminal-immigration
enforcement focuses on criminally prosecuting immigration offenses, it allocates
crime control resources to an unnecessary prosecutorial program-one which is
difficult to justify either on a deterrence or retributive approach. Further, as a
broader crime control strategy, criminal-immigration enforcement is misguided
because it focuses resources intensively on immigrant communities, thereby

234. See Morton Memorandum, supra note 14.

146

AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49:105

catching immigrants committing minor crimes, when serious crimes are likely
being committed elsewhere. 235
1. Distorting Crime Control
The incentives and conduct of criminal law enforcement officers are shaped by
knowing that the U.S. government has set out to regulate immigration in significant part by targeting immigrants who come into contact with criminal law
enforcement. Criminal law enforcement officers have enormous discretion and a
great span of substantive criminal law violations they may pursue? 36 The criminal
law is not a perfectly insulated screen that functions independently as a proxy for
immigration decision-making. Rather, with immigration officers and criminal law
enforcement personnel working cooperatively, and with explicit instruction to
utilize criminal law as an immigration screen, an expected outcome would be that
immigrants would be targeted for criminal-immigration enforcement because that
is how the state has resolved to regulate migration, not because the affected
immigrants are in most instances particular priorities for criminal law enforcement
due to the danger they pose to the public? 37 Broad discretionary criminal law
enforcement authority makes it relatively easy for an officer so inclined to arrest
and book a suspected immigrant for the short period required to perform an
immigration screen. The availability of federal reimbursement to state governments for incarcerating foreign-born noncitizens further incentivizes state law
enforcement agencies to target such persons quite apart from their priority as
criminal suspects. 238
Initial empirical research on the outcomes associated with ICE's screening in
jails and prisons supports the distortion of crime control administration predicted
by merging criminal and immigration enforcement activity. When law enforcement in Irving, Texas began to have 24-hour access (via telephone and video
teleconference) to ICE in the local jails, discretionary arrests of Latinos for petty
offenses rose immediately and substantially?39 The dramatic rise in low-level
arrests of Latinos particularly impacted arrest levels for minor traffic offenses. 240
This arrest data provides strong evidence that the increase in arrests was attributable not to an increase in lawless behavior among Latinos, but to police engage-

235. In the aggregate, foreign-born persons are substantially less likely than U.S.-born persons to commit
crimes in the United States. See Robert J. Sampson, Open Doors Don't Invite Criminals, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. ll,
2006, atAlS.
236. See WASLIN, supra note 115.
237. See id. at 13 (discussing ICE's failure to focus on serious criminals).
238. See !RCA§ SOl(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1365 (2006).
239. See TREVOR GARDNER, II & AARTI KOHLI, THE CHIEF JUSTICE EARL WARREN !NST. ON RACE, ETHNICITY &
DNERSITY, THE CAP EFFEcr: RACIAL PROFILING IN THE ICE CRIMINAL ALIEN PROGRAM 1 (2009), http://www.
law.berkeley.edu/files/policybrief_irving_FINAL.pdf.
240. See id. at 4.
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ment in immigrant profiling tied to the ICE screening program. 241
All of the prevailing justifications of the U.S. criminal-immigration convergence overlook the likelihood that the government's determination to regulate
immigration through criminal law enforcement will impact the way in which
criminal law administration itself functions, distracting efforts from a focus on
other priorities towards immigration regulation. When criminal law acts as an
immigration screen, it does not identify independently criminal wrongdoers but
reshapes criminal law administration into, in part, an immigration regulatory
regime. Suspected noncitizens become more likely targets of criminal law enforcement even when those noncitizens, all things considered, are not otherwise a
pressing crime control concern.
2. Unnecessary Prosecutions
Insofar as criminal-immigration enforcement is directed towards criminally
prosecuting undocumented persons for immigration-related offenses, it results in
enormous, unnecessary financial burdens to the impacted enforcement and punishment apparatuses. These costs are unnecessary because much of the targeted
population is already deportable absent the criminalization of their infractions. 242
Undocumented persons are in most cases subject to removal from the United
States whether or not they have committed any crime, such as illegal entry, reentry,
or another offense. 243
The justifications for these criminal-immigration prosecutions reference their
deterrent potential or their retributive function? 44 But to serve as a meaningful and
widespread deterrent, the sentence must be sufficiently harsh as to dissuade
persons committed to crossing the border from coming; the many persons willing
to risk serious injury or death to cross the border unlawfully are unlikely to be
dissuaded by the more remote possibility of a jail or prison sentence?45 Moreover,
harsh sentences carry a heavy cost which diverts resources from other criminal
enforcement priorities-a particularly questionable policy choice when the objective of removal may be accomplished without criminal prosecution or sentencing.
Harsh sentences also raise concerns from a retributive standpoint about proportionality, given that the offense at issue is one that involves no evident victim, and for
which there may be powerful excusing factors, such as flight from extreme poverty
or pervasive violence. 246

241. "Profiling'' is defined in the study as "racially disparate exercise of police discretion in the decision to
stop, investigate and arrest." !d.
242. See Chac6n, Unsecured Borders, supra note 65, at 1883-84.
243. !d.
244. See id. at 1885.
245. See id. at 1886.
246. See Doug Keller, Why the Prior Conviction Sentencing Enhancements in Illegal Re-entry Cases Are
Unjust and Unjustified (And Unreasonable Too), 51 B.C. L. REv. 719, 764--65 (2010) (discussing sentencing
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In any case, the cost of deterrent (or even properly retributive) sentencing must
be balanced against the diversion of resources from other prosecutorial or federal
spending priorities. 247 Allocating resources to immigration offenses leaves fewer
resources available for other criminal law enforcement and non-law enforcement
activities. Indeed, coincident with the dramatic increase in federal prosecutions of
illegal entry and reentry to the United States, federal prosecutions of public
corruption, gun trafficking, and white collar crime declined. 248 The case for the
United States' large-scale criminal-immigration prosecution program is weak,
both from a retributive standpoint where proportionality is absent, and in virtue of
its relative deterrence benefit as compared to the considerable associated costs.Z49
While further analysis of these important matters is beyond the scope of this
Article, the purpose of briefly noting the competing concerns is to underscore the
impairment of other domains of criminal law enforcement produced by the U.S.
criminal-immigration convergence.
3. Diverting Resources to Minor Crimes

The U.S. criminal-immigration convergence is further ill-advised because it
exacerbates preexisting tendencies toward diverting public resources to minor
victimless crimes. The extensive use of criminal law administration in the United
States as a means of maintaining social order across numerous domains of social
life leads to widespread contact with criminal law enforcement, often for relatively
insignificant violations of criminal law. This is especially true for those persons
with less in the way of material resources, who necessarily live out more of their
lives in public places routinely subject to criminal surveillance-on public buses
rather than in cars, at bars or parks rather than at gatherings in private homes or
college dormitories. But across all socio-economic classes, contact with law
enforcement relating to minor public order or drug infractions is not uncommon.
The Supreme Court implicitly recognized this wide-reaching scope of criminal law
enforcement in its opinion in Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, holding that a second
simple possession drug offense is not an "aggravated felony" for immigration
purposes. 250 Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, noted: "Like so many in this
country, Carachuri-Rosendo has gotten into some trouble with our drug laws." 251

enhancements and explaining how Ihey punish people too harshly for "doing no more than entering the United
States without permission after having been deported").
247. See id. at 742 n.!37 (2010) (estimating the cost incurred for incarcerating only those immigrants
convicted of illegal reentry in 2008 to be $637,162,082.50).
248. See Solomon Moore, Study Shows Sharp Rise in Latino Federal Convicts, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2009, at
A 14, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/19/us/ 19immig.html.
249. There are also important procedural costs associated with criminal-immigration prosecutions. See
Chacon, A Diversion?, supra note 5, at 1622 (citing United States v. Rob1ero-Solis, 588 F.3d 692, 700 (9th Cir.
2009)).
250. 130 S. Ct. 2577 (2010).
251. Carachuri-Rosendo, 130 S. Ct. at 2583.
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The available evidence on the criminal bases of deportations reflects this
phenomenon of wide-reaching criminalization of minor offenses: from 1997 to
2007, seventy-two percent of those removed from the United States on criminal
grounds faced immigration consequences as a result of nonviolent offenses. 252 The
most frequent criminal offense for removed noncitizens for whom offense data is
available was entering the United States illegally-the recorded crime for twentyfour percent of deportees? 53 Of those immigrants who were lawfully present and
faced removal, seventy-seven percent had committed nonviolent crimes. 254 Overall from 1997 to 2007, at least 362,192 people were removed from the United
States as a consequence of a nonviolent offense. 255
Of those individuals who are classified as violent offenders-at most, approximately one quarter of the total population of criminal deportees-many have not
committed serious violent crimes, but far less serious offenses?56 Crimes classified as violent offenses include in many jurisdictions statutory rape, where the age
difference between the older immigrant and the younger person is minimal and the
sexual activity was consensual. 257 A bar brawl or spat, which results in shoving
may end with a criminal plea. 258 In one illustrative case, Mary Ann Gehris,
convicted in Georgia of battery for pulling another woman's hair, received a
one-year suspended sentence?59 This entailed that under governing law, she was
classified as a violent aggravated felon-both deportable and ineligible for reliefeven though the hair-pulling incident, while surely unpleasant for the woman
whose hair was pulled, does not constitute a particularly dangerous violent act. 260
The conclusion to be drawn is that a criminal conviction is not necessarily a
reliable indicator of undesirability or dangerousness, even assuming that criminal
law enforcement officers could be perfectly insulated from the task of immigration
enforcement so that their criminal arrests reflected characteristics unrelated to

252. FORCED APART (BY THE NUMBERS), supra note 8, at 2.
253. See id. at 2-3.
254. See id. at 2. Consistent with ICE and Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") data, the U.S.
Department of State similarly has reported:
[T]he percentage deported [from the U.S.] for violent crimes is actually very low. Of those [with
criminal convictions] deported in 2005, over 50 percent were convicted for drug and immigration
offenses. Of those with drug convictions (37 percent of the total criminal deportees), approximately half were possession charges, not sales ....

Deportees in Latin America & the Caribbean: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the W. Hemisphere of the H.
Comm. on Foreign Affairs, liOth Cong. 17 (2007) (statement of Charles S. Shapiro, Principal Deputy Assistant
Sec'y for W. Hemisphere Affairs).
255. FORCED APART (BY THE NUMBERS), supra note 8, at 33.
256. See id. at 2.
257. See Morawetz, Understanding, supra note 96, at 1957--{)1 (discussing the statutory rape offense and its
deportation consequences).
258. See id. at 1939.
259. Seeid. at 1943.
260. /d.
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immigration concerns-an ultimately unachievable "acoustic separation" of criminal and immigration enforcement in a practically intertwined system. 261 An
immigrant may have actually possessed narcotics, trespassed, shoved someone
during a verbal altercation or pulled their hair, jaywalked, jumped a subway
turnstile, driven without a license, urinated in an alleyway (public indecency and a
sex crime in some states), or shoplifted, and still be a valued contributor to their
community and to society at large.Z62 A person who committed any of the above
noted criminal violations may work hard as a small business person, a landscaper,
or in construction, and be a pillar of their family and community. None of these
acts, even in combination over several separate arrests and convictions, reliably
serves as a proxy for undesirability or dangerousness as a U.S. resident, or
indicates that an individual's positive contributions are outweighed by the conduct
that led to their contact with the criminal law.
4. Diverting Resources to Demographic with Low Crime Rate

A final problem for criminal law administration posed by the U.S. criminalimmigration convergence is suggested by demographic data regarding noncitizens
and their rates of criminal offending relative to citizens. Popular justifications of
criminal-immigration enforcement characterize immigrants, and particularly unauthorized migrants, as especially crime-prone, 263 when in fact, the available
evidence demonstrates that foreign-born individuals are significantly less likely to
break non-immigration related criminal laws than are U.S. citizens. 264 Historically,
the incarceration rate for individuals born in the United States has been higher than
the incarceration rate of foreign-born individuals in the United States. 265 Moreover, Harvard sociologist Robert J. Sampson and his colleagues have revealed that
increases in immigration generally are associated with reduced crime rates.Z 66
Thus, directing criminal law administration toward noncitizens focuses crime

261. See generally Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal
Law, 97 HARV. L. REv. 625 (1984) (explaining the concept of acoustic separation).
262. Noncitizens may be subject to removal based on a "crime of moral turpitude," which was expanded in
1996 to include offenses as minor as subway turnstile jumping. See, e.g., Mojica v. Reno, 970 F. Supp. 130, 137
(E.D.N.Y. 1997).
263. Most Americans accept this view. See RUBEN G. RUMBAUT & WALTER A. EWING, IMMIGRATION POLICY
CTR., THE MYTH OF IMMIGRANT CRIMINALITY AND THE PARADOX OF ASSIMILATION: INCARCERATION RATES AMONG
NATIVE AND FoREIGN-BORN MEN 3 (2007) (finding, as of the year 2000, "about three-fourths (73%) of Americans
believed that immigration is causally related to more crime"); see also Jennifer M. Chacon, Whose Community
Shield?: Examining the Removal of the "Criminal Street Gang Member", 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 317, 318-19
(examining the "flawed but lurid contemporary accounts of the criminality of the immigrant population and the
general presumption of group dangerousness").
264. See, e.g., Kristin F. Butcher & Anne Morrison Piehl, Recent Immigrants: Unexpected Implications for
Crime and Incarceration, 5llNous. & LAB. REL. REv. 654,654-57,677 (1998) (demonstrating that the crime rate
for noncitizens over a ten-year period was lower than for citizens despite noncitizens' lower education levels).
265. See RUMBAliT & EWING, supra note 263, at 6 (finding that the incarceration rate for U.S.-born persons
during the period examined was 3.5%, while the incarceration rate for foreign-born U.S. residents was 0.7%).
266. See, e.g., Sampson, supra note 235.
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control resources on a population that, according to the available evidence, may be
less inclined to commit criminal offenses than U.S.-bom citizens.Z67 Hence, the
diversion of resources to criminally prosecuting undocumented immigrants may
be particularly misguided from a public safety standpoint.
C. Institutional Pathologies

Beyond its limits as a framework for either immigration regulatory decisionmaking or criminal law enforcement, the institutional culture that accompanies
criminal-immigration enforcement undermines attempts to realize alternative
immigration regulatory arrangements. By "institutional culture," I mean the basic
ideas shared by members of an organization that define, often unconsciously, that
organization's view of itself and of its environment. 268 Criminal-immigration
enforcement gives rise to a particular crime-centered institutional culture characterized by an emphasis on danger, solidarity, suspicion, cynicism, authority, and
numerical indicators of completed crime control projects or cases closed? 69 This
institutional culture is a product of the integration of immigration enforcement
with preexisting criminal law enforcement organizations-long understood to
possess the aforementioned characteristics-and of the adoption of a crimecentered agenda within independent immigration enforcement institutions. 270 In
particular, the institutional culture of criminal-immigration enforcement produces
two pathological effects: first, criminal-immigration enforcement institutions themselves perpetuate significant costly and unjustifiable harms; and second, the
crime-centered culture entailed by such enforcement further entrenches those
harms, undermining attempts to implement alternative regulatory arrangements. 271
A criminal law enforcement culture in the immigration context focuses attention
on meeting numerical benchmarks of apprehensions, arrests, and deportations in a
manner that mirrors a criminal law enforcement agenda. 272 ICE policy defines a
regime within which officers are to focus on the bottom line of numbers of
deported criminal aliens.Z 73 Enforcement initiatives center on hitting numerical

267. See RUMBAUT & EWING, supra note 263, at 1; Robert J. Sampson, Rethinking Crime and Immigration, 7
CoNTEXTS 28, 29 (2008), http://contexts.org/articles/files/2008/0l!contexts_winter08_sampson.pdf (demonstrating immigration is associated with lower crime rates and new immigrants are less likely to commit crime than
their U.S.-bom peers).
268. See EDGAR H. SCHEIN, ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE AND LEADERSHIP 32 (4th ed. 2010).
269. See, e.g., ROBERT REINER, THE POLITICS OF THE POLICE 118-23 (4th ed. 2010) (discussing police culture).
270. See id.
271. See id.
272. See Spencer S. Hsu & Andrew Becker, ICE Officials Set Quotas to Deport More Illegal immigrants,
WASH. PosT, Mar. 27, 2010, atA04; William K. Rashbaum, Retired Officers Raise Questions on Crime Data, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 7, 2010, atAl; Amy Taxin,/CE Boss Says He Suspended Use of Arrest Quotas, SEATILE TIMES (Aug.
17, 2009), http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/htmllnationworldl2009679023_apussocalimmigrationenforcement.
html.
273. See Morawetz, Understanding, supra note 96, at 1949-50. But see Taxin, supra note 272 (noting that ICE
head John Morton suspended the use of arrest quotas in 2009).
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targets rather than a more carefully calibrated regime engaged in subtly shaping
incentives and migration flows.
Also notable is the reliance on detention in the immigration context within
institutions that closely resemble (and often coexist alongside) sites of criminal
incarceration?74 As a report by ICE's Office of Detention Policy and Planning
explains, immigration and criminal detention "are typically managed in similar
ways," with both criminals and immigrants "detained in secure facilities with
hardened perimeters in remote locations at considerable distances from counsel
and/or their communities." 275 The report continues: "design, construction, staffing
plans, and population management strategies are based largely upon the principles
of command and control." 276 Consequently, immigration detention is experienced
by both detainees and employees as punitive. 277 Days in windowless cells, under
constant guard, surrounded by barbed wire, with little opportunity for productive
engagement of any meaningful kind exact a heavy toll on detained immigrants.
Further, the profound discomfort associated with detention convinces many who
might have meritorious claims to forgo those claims in order to avoid prolonged
detention?78 If a purpose of immigration regulation is to enable individuals with
meritorious claims to enter or remain in the country, then immigration detention
serves this purpose poorly. Working within the onerous conditions that obtain in
detention settings also has been shown to negatively impact the social and psychic
well-being of guards?79 Cognizant of these problems, ICE has resolved to create a
more humane and civil detention system, but the entrenched crime-centered
institutional culture of criminal-immigration enforcement has rendered any such
changes difficult to achieve, perhaps even unattainable. 280
Within the organizational theory literature, new organizational strategies-such
as a shift from a criminal to civil regulatory framework-have been shown to be
unachievable if inconsistent with an organization's culture? 81 A crime-centered
institutional culture may operate below the surface, without the express awareness
of members; and, institutional culture is largely determined and controlled by
members of an organization, not primarily by its leaders' pronouncements.
Critically, criminal-immigration enforcement relies in significant part on criminal
law enforcement officers to carry out its work: to apprehend immigrants, to
274. See, e.g., Geoffrey Heeren, Pulling Teeth: The State of Mandatory Immigration Detention, 45 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 601,613 (2010).
275. See DORA SCHRIRO, lMMIGRXI'ION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, lMMIGRXfiON DETENTION: OVERVIEW AND
RECOMMENDATIONS 4 (2009),' http://www.ice.gov/doclib/about/offices/odpp/pdf/ice-detention-rpt.pdf.
276. See id.
277. See Morawetz, Understanding, supra note 96, at 1946-47.
278. /d.
279. See, e.g., PHILIP ZIMBARDO, THE LUCIFER EFFEIT. UNDERSTANDING How GOOD PEOPLE TURN EVIL 187-94
(2007).
280. See Human Rights First Urges Fulfillment of Detention Reform Promises, HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST (2010),
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/20 I 0/1 0/06/human-rights-first -urges-fulfillment -of-detention-reform-promises/.
281. See generally SCHEIN, supra note 268.
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transport them, and to detain them. 282 These officers work in an independent
institutional culture that operates on a crime-centered command and control
framework. 283 Even employees of civil immigration enforcement entities, especially counsel for Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") and agents employed by ICE, have been acculturated within a crime-centered institutional
framework-to act in effect as prosecutors and law enforcement officers. The
particular unwanted features of this institutional framework may prove impervious
to change so long as the entrenched institutional culture remains in place.
ICE's attempts to reduce reliance on detention and to implement a truly civil
detention system provide one telling example of this phenomenon. Despite the
express commitment and explicit instructions of high-ranking ICE and DHS
officials to reduce reliance on detention of vulnerable and non-dangerous immigrants, ICE agents have not complied with these instructions, continuing to
perceive asylum-seekers and other non-threatening populations as a sufficient
security or flight risk to justify detention? 84 When the officers who determine
whether to release a particular immigrant operate on the assumption that noncitizens targeted for enforcement are so targeted because as criminals (who have
violated criminal-immigration provisions) they pose a risk to public safety, then it
is difficult for those officers to see no risk to public safety or of flight in releasing
those immigrants.
Thus, attempts to superimpose a set of civil regulatory expectations on existing
crime-centered institutions runs up against a competing set of institutional mores.
Even if such institutional accommodations were feasible within a regime of
criminal-immigration enforcement, the resulting reduction in the number of
relevant targets-to only those violent and serious offenders with minimal claims
to membership-would leave the regulatory regime with too small a scope to
satisfy enforcement demands or its existing levels of funding.
D. Considering Objections
The primary objection to the line of argument developed thus far is that
criminal-immigration enforcement could be transformed in order to accommodate
these concerns. If criminal law contact alone is a poor proxy for un-belonging or
dangerousness, the proxy regime could focus more narrowly on serious violent
offenders. If immigration detention is costly, then the government could rely more
on alternatives to detention: electronic monitoring, for example. If there are
compelling equities that outweigh the crimes attributed to certain immigrants,
procedures could be established to weigh those equities against the offending

282. See WASLIN, supra note 114.
283. See, e.g., REINER, supra note 269.
284. See DETENTION WATCH NETWORK, YEAR ONE REPORT CARD: HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE 0BAMAADMINISTRATION'S IMMIGRATION DETENTION REFORMS 9-15 (2010), http:/lwww.detentionwatchnetwork.org/sites/detention
watchnetwork.org/files/ICE%20report%20card%20FULL%20FINAL%202010%2010%2006.pdf.
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conduct for the entire class of immigrants and not only the currently limited
number of persons eligible for relief. If officers tasked with using criminal law
contact as a proxy immigration enforcement regime make arrests that are driven
more by concern with immigration than with stopping dangerous crime, then
officers could be trained to do otherwise.
Each of these institutional accommodations requires a separate response, but the
one point common to all such accommodations is that when immigration regulation happens through or in reference to criminal law administration-when
suspected immigration law violators are conftated with criminal law violators, a set
of deeply rooted assumptions and practices are set in motion. Immigration
regulation literally happens through and within criminal administrative institutions. It is then quite difficult to seek to impose a distinct and separate civil
regulatory culture within an existing institutional culture tasked simultaneously
with carrying out criminal law enforcement work.
Let us consider each alternative in tum. First, criminal-immigration enforcement could focus only on violent offenders whose crimes are so serious as to
negate any of the aforementioned concerns regarding functional membership and
triviality of offense: murderers, child molesters, rapists, armed robbers, or white
collar offenders guilty of massively defrauding investors. But there are few
immigrant offenders in any of these categories in any given year. 285 Well under one
percent of criminal removals have involved intentional homicide of any kind. 286
While the removal of noncitizen murderers or rapists may in most instances be
unobjectionable, at least where there is no long period of U.S. residence such that
the United States bears some responsibility for the conduct in question, such cases
are few and far between. Although the government may justify isolated criminal
removals in terms of these sorts of serious violent crimes committed by noncitizens, there is an insufficient number of such offenses for a limited approach along
these lines to serve as a meaningful enforcement model, so long as some
substantial level of deportations is maintained as a priority. In other words, this
accommodation would fundamentally change the structure of U.S. immigration
enforcement. It is not an available limited modification to the existing U.S.
criminal-immigration enforcement system.
With regard to other conceivable institutional accommodations, there are further
reasons for doubt that these accommodations would fundamentally correct the
harms associated with criminal-immigration enforcement. As regards immigration
detention, efforts of high-level management within ICE to reduce reliance on
immigration incarceration under the Obama Administration have proven less than
fruitful, in part, because of how entrenched norms in favor of detention are within

285. FORCED APART (BY THE NUMBERS), supra note 8, at 3.
286. /d.
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the current crime-centered institutional culture? 87 Explicit instructions from
Washington, D.C. to no longer detain asylum-seekers other than in exceptional
cases posing a public safety risk, for example, have gone unheeded in many
cases. 288 The presumption of immigrant criminality and the crime-centered culture
within ICE have proven resistant to such change absent a shift in the institutional
culture. Relevant, too, are the deeply vested interests in maintaining immigration
detention-thousands of jobs are provided by immigration prison facilities, and
powerful companies, the Corrections Corporation of America among them, draw
much of their revenues from detaining immigrants?89 Tinkering around the edges
of criminal-immigration enforcement and seeking to change its reliance on
detention, while leaving the broader enforcement approach intact rather than
abandoning it, will likely lead to vehement resistance from the beneficiaries of the
current system. An alternative regulatory model would permit the entry of new
institutional players, less wed to the old ways of doing business, and hence more
open to institutional change.
As far as instituting appropriate procedural mechanisms to take adequate
account of relevant equities is concerned: although this would be a great improvement over the status quo, any such reliable regime would be enormously resourceintensive, grinding the wheels of the immigration administrative apparatus to a
halt. With hundreds of thousands of removals and administrative immigration
determinations on criminal grounds each year, a large staff would be required to
sort through all the various equity claims of immigrants potentially subject to
criminal removal who are now deprived of such hearings due to fast-track
processing of various kinds. Counsel would be required to assist in assembling
corroborating documentation to verify claimed equities and analyze applicable
law. This accommodation would thus undermine any efficiency rationale for the
reliance on criminal-immigration screening. In light of the extensive cost and
further entrenchment of existing criminal-immigration enforcement arrangements
entailed by such a robust procedurally protective apparatus, a matter revisited infra
in Part V, a preferable outcome would be to begin to undo the U.S. criminalimmigration convergence and to embrace other ways of imagining (and managing)
migration. 290

287. The Morton Memorandum discourages the use of detention in a range of cases, and suggests detention is
appropriate primarily only for criminal aliens and "recent entrants." See Morton Memorandum, supra note 14, at
1-4. Unless they are subject to mandatory detention (as are most noncitizens convicted of crimes) and barring
"extraordinary circumstances," ICE officers are not to "expend detention resources on aliens who are known to be
suffering from serious physical or mental illness, or who are disabled, elderly, pregnant, or nursing, or
demonstrate that they are primary caretakers of children or an infirm person, or whose detention is otherwise not
in the public interest." See id.; see also DETENTION WATCH NETWORK, supra note 284, at 9, 15.
288. See generally Morton Memorandum, supra note 14.
289. See MARK Dow, AMERICAN GULAG: INSIDE U.S. IMMIGRATION PRiSONS 90,97 (2004).
290. See infra Part IV.
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Finally, it would be a profound challenge indeed to train criminal law enforcement personnel to serve as immigration screeners (their de facto role so long as
criminal law contact functions as a proxy immigration regulatory mechanism), but
not to attend to immigration concerns in carrying out their criminal law enforcement work. A further challenge is presented in that those persons inclined to
support cross-deputization of criminal law enforcement officers as immigration
law enforcers, and hence those officers inclined to aggressively carry out this
work, may well be motivated by bias against immigrants?91 This compounds the
difficulty of preventing criminal law enforcement officers from targeting immigrants on immigration rather than criminal grounds while carrying out criminalimmigration enforcement work.

****
For all these reasons, the U.S. criminal-immigration convergence has far less to
recommend it than its wide reach would suggest. The following Part will explore
why, given these profound shortcomings, immigration enforcement nonetheless
relies so heavily on criminal law administration as a proxy enforcement regime.
IV. PERSISTENCE OF THE

U.S.

CRIMINAL-IMMIGRATION CONVERGENCE

Although a range of complex causal influences contributed to the emergence of
the U.S. criminal-immigration convergence, one factor accounting for its persistence-little examined in the existing literature, and critical to understanding its
powerful sway-is its negotiation of a pervasive and profound cognitive dissonance in the United States regarding immigration and immigrants.Z92 This cognitive dissonance is addressed, however imperfectly, through reference to a conceptual framework that draws upon a stock crime-narrative formula, developed
originally, as explored supra in Part I, in crime fiction and related imaginative
literature. 293 In this regard, the U.S. criminal-immigration convergence reflects a
broader trend in U.S. public discourse of brokering political compromise and
envisioning regulatory solutions by using a formulaic stock crime-narrative
framework as a manner of conceptualizing complex social concerns. 294

291. See PHILLIP AflBA GOFF Ef AL., DEPUTIZING DISCRIMINATION? CAUSES & EFFECfS OF CROSS-DEPUTIZATION
PoLICY IN SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH (20 l 0), http://www.citizensfortaxfaimess.org/pdfllmmigration%20-%20Burbank
%20Study%205-27-1 O.pdf.
292. See Kevin R. Johnson, Race, the Immigration Laws, and Domestic Race Relations: A "Magic Mirror"
into the Heart of Darkness, 731No. L.J. Jill, 1154-57 (1998) [hereinafter Johnson, "Magic Mirror"] (discussing
the potential applicability of a range of social psychological theories, including cognitive dissonance theory, to the
connections between subordination of domestic racial minorities and discrimination against noncitizens).
293. See supra Part I.
294. See James Forman, Jr., Exporting Harshness: How the War on Crime Helped Make the War on Terror
Possible, 33 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 331, 346 (2009) ("As a nation, when faced with new or pressing
social challenges, we increasingly tum to criminal prosecution and incarceration."); Allegra M. McLeod,
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This Part will first briefly introduce the concept of cognitive dissonance and will
then consider two forms of pervasive cognitive dissonance in the United States
regarding immigration and immigrants. Subsequently, I examine how a stock
crime-narrative framework as applied to immigration enforcement serves to
manage this dissonance, even as it mishandles the complex social concerns at stake
in the immigration context.
A. Immigration Cognitive Dissonance

1. Cognitive Dissonance Theory
Social psychologist Leon Festinger introduced the concept of cognitive dissonance in his groundbreaking account of how human beings respond to the
experience of cognitive inconsistency.Z95 In A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance,
Festinger examined how contradictions between an individual's beliefs produce an
uncomfortable psychological pressure. 296 If the magnitude of the discomfort-a
sensation Festinger termed "dissonance"-is substantial, it motivates most people
to seek to alleviate the tension. 297 Fe stinger explained: "as soon as dissonance
occurs there will be pressures to reduce it" 298 proportionate to the "magnitude of
dissonance. " 299
Of course, some measure of cognitive dissonance occurs routinely and in a wide
variety of situations?00 On Festinger's account, elements of cognition, effectively
ideas or bundles of ideas, occur largely in response to one's experience of reality;
as the world is rife with contradictions, so too is human experience rife with
dissonance. 301 In specific instances, dissonance may arise in relation to newly
acquired information, or in response to social relations, or as a result of purely
individual-level processes? 02 Sometimes dissonance may be fleeting or persistent
but not disturbing (such as where it concerns not particularly fundamental
matters); in other instances, individuals experience major persistent dissonance,
and their inconsistent cognitions cannot comfortably persist. 303

Exporting U.S. Criminal Justice, 29 YALE L. & PoL'Y REv. 83, 84-85 (2010) (examining the application of U.S.
criminal law frameworks to various global social concerns).
295. FESTINGER, supra note 21.
296. See generally id.
297. See id. at 15 (explaining that "the relation between the two elements is dissonant if, disregarding the
others, the one does not, or would not be expected to, follow from the other").
298. See id. at 5.
299. See id. at 17.
300. See id.
30 I. See id. at I0.
302. See David C. Matz & Wendy Wood, Cognitive Dissonance in Groups: The Consequences of Disagreement, 88 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PsYCHOL. 22, 22 (2005), http://dornsife.usc.edu/wendywoodlresearch/documents/
Matz. Wood.2005 .pdf.
303. FESTINGER, supra note 21, at 16.
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Festinger has proposed three ways in which major dissonance may be accommodated: First, dissonance may be relieved by changing one's behavior (if dissonance
arose due to tension between a behavioral cognitive element and another cognitive
element)?04 Second, it is possible to relieve dissonance by changing one's
environment (if it is indeed possible to change the relevant situation)?05 Third,
dissonance may be reduced by "adding new cognitive elements" that serve to
reconcile the dissonant elements. 306 Adding new cognitive elements entails embracing new beliefs or conceptual frameworks that minimize the intensity of the
inconsistency between preexisting cognitive elements?07
This third approach is especially common when dissonant beliefs are culturally
ingrained or are otherwise resistant to change through behavioral or environmental
modifications. 308 Under such conditions, it will be far easier to rationalize the
inconsistency within a new cognitive framework than to transform the resistant
cognitive elements. 309 This is not to say that the new cognitive elements are
necessarily false or disingenuous, only that their embrace is motivated (at least in
part) by dissonance? 10
There is ample empirical support developed over several decades for the general
pattern described by Festinger's framework: where two or more cognitive elements exist in fundamental tension, and that tension is substantial, psychological
pressure will arise to reconcile the relevant contradiction?'' If behavioral or
environmental modifications are not possible, in most instances those experiencing
dissonance will adopt new cognitive elements, effectively a new cognitive framework, which functions to minimize dissonance. 312
2. Two Forms of Immigration Cognitive Dissonance

Immigration law scholars have long noted a uniquely American ambivalence
about immigration, but the precise contours of this ambivalence, its generative

304. See id. at 19.
305. See id. at 19-20.
306. See id. at 21.
307. /d. at 21-24.
308. See id. at 23.
309. People may attempt to reduce dissonance and fail. When this occurs, "one should be able to observe
symptoms of psychological discomfort, provided the dissonance is appreciable enough ...." See id. at 24.
310. See John T. Jost et a!., Political Conservatism as Motivated Social Cognition, 129 PsYCHOL. BULL. 339,
369 (2003) ("To say that ideological belief systems have a strong motivational basis is not to say that they are
unprincipled, unwarranted, or unresponsive to reason or evidence.").
311. See generally LEON FESTINGER ET AL., WHEN PROPHECY FAILS: A SOCIAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY OF A
MODERN GROUP THAT PREDICTED THE END OF THE WORLD (1956) (describing the first case study of cognitive
dissonance, which was conducted by infiltrating a cult that believed the world was about to end); Vincent van
Veen eta!., Neural Activity Predicts Attitude Change in Cognitive Dissonance, 12 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 1469
(2009).
312. See JOEL COOPER, COGNITIVE DISSONANCE: FIFTY YEARS OF ACLASSIC THEORY (2007).
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effects, and associated microprocesses remain underexplored? 13 Cognitive dissonance theory usefully illuminates this ambivalence-which occurs in relation to
both economic and racial concerns-clarifying its particular contours and associated motivational effects. 314
Economic Dissonance: The United States, a "Nation of Immigrants," 315 is
economically reliant on immigrants' labor and social contributions. 316 Yet, U.S.
citizens also jealously guard the economic and other privileges assumed to be
associated with restrictive immigration enforcement. 317 The common refrain of
complaints about immigration includes a fear on the part of citizens of losing jobs
to noncitizens, and of social services overwhelmed by excessive numbers of
immigrants? 18 This tension between restrictiveness and permissiveness regarding
immigration is embodied in what Cox and Posner incisively call the U.S. "illegal
immigration system," 319 as well as in the periodic amnesties extended to unauthorized immigrants in federal legislation. 320
By the end of the twentieth century, approximately one million unauthorized
immigrants were estimated to be entering the United States per year-almost the

313. Peter H. Schuck, The Emerging Political Consensus on Immigration Law, 5 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. I, I (1991)
[hereinafter Schuck, Political Consensus] ("Americans feel a special skittishness and ambivalence about
[immigration]. Our self-contradictions abound."); see Linda S. Bosniak, Exclusion and Membership: The Dual
Identity of the Undocumented Worker Under United States Law, 1988 Wis. L. REV. 955, 956 ("Undocumented
immigrants ... have long occupied a unique, deeply ambivalent place in the United States."); Hiroshi Motomura,
The Rights of Others: Legal Claims and Immigration Outside the Law, 59 DuKE L.J. 1723, 1746 (2010)
[hereinafter Motomura, Rights of Others] (examining deeply rooted national ambivalence regarding unauthorized
migration).
314. See NEWTON, supra note 126, at 67 (analyzing survey data indicating Americans view immigration "as
simultaneously injurious and beneficent").
315. See JOHN F. KENNEDY, A NATION OF IMMIGRANTS (1964).
316. More generally, among the country's most resonant mythologies is that this is a country open to
newcomers, a melting pot of different cultures from across the globe. See, e.g., DANIEL KANSTROOM, DEPORTXIlON
NXIlON: OUTSIDERS IN AMERICAN HISTORY IX (2007) (''The history of the United States is often told as a parable
about the virtues of open immigration for the individual and for the nation. Few, if any, national myths have ever
resonated so strongly and for so long.").
317. See, e.g., SUSAN F. MARTIN, UNAUTHORIZED MIGRATION: US POLICY RESPONSES IN COMPARATIVE
PERSPECfiVE 16 (2007), http:l/isim.georgetown.edulpublications/2007030 I_Unauthorized_Migration.pdf (" Although the public expresses concerns about high levels of irregular migration, there is far greater tolerance of the
specific individuals encountered working illegally-the cleaner, landscaper, nursing aide, for example, who is
providing services to American families.").
318. See, e.g., PETER BRIMELOW, ALIEN NATION: COMMON SENSE ABOUT AMERICA'S IMMIGRATION DISASTER
(1995); SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, WHO ARE WE?: THE CHALLENGES TO AMERICA'S NATIONAL IDENTITY (2004); see
also Cox & Posner, supra note 16, at 809; Nicholas Riccardi, Immigration Hard-Liners on a High, L.A. TIMES,
July 12, 2006, at AI.
319. See generally Cox & Posner, supra note 16, at 809.
320. See IRCA, Pub. L. No. 99-603, § 201, 100 Stat. 3359, 3394-3404 (1986) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.) (extending legal immigration status to a large class of unauthorized immigrants);
see also WENDY BROWN, WALLED STATES, WANING SOVEREIGNTY 7-8 (2010).
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same number as were coming through authorized channels. 321 Even as the
economic downturn led to substantially reduced levels of unauthorized migration,
the U.S. economy still relies fundamentally on these immigrant workers, who
constitute an estimated five percent of the U.S. workforce, and a far greater
percentage in low wage and low education sectors. 322
Still, the widespread perception, even if erroneous (as suggested by more than a
few economists), is that economic security in the United States is dependent upon
restrictive immigration policies? 23 Accordingly, a set of dissonant cognitions and
material conditions exist in the United States relating to the political economy of
immigration. 324
Racial Dissonance: A second source of immigration-related cognitive dissonance involves the tension between norms of color-blindness in the United States
on the one hand, and racial anxiety surrounding immigration on the other. 325
Color-blindness dominates public discourse about race in the United States, even

321. Cox & Posner, supra note 16, at 811 (citing U.S. IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION SERV., ESTIMATES OF
THE UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANT POPULATION REsiDING IN THE UNITED STATES: 1990 TO 2000 (2003), publications/
Ill_Report_l211. pdf).
322. See Motomura, Rights of Others, supra note 313, at 1761 (citing JEFFREYS. PASSEL& D'VERACOHN, PEW
HISPANIC CTR., A PORTRAIT OF UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRATION IN THE UNITED STATES 14-17 (2009)); Cristina M.
Rodriguez, Guest Workers and Integration: Toward a Theory of What Immigrants and Americans Owe One
Another, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 219, 223 (examining the dependence of the U.S. economy on Mexican and other
Latin American immigrants).
323. Schuck, Political Consensus, supra note 313, at 24 ("Immigration also threatens Americans' sense of
control over their economic security."). Much of the economics literature suggests liberalized migration
regulation would produce net economic benefits in poor, middle-wealth, and rich states. Concern about citizens of
rich states, like the United States, losing economically from immigration is predicted (though not clearly
established) by other studies, which suggest unauthorized or substantially increased lawful migration may harm
the economic prospects of certain working and poverty class Americans. It may also economically burden local
communities with large concentrations of migrants requiring public services. See generally GEORGE J. BORJAS,
FRIENDS OR STRANGERS: THE IMPACT OF IMMIGRANTS ON THE U.S. ECONOMY ( 1990); GEORGE J. BORJAS, HEAVEN'S
DOOR: IMMIGRATION POLICY AND THE AMERICAN ECONOMY (1999); Michael J. Trebilcock & Matthew Sudak, The
Political Economy of Emigration and Immigration, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 234 (2006); Economic Focus: Myths and
Migration, ECONOMIST, Apr. 8, 2006, at 76.
324. Prior to the passage of IIRIRA, Representative Dan Lungren summed up the dissonance surrounding
immigration in the United States like this:
The strange thing is, most people are against illegal aliens; most people will tell you to round them
all up and send them home; but those same people will say: "By the way, Congressman Lungren,
can your immigration subcommittee pass a private bill for this person I know ... for the woman
who works in my house ... they don't happen to have papers. Will you do something for them?"
That is not schizophrenia; I think it is a recognization [sic] that most of the illegal aliens ...
have come here to work, and when we know them, we in most cases like them .... But we know
we have to do something overall about illegal immigration.
99 CONG. REc. 29,986 (1986) (statement of Rep. Dan Lungren).
325. See Rev a B. Siegel, From Colorblindness to Antibalkanization: An Emerging Ground of Decision in Race
Equality Cases, 120 YALE L.J. 1278 (2011) (distinguishing concerns in equal protection doctrine about
"balkanization" from concerns regarding colorblindness in terms of a commitment to avoid social divisiveness);
Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REv. 747, 747 (2011) (exploring the prevalence of
"pluralism anxiety" in the United States, an "anxiety about ... group-based identity politics").
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as norms of color-blindness distort the complex realities of the persistent force of
race and racism. 326 Explicit and overt consideration of race is generally strongly
socially proscribed, 327 and a color-blind conception has permeated Supreme Court
doctrine on the Equal Protection Clause. 328 At the same time, anxiety about
immigration in the United States has a profoundly racial character? 29
The suppressed racial anxiety surrounding immigration to the United States has
a long lineage. The historical construction of citizenship through racially exclusionary immigration laws made it such that the category of "alien" is inflected through
and through with racial connotations? 30 As explored in Part I, supra, U.S.
immigration law sought for many decades to exclude non-white irnmigrants. 331
These racially exclusionary immigration laws aimed to realize a deeply held
conviction that national cohesion required a certain sort of homogeneity, envisioned in racial terms. 332 Persons other than those from Northern Europe were
feared ultimately to be "inassimilable" and hence to threaten the coherence of the

326. See generally Ian F. Haney L6pez, Post-Racial Racism: -Racial Stratification and Mass Incarceration in
the Age ofObama, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1023 (2010); see also 0INESH D'SOUZA, THE END OF RACISM: PRINCIPLES FOR
A MULTICULTURAL SOCIETY ( 1995); ANDREW KULL, THE COLOR-BLIND CONSTITUTION ( 1992).
327. See, e.g., Gonzalez-Rivera v. INS, 22 F.3d 1441, 1450-51 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that it was an
"egregious" violation of the Fourth Amendment for an officer to stop a vehicle, solely based on the occupants'
Latino appearance, suspecting they were unlawfully present in the United States).
328. See, e.g., Ian F. Haney L6pez, "A Nation of Minorities": Race, Ethnicity, and Reactionary Colorblindness, 59 STAN. L. REV. 985, 987 (2007); Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving
Forms of Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REv. 1111 (1997).
329. See Neil Gotanda, Asian American Rights and the "Miss Saigon Syndrome", in ASIAN AMERICANS AND
THE SUPREME CouRT 1087, 1096 (Hyung-chan Kim ed., 1992) (examining racially-driven conceptions of U.S.
citizenship).
330. All avenues to citizenship-by birth in the national territory (jus soli), birth to citizens (jus sanguinis), or
naturalization-were originally restricted by race. See THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION:
PROCESS AND POLICY 990-95 (3d ed. 1995); see also Chac6n, Unsecured Borders, supra note 65, at 1829, 1839
("The linkage between perceived alien status and illegal status is ... cemented in the public mind in racialized
terms."); Neil Gotanda, Race, Citizenship, and the Search for Political Community Among "We the People", 76
OR. L. REv. 233,253 (1997) (examining the ways in which "popular understandings of 'foreignness' suggest that
the concept is infused with a racial character"); NGAI, supra note 50, at 63-64 ("The process of defining and
policing the border both encoded and generated racial ideas .... "); Leti Volpp, The Citizen and the Terrorist, 49
UCLA L. REv. 1575, 1595 (2002) ("[R]ace and other markers ... patrol the borders of belonging to political
communities.").
331. See Immigration Act of 1924, ch. 190, § ll(a), 43 Stat. 153, 159 (repealed 1952). These laws were
motivated by an explicit desire to maintain the racial status quo. See STAFF OF H. CoMM. ON IMMIGRATION &
NATURALIZATION, REPORT ON RESTRICTION OF IMMIGRATION, H.R. REP. No. 68-350, pt. 1, at 13-14, 16 (1924)
("[The quota system] is hoped to guarantee, as best we can at this late date, racial homogeneity ...."). Southern
and Eastern Europeans were thought to be racially distinct from Northern Europeans and hence were permitted to
enter the United States only in limited numbers. See, e.g., JOHN HIGMAN, STRANGERS IN THE LAND: PATTERNS IN
AMERICAN NATIVISM 1860-1925, at 156-57 (2d ed. 1992). And once in the United States, many immigrants of
color were subject to persistent violent and discriminatory treatment. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323
U.S. 214 (1944) (declining to intervene to prevent the internment of Japanese persons by the U.S. government
during World War II); ELMER CLARENCE SANDMEYER, THE ANTI-CHINESE MOVEMENT IN CALIFORNIA 48 (2d ed.
1991) (describing mob violence directed against Chinese persons in Los Angeles).
332. See supra Part I.
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United States as a nation-state. 333
In the mid-twentieth century, when it became increasingly embarrassing for the
United States to prohibit the naturalization of Chinese immigrants as China was a
valued ally in the war effort, foreign policy concerns rather than humanitarian ones
began to bring about the dismantling of facially exclusionary immigration provisions. 334 However, the concern with demographic continuity-understood in
racial, ethnic, and often religious terms--continued to characterize U.S. immigration law and policy. It was not until 1965 that Congress abolished the national
origins quota system altogether and prohibited racial considerations from being
applied in awarding visas. 335 Since the 1965 reform, explicit racial categorizations
have been absent from U.S. immigration law, though anxiety about immigration
still registers in coded though profoundly racialized terms. 336
Many anticipated that the post-1965 system of family-based immigration would
maintain a certain level of racial homogeneity. 337 The emphasis on family
unificiation in the 1965 Act was expected to favor immigrants from Northern and
Western Europe, from which there was already a large immigrant population, and
to supply relatively few immigrants from regions with historically low levels of
immigration. 338 But the 1965 Act also implemented an annual cap of 20,000
immigrants from each country, which affected immigrants from developing
countries with large populations seeking to migrate differently than applicants
from other countries. 339 The per-country numerical limits were extended to the
Western Hemisphere in 1976, substantially impacting the ability of Mexicans to
immigrate lawfully to the United States. 340 The result was a growing population of
unauthorized immigrants from countries where significantly greater numbers of

333. See, e.g., SAMUEL HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND THE REMAKING OF WORLD ORDER
304-{)6 (1996) (positing that Western values are threatened by immigrants from other civilizations who reject
assimilation and continue to adhere to and to propagate the values, customs and cultures of their home societies;
that this sort of multiculturalism is a long-term threat to the health of Western civilization; and that "[n]o country
so constituted can long endure as a coherent society").
334. See Act of Dec. 17, 1943, ch. 344,57 Stat. 600 (amended 1946); see also Gabrie!J. Chin, The Civil Rights
Revolution Comes to Immigration Law: A New Look at the Immigration and Nationality Act of I965, 75 N.C. L.
REv. 273, 282-86 (1996) (exploring foreign policy motivations for the repeal of the ban on Chinese immigration);
J. Donald Kinglsey, Immigration and Our Foreign Policy Objectives, 21 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 299, 303...{)6
(1956) (examining U.S. foreign policy concerns relating to the exclusion of Asian immigrants).
335. See Immigration Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236,79 Stat. 911 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of8 U.S.C.).
336. See, e.g., Johnson, "Magic Mirror", supra note 292, at 1115-16.
337. David M. Reimers, An Unintended Reform: The 1965 Immigration Act and Third World Immigration to
the United States, 3 J. AM. ETHNIC HIST. 9, 16 (1983).
338. See, e.g., Cox & Posner, supra note 16, at 853-54.
339. Certain family-based applications were exempted from the numerical limits. See Immigration Act of
1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, § 2, 79 Stat. 911 (codified as amended at INA§ 202(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)).
340. See INA Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-571, § 2, 90 Stat. 2703 (codified as amended at INA
§ 201(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1151(a)).

2012]

THE

U.S.

CRIMINAL-IMMIGRPJJON CoNVERGENCE

163

people wished to immigrate than the annual numerical limits allowed. 341 The
family-based system did not suffice to contain changing racial demographics, and
many new immigrants of color arrived in the United States between the late 1960s
and the 1980s. 342 Because of numerical caps, large numbers of these immigrants
lacked lawful immigration status?43 Again, in popular discourse anxiety about immigration was articulated in (now barely coded) racial terms and ultimately figured
U.S. civilizational decline as a product of insufficient national homogeneity? 44
Contemporary anti-immigration sentiment refers consistently to the threat of
changing racial demographics in the United States as a threat to U.S. national
identity, and even national security. As one example, Peter Brimelow's Alien
Nation, a rallying cry for restrictive immigration reform, seeks to make the case
that one of the primary threats posed by increased immigration is a change in the
proportion of white to non-white Americans-a threat, it proposes, to the fundamental integrity of the U.S. nation-state. 345 In the era of the "War on Terror,"
restrictive criminal-immigration measures are understood to be required as well
due to the terrorist threat imputed to Muslim, Arab, Middle Eastern, and South
Asian men, who are identified as dangerous and unwilling to assimilate, a threat
again conceptualized in racial terms. 346
It is not only white U.S. citizens that support harsh criminal-immigration
measures promoted through invocation of racial anxieties. 347 The endorsement on

341. See Ngai, Response, supra note 50, at 63 (examining how changing racial demographics in the wake of
mid-century immigration reforms were invoked to spur racial anxiety toward unauthorized Latino migrants, and
stating: "that inclusionary impulse has since given way to exclusionary nativism, in which anxiety over migrant
illegality has been arguably a proxy for racism against Latinos").
342. See Reimers, supra note 336, at 10, 20.
343. Id. at 22.
344. See, e.g., BRIMELOW, supra note 318, at 7-9; RICHARD D. LAMM & GARY IMHOFF, THE IMMIGRATION TIME
BOMB: THE FRAGMENTING OF AMERICA 76-98 (1985) (discussing perceived threat posed by non-Anglo Saxon
immigrants and their presumed failure to assimilate).
345. See BRIMELOW, supra note 318.
346. See Muneer I. Ahmad, A Rage Shared by Law: Post-September I I Racial Violence as Crimes of Passion,
92 CALIF. L. REv. 1259, 1262 (2004); Miller, supra note 4, at 615; Volpp, supra note 329, at 1576, 1576 n.2
(examining the racialization of persons who appear "Middle Eastern, Arab, or Muslim" and the disidentification
of these persons as citizens).
347. For instance, California's Proposition 187 was promoted in strongly racially coded terms, invoking
threats to social cohesion and security posed by unauthorized (primarily) Latino immigrants in terms of a
propensity toward criminality. See generally Kevin R. Johnson, An Essay on Immigration Politics, Popular
Democracy, and California's Proposition 187: The Political Relevance and Legal Irrelevance of Race, 70 WASH.
L. REv. 629 ( 1995). The proposition sought to cross-deputize state criminal law enforcement officers to report
immigration law violators and to exclude unauthorized immigrants from accessing public health or education
services. See id. Cultivating fear about the criminality of unauthorized immigrants in racially charged terms, a
prominent Proposition 187 advocate claimed:
You get illegal alien children, Third World children, out of our schools, and you will reduce the
violence. That is a fact .... You're not dealing with a lot of shiny face, little kiddies .... You're
dealing with Third World cultures who come in, they shoot, they beat, they stab and they spread
their drugs around in our school system.
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the part of certain racially subordinated groups of policies that would appear to
disadvantage members of those groups is consistent with cognitive dissonance and
related theories in that members of subordinated groups experience heightened
pressures to reduce dissonance as they are more directly implicated in the
dissonant cognitions and associated social contexts?48
So, alongside a pervasive economic dissonance that characterizes conceptions
of immigration to the United States, a deep-seated racial dissonance suffuses U.S.
immigration policy. The following Section examines the role of a stock crimenarrative framework in negotiating both racial and economic dissonance concerning immigration.
B. Dissonance Deferred

A stock crime-narrative framework has increasingly been applied to the immigration context wherein criminal aliens are understood to threaten the security and
well-being of U.S. society-a society in fact constituted by immigrant populationsand the identification of these criminal individuals has become the top priority for
immigration enforcement. 349 The challenge of immigration regulation within a
crime-centered framework is to screen out and remove criminal aliens so as to
enable the appropriate form of immigration. 350 This framework appeals-and even
enables a certain relief or pleasure-as it negotiates the economic and racial
dissonance that abounds in the United States in regard to immigration. 351

See id. at 657 (quoting Barbara Coe, a drafter of Proposition 187). Yet, despite this heavily racially inflected
rhetoric, Proposition 187 was supported by substantial numbers of African Americans and Asians, as well as
significant numbers of Hispanic voters. See Heading North: After Prop. 187, ECONOMIST, Nov. 19, 1994, at 64.
Approximately fifty-seven percent of Asian American voters, fifty-six percent of African American voters, and
thirty-one percent of Hispanic voters expressed support for the initiative. See id.
348. For example, system justification theory stresses that in some instances, members of disadvantaged
groups are equally, if not more likely than members of advantaged groups to support a status quo that exacerbates
the disadvantaged group's subordinated position. See Jost, supra note 310, at 350 ("If there is indeed a motivation
to justify the system to reduce ideological dissonance ... then it may be that those who suffer the most because of
the system are also those who would have the most to explain, justify, and rationalize."); see also John T. Jost et
al., Social Inequality and the Reduction of Ideological Dissonance on Behalf of the System: Evidence of Enhanced
System Justification Among the Disadvantaged, 33 EuR. J. Soc. PsYCHOL. 13 (2003). This tendency to rationalize
the status quo among members of subordinated groups is by no means universal. In protests in 2006 surrounding
harsh proposed immigration legislation, for example, immigrants resisted the characterization of immigrant status
as coextensive with criminality, taking to the streets by the thousands chanting "We are not criminals." See
Protests Go On in Several Cities as Panel Acts, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2006, at A 12.
349. See Bill Ong Hing, The Immigrant as Criminal: Punishing Dreamers, 9 HAsriNGS WoMEN's L.J. 79, 80 (1998).
350. See Daniel Kanstroom, Post-Deportation Human Rights Law: Aspiration, Oxymoron, or Necessity?, 3
STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 195, 197-98 (2007) [hereinafter Kanstroom, Post-Deportation] ("Visitors to ICE's website
are treated to a spectacular and revealing rogue's gallery. One after another, the faces and tattooed bodies of
swarthy, evil-doers appear as symbols of success stories for the invigorated removal system. They are almost all
people of color, mostly Latino men (though one Serbian war criminal and a coupe of women made the cut). The
screaming headlines read like those of 1950s 'true crime' magazines ....").
351. See generally Auden, supra note \23.
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This crime-centered account isolates responsibility for what might be construed
otherwise as a complex global problem-regulating migration flows and integrating immigrant populations-to a limited class of deviant individuals, criminal
aliens. This conceptual framework, pervasive in U.S. immigration policy discourse, has served as a driver in the legislative history recounted in the preceding
pages, where political consensus is sought through a quid pro quo, increasing
harshness toward criminal aliens traded against liberalization of other areas of
immigration regulation. The conceptual model is resonant in the immigration
context as well as elsewhere because it coheres with a stock naturalized crime
narrative. Ultimately, this approach alleviates collective responsibility for (and
offers collective release from) understanding and responding to the complex
factors that drive migration flows from poorer countries to richer ones, instead
demonizing "illegals" as lawbreakers or criminal aliens guilty of "illegal entry" or
"illegal reentry." 352
There is routinely a slippage between the identification of "criminal aliens" as a
class of criminally involved persons to be removed, and "illegals," or undocumented or unauthorized immigrants. Although the two categories overlap only in
part-the category of "criminal aliens" includes thousands of lawful immigrants,
and only a small minority of unauthorized immigrants come into contact with
criminal law enforcement-in popular discourse, the two categories are often
conflated. 353
U.S. Secretary of Homeland Security, Janet Napolitano, in an address on the
Obama Administration's immigration enforcement program, explained the U.S.
immigration predicament in terms that reflect precisely this approach to relieving
immigration dissonance. 354 For this reason, Napolitano's address is worth quoting
at length:
We all know the story: A steady influx of undocumented workers, crossing our
borders illegally in search of work and a better life. A market among employers
willing to flout the law in order to hire cheap labor. And as a result, some 12
million people, here illegally, living in the shadows-a source of pain and
conflict. It is wrong. It's an affront to every law-abiding citizen and every

352. See Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, Alien Language: Immigration Metaphors and the Jurisprudence of
Otherness, 79 FORDHAM L. REv. 1545, 1547-48 (2011) ("In attempting to comprehend new ideas, people borrow
from familiar concepts. The metaphors floating in our minds ... affect social discourse and ultimately social
action. Thus, how we think metaphorically affects how we talk about problems and the solutions we formulate in
response to those problems. This becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy: the more we repeat, circulate, and repackage
certain metaphors, the more our conceptual domains become tied to a limited set of associations.") (internal
citations omitted).
353. Also significant, as Professor Jennifer M. Chac6n has pointed out, "[t]he number of noncitizens subject to
detention and removal as 'criminal aliens' exploded after 1996 not because a flood of 'criminal aliens' entered the
country, but because the 1996 legal changes converted many lawfully present noncitizens into criminal aliens."
See Chac6n, Unsecured Borders, supra note 65, at 1846.
354. See Janet Napolitano, Remarks on Immigration Reform at the Center for American Progress (Nov. 13,
2009}, http://www.dhs.gov/ynews/speeches/sp_1258123461 050.shtm.
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employer who plays by the rules .... Our system must be strong enough to
prevent illegal entry and to get criminal aliens off our streets and out of the
country. But it must also ... reward the hard work and entrepreneurial spirit
that immigrants have always brought to America .... [Toward this end, DHS
has] revised and standardized our immigration-enforcement agreements with
state and local law enforcement to make sure that these agencies are effective
force multipliers in our efforts to apprehend dangerous criminal aliens. We've
expanded the Secure Communities program ... and ... identified more than
111,000 criminal aliens. 355

The conftation over the course of this well-worn story of criminal aliens and
illegals functions to resolve the tension between harshly enforcing immigration
restrictions against those who, as Napolitano notes, come only "in search of work
and a better life," by emphasizing criminal alien removals, and the danger posed
by this category of persons. 356
Perhaps the most important feature of a crime-centered framing of immigration
regulation is that it posits a now familiar and relatively simple solution, which
whatever its social and economic costs, promises collective security and preservation of the status quo through incarceration and removal from U.S. public life of
those criminal aliens-a readily identifiable and limited group-presumed to be
individually responsible for the myriad problems posed by and reflected in the
limitations of the U.S. immigration regulatory regime. 357 This account discharges
any shared historical or contemporary responsibility that may exist for the
conditions under which significant numbers of indigent migrants come to the
United States without authorization seeking work in legal labor markets and
support for their families left behind. 358 This conceptual framework also characterizes "criminal aliens" in such a way as to disclaim any collective introspection as
to why a subset of indigent immigrants, as well as U.S. citizens, find themselves in
large numbers under criminal supervision, or why such persons tum to alcohol and
drugs, or suffer from mental illness in substantial numbers, resulting in criminal
law contact of the sort the preceding Sections explored.
This crime-centered framework is especially resonant in the context of U.S.
immigration enforcement because it responds to the economic and racial dissonance discussed above. 359 The emphasis of immigration enforcement on criminal
aliens serves to relieve dissonance between a general openness to or at least blatant

355. /d.
356. See id.
357. See Sweeney, supra note 69, at 84 ( "The removal (and subsequent bar to readmission) of noncitizens
convicted of crimes is a very satisfying outcome ... because ... it provides a permanent separation of the
wrongdoer from the community, thereby providing maximum protection to society."); see also Kanstroom,
Post-Deportation, supra note 350, at 203 ("Post-entry social control deportation, like its historical antecedent
banishment, offers an alluring promise: the permanent elimination of 'bad' people from our communities.").
358. See Sweeney, supra note 69, at 84.
359. See supra Part IV.A.2.
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economic reliance upon immigrants, coupled with a jealous safeguarding of the
economic privilege of U.S. citizens, by allowing a comforting fiction to persist:
that channels to immigration may remain open to the good, hardworking immigrants upon whom the U.S. and world economies rely, while excluding only those
who are undeserving, who do not belong, who are invading criminals. The
exclusion of the mass of criminal aliens imperiling good immigration, the hope is,
will permit a ready and easy immigration regulatory solution, one that readily
allows the right sort of immigration to flourish by banishing the wrong sort of
immigrants to some far-away, sealed-off, foreign land.
This interposition of tropes of immigrant criminality to appeal to economically
motivated fears played an important role in the passage of the 1996 immigration
legislation, IIRIRA. 360 Although IIRIRA functioned to limit access of undocumented immigrants to virtually all federal ,public benefits-including loans,
licenses, food aid, housing assistance, and post-secondary education-an important justification for the legislation was found in unsubstantiated concerns about
immigrant criminality?61 Members of Congress offered statements in support of
the economic restrictions that directly referenced the threat of criminal aliens. 362
Representative Orrin Hatch (R-UT), for instance, warned:
We can no longer afford to allow our borders to be just overrun by illegal
aliens .... Frankly, a lot of our criminality in this country today happens to be
coming from criminal, illegal aliens who are ripping our country apart. A lot of
the drugs are coming from these people. 363

Along these lines, criminal-immigration enforcement purports to protect against
criminal wrongdoing while preserving a certain measure of economic reliance on
immigration and immigrants' labor.
As to the second source of cognitive dissonance that the criminal-immigration
convergence serves to relieve-the tension between norms of color-blindness, on
the one hand, and racial anxiety surrounding immigration, on the other--emphasis
on criminal aliens ascribes wrongdoing to largely non-white immigrants, rather
than seeking their exclusion on grounds previously reinforced in national origins
quotas that sought to uphold the status of the United States as a predominantly
white and European-descended nation. In a variant of what Professor Ian F. Haney
Lopez calls "post-racial racism," U.S. immigration enforcement reinforces racial
hierarchies structurally without explicitly targeting individuals on racial grounds. 364

360. IIRIRA, Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C., 110 Stat. 3009,3009-546 (1996).
361. See Chac6n, Unsecured Borders, supra note 65, at1843.
362. See 142 Cong. Rec. 25,362 (1996).
363. Id.
364. See Ian F. Haney L6pez, Post-Racial Racism: Racial Stratification and Mass Incarceration in the Age of
Obama, 98 CALIF. L. REv. 1023, 1069-73 (2010) (arguing for a broad institutional and structural view of racism,
noting that structural racism causes the bulk of racially disparate outcomes, and arguing that the popular
understanding of racism as discrete acts of individual malefactors is "a pinched conception" of racism).
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Young men (and increasingly young women) of color are subject disproportionately to arrest for drug crime and other low-level offenses? 65 The image of the
arrestee in the U.S. popular imagination is of a black or brown body, even as, of
course, criminal law impacts many white persons? 66 The U.S. criminalimmigration convergence thus maintains through its structural organization a
racially coded immigration enforcement approach, though one that is expressly
race neutraL
Interestingly, several hypotheses suggested by this theoretical account of the
connection between racial dissonance and endorsement of criminal-immigration
enforcement have been initially empirically substantiated by an early study of
public support for cross-deputization of police as immigration enforcers. 367 Social
psychologist Philip A. Goff and his colleagues have found that support for
criminal-immigration enforcement (specifically cross-deputization of local criminallaw enforcement officers as immigration agents) is predicted by unconscious
racial prejudice and a perceived threat to individuals' values rather than by a
principled or pragmatic stand regarding immigration. 368
V.

UNDOING THE U.S. CRIMINAL-IMMIGRATION CoNVERGENCE

Given the entrenchment of the U.S. criminal-immigration convergence and the
profound harms it entails, what are the contending approaches that might undo or
limit this convergence? This final Part begins to consider various approaches to
undoing criminal-immigration enforcement and tore-conceptualizing immigration
outside a crime-centered fran:Iework.
A. A Procedural Fix?

Much of the scholarly work critically assessing the U.S. criminal-immigration
convergence proposes importing procedural rights that attach in the criminal
context to the immigration context. A growing number of immigration law
scholars and immigrants' rights advocates have sought to mitigate the excesses of
U.S. criminal-immigration enforcement by advocating enhanced judicially enforced due process protections in immigration proceedings, in particular, rights to:
court-appointed counsel, application of an exclusionary rule, and proportionality
principles. 369 These arguments generally recommend that because U.S. criminal
365. See, e.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF 0BAMA 96-97
(2010).
366. See id. at I02.
367. See GOFF, supra note 291, at 1-2; see also Chief Chris Burbank et al., Policing Immigration: A Job We Do
Not Want, HUFFINGTON PosT (June 7, 2010), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/chief-chris-burbank/policingimmigration-a-jo_b_602439.html (reporting on study indicating support for cross-depulization is predicted by
racial prejudice).
368. See GoFF, supra note 291, at 1-2.
369. See, e.g., Chac6n, A Diversion?, supra note 5, at 1623 ("The application of the exclusionary rule to
removal proceedings is a meritorious proposal to address the procedural problems previously discussed .... ");
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and immigration regulation have become so thoroughly entwined, 370 courts should
"strive to call things what they are" and recognize deportation as punishment, and
deportation proceedings as quasi-criminae 71 Other scholars have proposed that
removal proceedings straddle the criminal-civil divide with certain elements of
immigration proceedings more akin to criminal proceedings and others more akin
to civil proceedings? 72 On this view, rights should be assigned to the two contexts
accordingly. 373 Both approaches locate the critical agents of change as courts or
judges, who are urged to reinterpret the Constitution to extend more robust due
process rights to immigrants in removal proceedings. 374
Before proceeding to consider the potential limits of a procedural rights
revolution in the immigration context, it is worth noting that this is important work
that seeks to address the serious needs of a vulnerable group of people. Scholars
and advocates that have made the case for a procedural rights revolution in
immigration law appropriately insist that the stakes for immigrants facing removal
are high, and that these stakes could be more appropriately recognized as such by
extending meaningful procedural protections? 75 Mitigating any of the harms
confronting noncitizens in removal proceedings, particularly by securing a right to
counsel, would represent a major gain for affected immigrants and for the integrity
and legitimacy of the legal system as a whole.
But insofar as advocacy for expanded procedural rights turns on judicial
recognition of such rights achieved by underscoring the quasi-criminal nature of
immigration enforcement, it carries underappreciated risks, and may entail consequences unintended and undesired by its proponents. In particular, extension of
criminal procedural rights to the immigration context may further entrench the
intertwining of criminal and immigration enforcement. If a procedural rights
revolution in the immigration context is to have the desired effect of mitigating the
harshness of criminal-immigration enforcement, it ought to be accompanied by
efforts to resituate immigration law and policy outside the crime-control frame-

Stella Burch Elias, "Good Reason to Believe": Widespread Constitutional Violations in the Course of Immigration Enforcement and the Case for Revisiting Lopez-Mendoza, 2008 Wis. L. REv. 1109, 1115 (arguing for the
application of the exclusionary rule in immigration proceedings).
370. See Kanstroom, Deportation, supra note 20, at 1935.
371. Seeid.
372. See Peter L. Markowitz, Deportation Is Different, 9 (Cardozo Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 308,
2010).
373. See, e.g., Peter L. Markowitz, Straddling the Civil-Criminal Divide: A Bifurcated Approach to Understanding the Nature of Immigration Removal Proceedings, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 289, 350--51 (2008).
374. See Marc L. Miller, Immigration Law: Assessing New Immigration Enforcement Strategies and the
Crimina/ization of Migration, 51 EMORY L.J. 963, 972 (2002) ("For these observers, hope for reform lies in more
law, more process, and in general greater involvement by courts in supervising critical immigration decisions such
as detention and deportation.").
375. See Markowitz, supra note 372, at 59.
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work explored above. 376 Yet, this project of framing immigration outside a crimecentered paradigm exists in potential tension with an insistence upon the quasicriminal nature of deportation at the heart of much procedural rights advocacy.
A separate yet related critical question immigration law scholars seldom ask is:
What do we actually know about the interaction between procedural norms,
substantive outcomes, and the attention to process values in criminal law?
Attending to this question suggests that a procedural rights revolution in the
immigration context may hold less promise than imagined. As it has in the criminal
law context, an immigration procedural rights revolution may have the unintended
consequence of legitimizing the increasingly harsh substantive immigration law
by offering, in principle, a panoply of robust procedural protections seldom
enjoyed by defendants in practice and against which harsh substantive laws can be
defended. As criminal law scholars have illuminated, this limitation has been
borne out in the aftermath of the revolution in criminal procedure, and there is
reason to suspect a similar pattern would recur in the immigration context. 377
So how well do procedural protections in the criminal law context function to
protect against relevant substantive law or other excesses? Despite the Eighth
Amendment's protection against cruel and unusual punishments, 378 the Supreme
Court has held that a twenty-five-year to life sentence for a nonviolent recidivist
offender who stole three golf clubs passes muster under the Constitution. 379 Not
only are defendants sentenced to decades in prison for relatively minor theft or
drug offenses, but the conditions in U.S. prisons and jails are widely understood to
be abhorrent: more than one in ten inmates face rape while incarcerated, 380 and
beatings and humiliation are routine? 81 The Sixth Amendment right to effective
assistance of counsel in criminal cases frequently means little. 382 As Professor
David Luban has described: "the vast majority of criminal defendants receive no
individualized scrutiny of their cases but instead are processed like carcasses at the
meat-packing plant." 383

376. This argument is distinct from that of Professor Marc L. Miller, who has argued against a primary focus
on due process; instead, he proposes constraining executive discretion and achieving just outcomes through
prosecutorial charging and plea policies. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 374, at 972; Ronald Wright & Marc Miller,
The Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff, 55 STAN. L. REv. 29, 30-32 (2002).
377. See Cox & Posner, supra note 16, at 843-44; see generally Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodriguez, The
President and Immigration Law, 119 YALE L.J. 458 (2009).
378. U.S. CONST. amend VIII.
379. See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. II (2003).
380. See, e.g., Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003, 42 U .S.C. § 15601 (2) (2006) ("[N]early 200,000 inmates
now incarcerated have been or will be the victims of prison rape. The total number of inmates who have been
sexually assaulted in the past 20 years likely exceeds 1,000,000.").
381. See, e.g., ALAN ELSNER, GATES OF INJUSTICE: THE CRISIS IN AMERICA'S PRISONS 2-3 (2004) (detailing a
sheriff's effort to make his prison the toughest through humiliation and intimidation).
382. See David Luban,Are Criminal Defenders Different?, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1729, 1754 (1993).
383. !d.; see Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst Crime but for the
Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835, 1836-37 (1994). Rights are rendered meaningful primarily for those able to
afford robust representation or lucky enough to be assigned a defender with the time and resources to devote to
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Beyond the marked discontinuity between the promises of criminal procedural
protections and the actual state of affairs in U.S. criminal law administration lies a
further structural challenge in remedying substantive overreaching through procedural means. The combination of robust procedural protections and a political
commitment to crime control have been associated not only with pervasive
exceptions to procedural safeguards, but also with an excessive ratcheting up of
the harshness of substantive criminallaw. 384 This one-way ratchet has come to
pass because legislators and the public perceive (even if erroneously) procedural
protections as interfering with the effective regulation of crime? 85 Professor
William J. Stuntz has illuminated that a significant part of this problem lies in
combining judicially implemented procedural regulation with substantive law
deference, because this approach creates misaligned incentives for lawmakers. 386
In the criminal law context, with the constitutionalization of criminal procedure,
the Supreme Court "has regulated policing and trial procedure" 387 and deferred to
legislatures with regard to substantive criminal law. This means that legislators
have been pushed away from a realm-procedure and policing-where the
implementation of moderate policies would have come at a relatively low political
cost. 388 Instead, legislators focus almost exclusively on another domainsubstantive criminal law-where moderation amidst tough-on-crime sentiment
has become more difficult to manage politically. Further, substantive criminal
lawmaking has become a manner of circumventing unpopular procedures, because
more expansive and harsher criminal law gives prosecutors greater power to
negotiate around unpopular procedures by obtaining guilty pleas. 389 As the
Supreme Court constitutionalized criminal procedure, "politicians responded with
a forty-year backlash of overcriminalization and overpunishment." 390 Political
discourse regarding crime has become "too punitive, racially divisive, and insufficiently attentive to the liberty and autonomy interests that constitutional law
allegedly protects." 391
A further structural problem identified by Professor Charles D. Weisselberg, and
suggested by the analysis supra in Part III, relates to the impotence of isolated
procedural fixes, such as the form Miranda warning, to meaningfully improve

their case. See Luban, supra note 382, at 1763 ("[F]or there are in reality two criminal justice systems, two
criminal populations, and two criminal defense bars.").
384. See, e.g., William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 HARV. L. REv. 780,792
(2006).
385. See id. at 792-93.
386. See id. at 782.
387. /d.
388. /d.
389. William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REv. 505,519-20 (2001).
390. Stuntz, supra note 389, at 850.
391. /d.
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fairness in criminal law enforcement absent a shift in institutional culture. 392
Weisselberg has demonstrated how the warning and waiver regime implemented
by the Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona 393 ultimately failed to secure the
voluntariness of criminal suspects' participation in interrogation because it "coheres" with a sophisticated psychological approach to police interrogation, rather
than operating apart from it as the Miranda Court intended." 394 Moreover,
following the prescribed procedure-what Weisselberg concluded ultimately (and
mournfully) is "Miranda's hollow ritual"--diverts attention from whether the
values sought to be achieved by the procedure have actually been protected in an
individual case or in the aggregate? 95
It is not hard to imagine a similar series of developments in the immigration
context: Courts create more robust immigration procedural protections in response
to the valiant efforts of immigrants' rights advocates. But in the face of persistent
application of a crime-centered conceptual framework to immigration regulation,
legislators frustrated over what they perceive to be inadequate enforcement and
interfering procedural protections systematically increase the harshness of substantive law and underfund the legal services intended to safeguard the procedural
protections advocates sought in the first instance. An increasing and increasingly
harsh range of substantive criminal-immigration laws allocate further discretion
and power to the government officers tasked with bringing immigration charges
and litigating removal cases. 396 The result is that those officers are often able to
circumvent procedural protections with the threat of ever-harsher substantive
charges. 397 To the extent that procedural protections such as Miranda warnings are
required to be administered in the immigration context, those warnings operate to
little effect (as Weisselberg has demonstrated in the criminal contexe 98 ) because
the implementing agency does not change its internal culture to embrace the values
the form procedures sought to achieve. The result might well be ever-harsher
substantive criminal-immigration law, further antagonism between courts and the
political branches in the domain of immigration regulation, and a set of procedures
that fails to operate to realize the desired effects.
The point is not that the procedural revolution in the criminal law context is the
primary cause of the harshness of U.S. substantive criminal law and of other forms
of dysfunctionality in U.S. criminal law administration; nor is it that a parallel
rights revolution in immigration proceedings would be the primary cause of
subsequent harsh immigration legislation. Indeed, the current substantive criminal392. Charles D. Weisselberg, Mourning Miranda, 96 CALIF. L. REv. 1519, 1521-22 (2008).
393. 384 u.s. 436 (1966).
394. See Weisselberg, supra note 392, at 1522.
395. See id. at 1523.
396. See Legomsky, supra note 4, at 495.
397. Immigration law scholars have noted the presence of plea-bargaining equivalents in immigration
proceedings. See id.
398. See Weisselberg, supra note 392, at 1523.
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immigration law is extremely broad and pumt1ve, and current constitutional
procedural protections in the immigration context are quite limited. But just as the
rights revolution in criminal procedure failed to turn the tide on the harshness in
substantive criminal law (and indeed co-existed with escalating harshness), so too
might a rights revolution in immigration procedure fall short in reorienting
substantive immigration law, particularly without a shift in the governing crimecentered conceptual and enforcement framework. 399
Stuntz's proposed solution to the pathological institutional dynamics just
described in the criminal law context is to deregulate the criminal process, and
apply greater attention and more stringent rule-of-law principles to substantive
criminallaw. 400 I do not necessarily endorse Stuntz's proposal as a way out of the
current criminal or immigration law morasses. Rather, my intervention here relies
on Stuntz's critical analysis to support a more modest insight: Change to the
fundamental character of criminal-immigration enforcement will ultimately require a change in politics and political discourse, not primarily changes in
judicially enforced procedural rules.
A preferred course, which would avoid the pathologies identified by Stuntz in
the criminal procedure context, would be one that legislatively narrowed the
scope, reduced the harshness, and revised the crime-centered enforcement model
in the immigration domain. Conventional academic wisdom has held that the
politically charged nature of crime renders impossible any legislative change
favorable to criminal suspects or defendants (and perhaps by analogy to those
persons that are the subjects of the U.S. criminal-immigration convergence). 401
But a range of recent developments suggest otherwise: more than a few states have
repealed harsh drug laws and mandatory minimums and sought to restore some
measure of proportion to criminal law administration. 402
B. Centering Development Economics and Human Rights

If the harms of the U.S. criminal-immigration convergence are to be undone,
more critical than a rights revolution in immigration procedure or perhaps in
tandem with it, is a reorientation in the conceptual framework through which
immigration is understood and enforcement is attempted. An alternative conceptual framework is required to manage the cognitive dissonance and attachment to a
crime-centered framework analyzed supra in Part IV, and to respond to the
material contradictions from which that dissonance arises. In other words, undoing
the U.S. criminal-immigration convergence will necessitate another manner of

399. But see Cox & Posner, supra note 16, at 843-44 (arguing that constitutional protections may explain state
of substantive immigration law).
400. See Stuntz, supra note 389, at 579-80.
40 I. See supra Part IV. A.
402. See, e.g., JUDITH GREENE & MARC MAUER, SENTENCING PROJECT, DOWNSCALING PRISONS: LESSONS FROM
FoUR STATES 29-31 (2010) (detailing Michigan's repeal of the its harsh drug laws).
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addressing economic and racial anxieties surrounding immigration-preferably by
confronting the relevant tensions head-on rather than displacing them through the
use of a poorly matched proxy regime. I will preliminarily address each source of
dissonance and possible conceptual reorientations in tum and will further develop
this analysis in future work.
1. Economic Dissonance, Immigration, and Development

A development-focused immigration regulatory model would conceptually
resituate immigration in terms of the complex push and pull factors that drive it.
Rather than evading economic anxieties in the United States regarding immigration through a crime-centered framework, this approach would confront them
directly, addressing those anxieties within the broader political-economic context
in which they exist. This project would be two-fold: first, to examine and attend to
the actual economic threats entailed by reconfigured or reduced immigration
enforcement; and second, to come to terms with the futility and injustice of harsh
enforcement, particularly in light of staggering global economic inequality. 403 The
aim of this conceptual reorientation more broadly would be to make credible an
immigration regime dedicated not to criminal-immigration enforcement, but
focused instead on regulating in-flows and out-flows of migrants by grappling with
the conditions that drive large-scale regionally-concentrated migration-the primary form of immigration that fuels economic anxieties.
Central to such re-conceptualization is the reality that U.S. immigration laws
fail to provide for adequate levels of lawful immigrant labor; they also fail to
respond to the demand to immigrate on the part of those willing to risk death to
come to the United States. 404 At the same time, migration as a development policy
imposes great hardship on individual migrants who must travel great distances and
live under often difficult conditions. 405 Family separation and "brain drain" in
sending states406 are also matters of paramount concem. 407 Using migration as a
development strategy has the further negative effect of discouraging sending state
governments from addressing development needs through means other than
remittances and thus infringes the freedom to stay of those who may wish not to

403. Approximately 1.4 billion people live in extreme poverty, barely subsisting on less than $1.25 per day.
See WORLD BANK, POVERTY 0AJ"A: A SUPPLEMENT TO WORLD DEVELOPMENT iNDICATORS 2008, at I (2008),
http://www.gi vewell.org/files/DWDA %202009nnterventions/World%20Bank. %202008. %20Poverty%20data
%20-%20A%20supplement%20to%20World%20Development%20Indicators%202008.pdf.
404. See, e.g., Kevin R. Johnson, It's the Economy, Stupid: The Hijacking of the Debate over Immigration
Reform by Monsters, Ghosts, and Goblins (or the War on Drugs, War on Terror, Narcoterrorists, Etc.), 13 CHAP. L.
REv. 583,602 (2010) (discussing the demand to immigrate as a result of the absence of economic opportunity).
405. Jennifer Gordon, People Are Not Bananas: How Immigration Differs from Trade, 104 Nw. U. L. REv.
1109, 1143 (2010).
406. I use the term "sending state" to refer to those countries from which immigrants leave. Correspondingly, I
use the term "receiving state" to refer to those countries to which immigrants arrive.
407. See Gordon, supra note 405.
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migrate but are left with little other choice.408 In the United States-as in other
primary receiving states-migration flows may increase the competition for jobs
along with other social costs. 409 Nonetheless, the status quo entails the de facto use
of migration as a development policy with little forethought and little attention to
limiting the economic and other harms associated with this approach. And our de
facto but un-reflective use of migration as a development policy is bad for many
immigrants, as well as for both sending and receiving states. An improved
approach would be to cultivate a better, more informed understanding of how
migration is functioning in relation to development concerns and how it could
function better to address the various interests at stake.
The key challenge, then, is to address economic concerns regarding immigration
in a manner that directly acknowledges those concerns and strives to generate a
win-win reward structure for those in primary sending states, as well as for those in
the United States. The question such a reconceived immigration regulatory
approach would seek to answer generally is: How can migration flows be
organized so as to minimize the associated harms in sending and receiving states,
and achieve fair distribution of any associated gains?410
One proposal along these lines, about which there remains considerable uncertainty and ambivalence, concerns what development economists call "cyclical
fiows." 411 When immigration flows occur cyclically, migrants spend a certain time
abroad, but many ultimately return to their respective cities or villages in their
countries of origin, bringing with them resources and expertise cultivated abroad
to be invested in local development. 412 Receiving states obtain substantial economic benefit from flexible labor (which would pose less threat to citizens were
labor protections enforced) and profit from the diversity contributed by newcomers
from other places.413 With cyclical flows, extended families in receiving states
may remain, prohibiting places of out-migration from becoming "ghost towns,"
and greater accrued wealth brought by cyclical migrants could be put to productive
use. 414 In sum, both sending and receiving states and their citizens may benefit
from cyclical migration, particularly where it is coupled with investments of both
sending and receiving states in infrastructure for health, education, and investment
in sending states. 415 In contrast, the proponents of cyclical migration propose
permanent migration on a large scale can depopulate townships and entire regions
in sending states, and raise more legitimate concerns about employment scarcity in

408. See id.
409. See id. at 1144.
410. See id.
411. Alejandro Portes, Migration and Development: Reconciling Opposite Views, 32
5, 8 (2009).
412. /d.
413. /d.
414. !d.
415. /d.
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primary receiving states. 416 According to development economist Alejandro Portes,
immigration regulation should thus seek to encourage cyclical migration and
discourage large-scale permanent migration, which is not accomplished through
criminal-immigration enforcement-an approach that either discourages migration altogether or incentivizes migrants to remain so as to avoid apprehension upon
reentry, and more generally incentivizes them to mistrust and evade law enforcement.417 For both professional and manual workers, receiving and sending states
could work cooperatively to incentivize cyclical flows, so that return is voluntary
rather than directly coerced. 418 Further research and analysis is required to
determine whether incentivizing cyclical flows would actually function as a
win-win model for migration regulation, but the reconceived orientation of this
model toward addressing underlying concerns regarding labor, migration, distributive justice, and socio-economic development is a step in the right direction.
Another development economist, Jagdish Bhagwati, has put forward a blueprint
for a World Migration Organization ("WMO") on the model of the World Trade
Organization ("WTO"), dedicated to facilitating win-win immigration regulatory
regimes, such as those explored by Alejandro Portes. 419 The WMO would monitor
immigration policies and pressure restrictionist states to move toward increased
openness. 420 The limitation of this approach is that no one has yet managed to
identify how such an institution could structure participation so that participating
states would recognize their respective interests as being served by participating
and abiding by the Organization's edicts.
The specific tactics and strategies to achieve this end of greater and more
humane global immigration policy integration are well beyond the scope of this
Article. But the underlying conceptual framework for immigration regulation and
the bulk of resources on this approach would be devoted to enabling socioeconomic development and improved life chances in primary sending states and
primary receiving states like the United States. Such efforts would focus on
creating incentives to return for immigrants in primary receiving states, and
working to better and more equitably manage the complicated structural factors
that lead individuals to permanently re-settle in certain states in large numbers. On
this model, criminal-immigration enforcement would continue, if at all, only as a
small part of the repertoire of criminal and immigration law responses in egregious

416. See id. at 19.
417. See id.
418. Proposed guest worker programs absent accompanying changes in development-centered immigration
policy are unlikely to reorient U.S. immigration regulation so as to produce cyclical flows. See id. Guest workers
would seek to remain, and, as in previous historical periods, would thereby become undocumented residents. See
id. The same problems that the current restrictive regime entails would be repeated in a guest worker program if
overstays were policed-fear of apprehension would encourage many to remain. See id.
419. See, e.g., JAGDISH BHAGWATI, A STREAM OF WINDOWS: UNSETTLING REFLECTIONS ON TRADE, IMMIGRATION
AND DEMOCRACY 317 ( 1998).
420. See id.
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cases of harm to persons perpetrated by noncitizens.
This approach would seek to address head-on the primary cause of large-scale
immigration: global inequality and political instability. As long as there are vastly
greater opportunities for personal attainment in the United States-and other
primary receiving states-as compared to relatively impoverished sending states,
there will be powerful pressures to immigrate. Improved levels of socio-economic
development will, in the long run-more than any fence, wall, or border patrolsustainably reduce migration ftows. 421
2. Racial Dissonance, Immigration, and Human Rights
A human rights immigration framework, developed by, among others, political
philosopher Joseph Carens serves to disrupt the ease with which immigration
cognitive dissonance is addressed through criminal-immigration enforcement. 422
Carens's account relies on three premises: (1) all human beings are of equal moral
worth; (2) the social order is not naturally given, but requires that legitimate
reasons be given for the maintenance of institutions and practices; and (3) restrictions on freedom must be justified. These three premises fundamentally undermine
current policy on Carens's account for three additional reasons: (1) because they
entail support for freedom of movement only subject to reasonable restrictions;
(2) because freedom of movement is essential for equality of opportunity; and (3) a
commitment to equal moral worth entails some commitment to keeping economic,
social, and political inequalities as low as possible. 423 A moral right to freedom of
movement (as distinct from a legal right) may be subject to limitations, as are
many rights, by the competing rights claims of other entities: namely, sovereign
states and other rights-holders, such as citizens of destination states or sending
states who may fear resource drain or brain drain caused by mass migrations. 424
But the default, on this account, is a right to freedom of movement rather than the
converse. Another account offered by political theorist Jaqueline Stevens proceeds
from the premise that human beings are born into a state of natural freedom subject
to the constraints of mortality. 425 As enslavement unjustly limits the freedom of the
slave by unjustifiable force, so, too, restrictive immigration policies unjustly
421. Of course, as it is not the poorest of the poor who have access to immigration channels, but rather those
with the means to immigrate, short-term development advances may increase levels of immigration from some
currently deeply impoverished locations. But as the cases of Ireland, Italy, and South Korea demonstrate, once
primary sending states offer a certain level of socio-economic opportunity, immigration flows markedly decrease
and many nationals return home. See MARTIN, supra note 318, at 10; see also Bill Ong Hing, NAFTA,
Globalization and Mexican Migrants, 5 GEO. MASON U. J. L., EcoN. & PoL'Y 87, 93 (2009) ("U.S. immigration
policy should not revolve around a business need for workers; it should address the modern-day social, cultural,
political, and economic relations between nations-particularly those in our hemisphere.").
422. See generally CARENS, RIGHT TO STAY, supra note 225; JOSEPH CARENS, OPEN BoRDERS AND THE CLAIMS
OF COMMUNITY (forthcoming) (on file with author).
423. See generally CARENS, RIGHT TO STAY, supra note 225.
424. See id.
425. See generally JACQUELINE STEVENS, STATES WITHOUT NATIONS: ClTIZENSHIP FOR MORTALS (2009).
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constrain free movement of individual humans. 426
The power of these accounts is not in their legal force, though some human
rights litigation has successfully chastened U.S. criminal-immigration enforcement.427 Rather, human rights accounts are most productive in their potential to
morally ground a reconception of immigration regulation, centering concern for
fundamental racial equality and universal human dignity outside a crime-centered
framework. Further, such accounts raise a fundamental challenge to the prevailing
enforcement model by refusing to concede to its terms. Perhaps most importantly,
a human rights framework serves to disrupt the seemingly natural presumptions
that undergird the U.S. criminal-immigration convergence. If immigration is a
human right, then enforcement measures cannot, by definition, be justified in terms
of trespass. If immigration is a human right, then lawful presence is not a privilege
to be revoked at will if a lawful resident criminally offends. If immigration is a
human right, then a compelling claim of right, beyond any efficiency rational or
informational benefit, is required to defeat it. Conceptually resituating immigration in terms of human rights and development is critical to reshaping the
conceptual territory within which immigration enforcement occurs, and to creating
space within which to imagine alternatives that might undo the U.S. criminalimmigration convergence and its associated harms.
CONCLUSION

When closely considered, it becomes apparent that the use of criminal law as an
immigration regulatory proxy is not the easy fix some have imagined for the
profound challenges inherent in immigration regulation. Instead, the U.S. criminalimmigration convergence misguides immigration regulatory decision-making,
drains criminal law enforcement resources, diverts attention from serious crime,
and undermines efforts to introduce preferable immigration regulatory regimes. As
a consequence, sustainable comprehensive immigration reform cannot be realized,
as many appear to anticipate, by treating criminal alien enforcement as the
uncomplicated front for political compromise. Nor does a crime-centered conceptual framework adequately capture the harms and possible remedies for managing
migration flows or the integration of immigrants into U.S. communities. Instead,
immigration regulation should engage the complex factors that drive migration
flows and the varied economic and social interests at stake in the immigration
context. To this end, the U.S. criminal-immigration convergence must be undone-a feat that will require, in addition and perhaps prior to any immigration
procedural rights revolution, a reorientation of the conceptual framework that
shapes U.S. immigration law and politics.
426. See id.
427. See, e.g., Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Submission in Preparation for a Working Meeting (Mar. 26, 2011)
(granting precautionary measures for Haitian nationals in the United States under human rights law because the
Haitians' lives would be at "grave risk" were they deported to Haiti).

